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GLOSSARY OF TERMS  
Allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the efficiency with which companies are 
allocating inputs (resources). A company will be allocatively efficient if no reallocation of inputs 
would produce a greater benefit for its customers or society. 
Corrected ordinary least squares (COLS). Please refer to Ordinary least squares. COLS 
follows the same statistical technique as OLS (i.e. estimating a line of best fit by minimising the 
sum of squared errors), however the ‘average’ line is shifted towards the best performing 
company. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA). A quantitative non­parametric technique that optimises 
the number of inputs required for a particular output and vice versa. It does not require 
assumptions on the functional form, but it also does not allow statistical testing on the 
significance of explanatory variables. 
Degrees of freedom. This term refers to the total number of observations in the sample less 
the number of independent constraints or restrictions (i.e., variables). 
Efficiency change. Efficiency change refers to the ‘catch­up’ component of a company’s 
productivity. The ‘change’ is calculated in relation to comparable ‘frontier’ companies or a 
benchmark (e.g. industry upper quartile efficiency performance). 
Functional analysis. A form of sub­activity analysis focused on cross­cutting activities like 
power costs. 
Menu regulation. Menu regulation is a form of regulation where regulated companies are no 
longer presented with a ‘take it or appeal it’ regulatory offer regarding the allowed level of 
expenditure, but are instead given a range of options from which to choose. 
Non­parametric index numbers. Non­parametric index numbers refers to a method of 
estimating changes in efficiency, technical and productivity over time and across different 
comparators. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS). OLS is a method by which linear regression analysis seeks to 
derive a relationship between company performance and characteristics of the production 
process. This method is used when companies have relatively similar costs. Using available 
information to estimate a line of best fit (by minimising the sum of squared errors) the average 
cost or production function is calculated and companies are benchmarked against this. 
Panel data set. A panel data set refers to a data set containing cross­section observations 
collected for a number of years e.g. 10 companies are surveyed over 10 years. A panel data set 
can be created at any given level of aggregation (e.g. company, sub­company, sub­activity). 
Pooled data specification. A pooled data specification (or approach) refers to an approach to 
modelling panel data that does not take into account any relationships between the observations 
either in a cross­section or over time. 
Productivity change. Productivity change captures the combined changes resulting from: 
technical change; efficiency change, allocative efficiency and economies of scale. 
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Stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). Stochastic frontier analysis is a method of econometric 
modelling which explicitly tries to model ‘noise’ in the data measurement, thereby allowing the 
inefficiency component to be identified separately. 
Sub­activity. Sub­activity refers to a specific activity within an identified vertical segment of a 
WoC or WaSC , for example sewage treatment plants. 
Sub­company. Sub­company refers to a level below a company’s total output at which outputs 
and input costs are identified separately. Sub­company refers to an entire vertical segment within 
a WoC or WaSC, for example water treatment (as defined by Ofwat’s accounting separation 
guidelines). However, when referring to sub­company cost modelling we include sub­activities 
including functional analysis. 
Technical change. Is the ‘innovation’ component of productivity and captures the shift in an 
industry’s efficiency frontier. 
WaSC Water and sewerage company. 
WoC. Water only company. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This report forms part of Ofwat’s “Future Price Limits” project, and examines the extent to 
which Ofwat could make use of panel and sub­activity data in assessing the performance of 
companies. Panel data refers to the use of more than one year’s data in assessing performance, be 
it backward looking historical information and/or forward looking forecasts. Sub­company data is 
more difficult to define since almost all information is to some degree sub­company, if only 
insofar as it relates to water or sewerage. For the purposes of this report, we have interpreted 
two separate aspects which are defined as: 
•	 sub­company refers to the nine vertical segments that Ofwat has used for the purpose of 
defining accounting separation; and 
•	 sub­activity means below the level of the nine vertical segments. 
So data on water resources by zone, sewage treatment by plant or retail costs for a particular 
class of customer are all examples of sub­activity data. Analysis of segmental costs, such as IT or 
property or power costs, provide a different example of sub­activity data. 
Cost modelling is widely used among regulators as a way of determining relative efficiency levels 
and thereby setting efficiency targets for natural monopolies. To date, Ofwat has made use of 
sub­company and sub­activity data, particularly for certain areas of operating expenditure, but 
has not routinely used panel data for comparative analysis. This report therefore examines the 
academic basis for such analyses and the extent to which other economic regulators have used 
these approaches. Ofgem, for example, relied heavily on panel, sub­company and sub­activity 
data in the 2009 price review of the Electricity Distribution Network Operators. Ofgem’s recent 
RIIO review concluded that greater use should be made of forward looking panel data. ORR has 
used an 11 year panel dataset to compare Network Rail with 12 other European rail network 
operators. 
This report also considers the context in which Ofwat will decide whether to use such data. This 
context is provided in part by the Cave Review, which identified several opportunities for 
increased competition in the industry, which will require new information for entrants and 
Ofwat. In isolation, the Cave Review can be expected to lead to greater use of panel, sub­
company and sub­activity data. The Competition Commission has also recommended that 
Ofwat should consider using panel data. In addition, the Gray Report on Ofwat is due to be 
published soon and the indications are that it will recommend that regulation should become less 
intrusive and data intensive than it is at present. Ofwat is also carrying out its own project on 
regulatory compliance, one of the aims of which is to reduce the regulatory burden. There are 
therefore conflicting pressures on Ofwat, which reflect the fact that there are costs as well as 
benefits in adopting more sophisticated modelling approaches. The tests for change are 
therefore that they represent an improvement on the status quo and that the resulting benefits 
outweigh the costs. It has not been practical in this report to quantify costs versus benefits so the 
conclusions reached here rely on a subjective assessment of these issues. 
Our overall conclusion in regard to panel data is that it would be beneficial for setting price 
limits at the next price review, PR14, and beyond. Although at PR14 greater care will be needed 
as the panel will be for only three or four years. Panel approaches are beneficial because they 
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would increase the available observations (data points) used in the models and therefore improve 
the models statistical significance and/or allow more explanatory variables to be included. It 
would also enable trends over time to be measured at company and industry levels. Only limited 
or no additional information should be needed by Ofwat than at present, but their models would 
be able to use multi­year rather than single year data. 
We consider that Ofwat should focus on backward looking data at PR14, but should also 
investigate the feasibility of using forward looking data, with the forward looking data taken 
from companies’ PR14 business plans. There is currently a lack of practical evidence regarding 
the use of forward looking data and we recommend that Ofwat consider Ofgem’s use of this 
data for its ongoing price determinations in gas distribution and energy transmission, RIIO­G1 
and RIIO­T1. We believe that it would be unduly onerous to expect companies to reapportion 
pre­2010 costs across the nine businesses defined for the purposes of accounting separation. 
There will therefore be only a few years of historical data available for analysis at this level in 
PR14, but this should improve over time with regulatory commitment. We do however note that 
provided that appropriate tests for data consistency are carried out, there is the potential to 
employ aggregate company level panel data from before and after the introduction of the 
accounting separation guidelines. 
It is also clear that sub­company data will be important in the future for price setting if greater 
competition is introduced, and segments of companies are excluded from a price cap or if local 
access prices need to be determined. Sub­company approaches have also been used by Ofwat in 
the past. Our overall conclusion in regard to sub­activity data, however, is that its use would be 
unduly onerous for setting price limits, with the exception of those small number of examples 
where Ofwat has needed to use sub­activity data for many years, such as for large sewage 
treatment plants and consequently some data is already being collected. We do, however, see a 
vital role for sub­activity data in facilitating competition. This is because most activities by 
entrants, be it in water abstraction, retail, sludge treatment or whatever, will be at a sub­activity 
level. In order to calculate access prices for an essential facility and to provide transparency of an 
incumbent’s costs in potentially contestable markets, Ofwat will need to examine costs at a sub­
activity and location specific level. 
Any change to Ofwat’s approach to modelling, including adopting the use of panel or sub­
activity, raises concerns around both the consistency of results and the robustness of approach. 
This is in part because any change is likely to be linked to a different definition of costs or set of 
explanatory variables in the model. But it is also in part because there may be concerns about 
the regulatory appropriateness of the modelling. Of course, regulators are limited in what they 
are able to do and consequently must often trade­off the costs of data requests with theoretical 
requirements for modelling. However, these concerns do not mean that modelling should not 
change, rather that robustness checks should be introduced so that corrections for bias in the 
results can be introduced by the regulator. These robustness checks include running models at 
different levels of aggregation and using available statistical tests for bias in the results. If 
Ofwat’s wider review of cost assessment and recovery recommends the continued use of 
economic cost modelling, then we recommend that Ofwat should consider adopting these sorts 
of checks alongside a move to panel data both at PR14 and beyond. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Cambridge Economic Policy Associates (CEPA) in collaboration with Mott MacDonald and Dr. 
David Saal of Aston University have been retained by Ofwat to advise on the possible use of 
panel and sub­company data as part of the suite of performance measurement tools available to 
the regulator. Our team has involved individuals from a range of backgrounds, including 
economics, engineering, water and sewerage business and regulation. In addition, to ensure a 
robust approach to the project a key academic role has been taken by Dr David Saal. 
This work is being undertaken as part of Ofwat’s Future Price Limits project. Several other 
pieces of work are underway within this overall project, some of which are also linked to the cost 
assessment/performance measurement area. Consequently there are areas in this report where 
we note issues that need to be addressed but which are outside the narrow scope of our project 
but likely to be within­scope for other work that is underway. Clearly cost allocation and the 
implications for performance measurement are an important consideration within the accounting 
separation work underway in Ofwat. 
This work has been undertaken through close collaboration with staff at Ofwat through a series 
of workshops. We appreciate the time and resources Ofwat has made available to work with our 
team but the views expressed in this report represent the thinking of our team and should not 
necessarily be attributed to Ofwat. 
Clearly the industry is going through some major changes at the moment with significant 
uncertainty about the potential structure of the industry in five to 10 years. As such, rather than 
seek to provide a definitive answer as to whether panel and sub­company data is useful and 
would meet any cost­benefit requirements, we seek to determine, firstly, under what conditions 
these approaches might be appropriate, and, secondly, the issues which must be considered in 
applying these techniques. For the latter, in particular, we examine the issues on the basis of 
Ofwat’s accounting separation guidelines. We believe that this framework provides a flexible 
foundation for Ofwat while still allowing robust and specific answers to be developed in the light 
of this report. 
1.1. Structure of the report 
This report is structured in three broad blocks as follows. 
•	 Sections 2 to 4 provide key background to the question by considering the context of the 
project. This block includes a brief review of the economic theory underpinning 
performance/cost assessment and practical regulatory use of benchmarking; 
•	 Sections 5 to 7 set out our approach to assessing the applicability of both panel data and 
sub­company data. This approach is then applied to one possible future industry 
structure. We primarily focus on the structure defined in the accounting separation 
guidelines that Ofwat has already introduced; and 
•	 Sections 8 and 9 draw out the key lessons/observations from the analysis after 
undertaking a high­level qualitative cost benefit analysis of the approaches. We conclude 
by noting some possible further considerations. 
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A series of annexes support the report providing detail of existing regulatory and academic uses 
of both panel and sub­company data in regulated water, energy, post and rail industries as well as 
the implications of some other possible future industry structures. 
In reading this report, it is important to bear in mind the terms of reference for this project. Our 
remit was to consider the case for panel and sub­company analysis, not the overall appropriate 
way that Ofwat should approach performance measurement. Of course, addressing our narrow 
issue without some consideration of the broader questions is not possible. We have, however, 
tried to limit the interaction with the broader questions to noting how and where these wider 
issues arise and we leave it to the consultants engaged by Ofwat to conduct the Use of Comparator 
study to answer those questions. Section 3 is the only section that does not follow as closely our 
attempt to limit ourselves to the direct question posed to us. This is due to the difficulties of 
separating the narrower and wider issues when considering alternative modelling approaches. 
Aspects of this report are inevitably quite technical. In consequence, to make the report 
accessible to as broad an audience as possible, each section commences with a clear statement of 
the key themes and lessons in that section. This way we believe that the flow of the argument in 
the report should be accessible to all readers. 
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2. CONTEXT  
Key themes and lessons 
Up to now, Ofwat has placed significant emphasis on comparative performance measurement when 
determining prices at periodic reviews. Further, legislation currently requires the OFT to refer mergers 
(excluding smaller companies) to the Competition Commission (CC). The CC, if it deems a water 
merger has taken place, must assess the impact of the merger on Ofwat’s ability to make comparisons 
between different water companies (including qualitative comparisons), demonstrating the central role 
that such performance measurement is seen to have within the regime.1 
Ofwat developed models for the first review, PR94, which have formed the basis of such analysis at 
each periodic review from 1994 to 2009. However, as the amount of data available for analysis has 
increased over the years, it is now possible for Ofwat to adopt other modelling approaches to 
comparative analysis than those used up to now. 
In addition, other stakeholders in the sector, including the CC, the Cave Review, companies and 
academics, have made recommendations that Ofwat could usefully adopt alternative approaches, 
especially panel data and sub­company analysis. 
Changes are taking place within the sector with the introduction of the accounting separation 
guidelines, which require companies to provide data on nine different business units. In addition, the 
Government is considering potential future market reform, including possible industry structure 
changes. This means that the need for performance measurement and the type of analysis undertaken 
is changing, with the implication that the appropriate methods of comparative performance analysis 
may also need to change. 
This section considers some of the rationale for considering Ofwat’s approach to 
cost/performance measurement and the broader context for this project. 
It should be noted that much of this section can also be seen as justification for other projects 
underway within Ofwat to consider not just the general way that performance measurement is 
used and undertaken but also the overall role of regulation. However, these elements are outside 
the scope of this project. 
2.1. Ofwat's approach 
Ofwat developed a detailed approach to performance measurement for the first price control, 
PR94, and while some changes have taken place since then, the basic approaches have remained 
the same. Ofwat’s approach was to: 
•	 model separately operating costs (opex) and capital costs (capex); 
•	 assess capital efficiency by making comparisons of standard unit costs using the cost base 
tool; 
•	 use single year cross­section econometric analysis of the companies to determine the 
relative opex efficiency of companies (Ofwat used to use an average cost over a number 
of years for capital maintenance analysis); 
Schedule 4ZA, Enterprise Act 2002. 
10 
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•	 undertake the opex assessment at a range of levels, including functional ones (such as 
power costs) which are below the activity to which the price­cap is applied; 
•	 use sub­activity data for large sewage treatment plants and sewerage areas and also use 
some unit cost models for sewerage opex; and 
•	 use a time series based approach when considering the annual overall efficiency frontier 
shift. 
The opex econometric models were developed by Ofwat in collaboration with academics in the 
early 1990s, and while they have been refined over time, the underlying approach and 
methodology has remained largely stable since the 1994 price review. 
However, some of the refinements that have taken place since PR94 have included the removal 
of econometrics. For example, at PR09, Ofwat did not use the capital maintenance econometrics 
models. Instead it used the cost base tool together with the capital expenditure incentive scheme 
(CIS). 
2.2. Issues 
The approach to performance measurement that was put in place for PR94 was one that clearly 
responded to the constraints faced at that time, namely: 
•	 limited historical data; 
•	 a regulatory framework focused on water and sewerage level activities; 
•	 a significant number of WoCs as well as the limited number of WaSCs; and 
•	 the need to model a complex industry cost structure despite limited data. 
The data available to Ofwat has been protected to some degree over the last 20 years as the 
merger rules established for the water sector required a clear link to the impact on the regulator’s 
ability to undertake comparative assessment including comparative performance measurement. 
(As set out in the law and evidenced by the early Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
reviews.)2 
What is clear is that since PR94: 
•	 a more complete and consistent data series has been developed which makes additional 
approaches possible, as suggested by various academic papers (refer to Section 3.3 and 
Annex A.2, A.3 and A.4.1 for examples) that have employed Ofwat’s regulatory data for 
panel analysis; 
•	 possible trade­offs are lost through Ofwat’s approach to modelling, such as between 
opex and capex and/or between functions or inputs (such as power and other opex);3 
and 
2 
The 1989 Water Act. 
3 
This issue is in part addressed through the discretionary way that Ofwat sets the final efficiency targets, but this 
causes other concerns with the regulatory regime. 
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•	 more complex/comprehensive models for costs can be considered if more 
data/observations are available.4 
These issues are discussed further in sections 3 and 4 of this report. 
What is clear, however, is that further consideration of the way in which Ofwat undertakes 
performance measurement is now highly relevant and has, in part, been captured in some of the 
more recent joint UKWIR/Ofwat studies.5 
2.3. Other factors 
Even if Ofwat’s PR09 approach was “best practice” there are other factors that mean a 
reconsideration of the approach to performance measurement, and the role of panel and sub­
company analysis, is needed. 
2.3.1. Accounting separation 
Ofwat has introduced accounting separation guidelines based around cost allocation for the 
companies from 2009/10 based on nine functions or business units within water and sewerage. 
These functions are discussed later in this report in some detail but broadly break into three 
businesses: water, sewerage and retail. Water and sewerage are then both broken into a further 
four activities. Ofwat is currently only asking companies to report their costs according to the 
nine functions set out in the accounting separation guidelines. 
The introduction of reporting costs to the separate business units raises concerns about the 
existing performance measurement in two ways: 
•	 it may cause a structural break in the data with both past data collected and between 
companies e.g. if the new accounting separation guidelines lead to a different cost 
allocation it may take a while for all companies within the sector to allocate costs in the 
same way; and 
•	 the potential change in the way that regulation would be applied to the sector if there 
were to be a new separate retail control introduced at PR14. The final form that the 
regulatory structure will take is dependent on the proposed new legislation (which will 
stem from the as yet unreleased Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra) Water White Paper). 
Accounting separation also raises additional issues related to the appropriate assessment of 
overall costs where cost interactions between various activities exist. This issue is discussed in 
detail in Section 3 of this report. 
2.3.2. Cave Review 
Developing from the accounting separation point but raising some more fundamental issues is 
the question of introducing market reform. Work on the question of where greater competition 
4 
These issues/concerns have to be measured against the benefit of a relatively consistent approach having been 
adopted at the four price reviews that have taken place since privatisation in 1989. 
5 
See for example: Ofwat/ UKWIR (2007) and UKWIR (2008). 
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could be introduced and the implications that this has for regulation of the water and sewerage 
industry is at the heart of Ofwat’s work on Market Reform. The Cave Review clearly identified 
areas where greater competition was deemed to be possible – primarily around water abstraction 
and retail. It also recommended that the thresholds for merger referral be changed, something 
that could potentially allow a further consolidation in the industry. 
Defra will publish later in 2011 a Water White Paper, aimed at providing clear direction and a 
policy framework for addressing future challenges in the water sector. However, the content of 
the Water White Paper is not yet known. While the paper can be expected to include a discussion 
on the issues around industry structure, whether the recommendations contained will include 
some degree of ownership/legal separation or just build on Ofwat’s accounting separation 
guidelines is unknown. 
In view of this, we examine the modelling issues in subsequent sections primarily on the basis of 
the accounting separation framework but also with some limited discussion of the implications 
from further separation. 
2.3.3. Competition Commission 
The CC has reviewed a number of mergers in the water sector. Cases considered by the CC have 
included referred mergers between South East Water and Mid Kent Water and Severn Trent/ 
Wessex Water and South West Water.6 Strong recommendations have been made in some of the 
resulting CC reports for Ofwat to consider alternative approaches to performance 
benchmarking, including the use of panel data methods. 
2.3.4. Other regulatory reforms 
Ofgem completed its review of whether existing energy regulation in Britain was “fit for 
purpose” during 2010 – the RPI­X@20 review (then renamed RIIO for Revenue = Incentives + 
Innovation + Outputs). One of the areas considered in this review was performance 
measurement with a strong recommendation being made to focus on panel data and using 
forward looking information. This recommendation in part built on the last electricity 
distribution price determination (made in 2009) which used panel data analysis, although the 
RIIO focus on forward looking cost estimates was new. Forward looking data is to be drawn 
from highly detailed company business plans, submitted to Ofgem for the purpose of assessment 
and benchmarking. It is not yet clear the extent to which Ofgem are proposing to use forward 
looking data for performance assessment whether this is target setting or just consistency 
checking. However, Ofgem’s current strategy for the first RIIO transmission price control 
(RIIO­T1) states that business plans will be reviewed in order to determine ongoing efficiency 
improvements.7 For example, Ofgem states that transmission operators’ (TOs) direct operating 
expenditure “will primarily be based on our assessment of the forecasts in their business plans”.8 
6 
The Severn Trent/Wessex Water and South West Water reviews were undertaken by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. 
7 
Ofgem (2011a). 
8 
Ibid, p 3. 
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Other regulators around the world have used different approaches to performance measurement 
some of which include the use of panel and sub­company assessment. These are discussed 
further in Section 4 below. 
2.4. Summary 
It would be appropriate to consider whether panel and sub­company data could improve 
Ofwat’s performance measurement tools, even if the potential changing industry structure, 
changing focus of regulation and lessons from other sectors (especially energy in Britain) were 
not also creating pressure for such an assessment. However, the development and 
implementation of accounting separation guidelines provide another reason why such an exercise 
is worth doing at this time. 
14 
 
 
                 
       
                                 
                             
                     
                              
   
                                 
                               
                     
                         
       
                               
                         
                             
                                     
          
                                 
                             
                               
                       
                       
     
        
                               
                       
                           
               
                     
                           
                        
                             
   
                         
                         
                       
                     
     
                         
           
                                   
                   
                           
     
 
3. COST MODELLING USING PANEL AND/ OR SUB­COMPANY DATA  
Key themes and lessons 
Our findings show that it would be possible for Ofwat to measure performance using panel and/ or 
sub­company data. However it is important that however Ofwat chooses to measure performance it 
considers the appropriate economic theory, and addresses any issues that arise. 
From theory the following key themes and lessons arise for panel data and sub­company analysis. 
Panel data 
•	 Panel data has great potential to improve Ofwat's ability to carry out cost assessment in the 
water industry. This is because it can increase the available degrees of freedom which allows for 
improved model specifications, which could make regulatory cost assessment models more 
consistent with economic cost modelling approaches. This can allow for better modelling of 
differences between firms. 
•	 If Ofwat were to use panel data, it would require better controls for intertemporal differences 
in firm characteristics, capital stocks, input prices, and possibly technical change. Given that 
there are a limited number of potential observations and the additional parameters will use up 
some of the additional degrees of freedom, we can see that panel data will by no means be a 
panacea for effective performance measurement. 
•	 If Ofwat used panel data, then it would be able to use benchmarking techniques that better 
allow for opex­capex tradeoffs. This is because panel models have the potential to provide 
sufficient data to allow modelling of opex costs as a function of input prices, MEA capital 
stocks, and operating characteristics. Panel data therefore could facilitate the adoption of 
benchmarking approaches that result in better incentives for companies to improve their 
overall cost efficiency 
Sub­company and sub­activity data 
•	 There is no reason in principle why Ofwat could not use sub­company data modelling to 
model firm costs, provided there was sufficient regulatory commitment to data collection. 
Ofwat would need to collect appropriate data on outputs, inputs, input prices, capital stocks, 
and operating characteristics at the sub­company/activity level. 
•	 Because of substantial geographic heterogeneity in water industry operating characteristics, sub­
company data may allow a better understanding of the determinants of costs. However 
controlling for these operating characteristics may require additional degrees of freedom. Panel 
data may therefore be required to increase the number of observations and hence the degrees 
of freedom. 
•	 Modelling with sub­company/activity data has the potential for substantial biases related to 
aggregation. For example, firms may be horizontally integrated (at the sub­activity level) 
because of the presence of horizontal integration benefits accrued from multiple plant 
operation. Ofwat should therefore apply aggregation techniques that take horizontal 
integration into account. 
•	 Ofwat must also contend with sub­company/activity analysis issues related to vertical cost 
interactions if they influence costs. 
•	 There are a number of potential benefits to using sub­company data, and they could be used to 
facilitate the development of efficient competition. However, effective benchmarking at sub­
activity level may potentially be both infeasible and prohibitively expensive given the amount of 
data required. 
15 
 
 
    
                                 
                       
                   
 
                              
                         
                     
     
   
                             
                             
                             
                            
                           
                         
           
           
                                 
                           
                               
                           
                              
                                   
                         
                            
                          
                             
           
     
                             
                           
                         
                             
                         
                             
                                                 
           
                               
                         
                                     
             
Cost models 
•	 There are a number of different methods that can be used for cost modelling purposes with 
sub­company, sub­activity or panel data. Commonly used approaches by regulators and 
academics include, econometrics, data envelopment analysis, and non­parametric index number 
approaches. 
•	 Each approach has its own benefits and limitations. We recommend that Ofwat employ index 
number approaches as a readily applicable company level consistency checking tool, with which 
relative company performance measures derived with econometric or DEA methodologies can 
be cross checked. 
3.1. Introduction 
This section briefly considers the key concepts of economic theory of cost modelling that are 
relevant to the water and sewerage sectors and, given this context (and that of regulatory 
objectives), discusses the potential applicability of different approaches. This will allow us to 
highlight several generic modelling issues that are likely to influence model accuracy. Annex A 
builds on the themes presented below and provides, from an academic viewpoint, a more 
complete consideration of the economic theory of cost modelling and the potential implications 
for regulatory cost assessment. 
3.2. Economic theory of cost modelling 
The economic theory of costs rests on the assumption that firms aim to minimize the total cost 
of production given the production technology available to them, the outputs they produce, and 
the input prices they face.9 It also highlights the need for fully flexible modelling approaches 
able to allow for a more complete specification of the underlying relationship between costs, 
outputs, input prices, and the scale of operations. As a result, economic cost modelling generally 
requires the specification of costs as a function of outputs and input prices, and the use of an 
empirical model that is sufficiently flexible to reflect how alternative methods of production 
influence a firm’s costs. Fundamentally, such flexible models allow for the cost implications of 
important economic relationships to be captured in the empirical modelling.10 To illustrate this, 
in this section we focus on the economic concepts of opex capex trade­off, cost interactions, 
scale, heterogeneity and technical change. 
Opex capex trade­off 
Water industry capital stocks are not fully flexible and adjust slowly over time. Nevertheless, 
differences both between companies and across time in these capital stocks have a significant 
influence on opex requirements.11 The combination of: (i) a complex output production process; 
and (ii) input substitutability between opex and capex in the water industry suggests that high 
level total cost benchmarking approaches which are broadly consistent with economic total cost 
modelling are appropriate. This is particularly the case for longer panel data analysis where 
9 
See, for example, Chambers (1988). 
10 
For example, Stone & Webster (2004a) employ a fully flexible cost function specification which suggested 
increasing returns to scale for small WoCs, but larger WaSCs exhibited decreasing returns. 
11 
See for example, Stone & Webster (2004b) which found that changes over time in water and sewerage capital 
stocks had an impact on opex requirements. 
16 
 
 
                           
                           
                                
                              
                           
                             
                        
           
   
                       
                         
                        
                       
                               
                              
                         
                            
                             
                       
                 
                       
                         
                                 
                           
                         
                         
     
                         
                            
                           
                             
                   
                 
 
                           
                             
                           
                                                 
                                 
         
                                     
              
capital adjustment is more likely to approximate long term adjustments.12 An alternative is the 
use of economic quasi­fixed capital stock modelling approaches that allow for both the relatively 
fixed nature of capital, while also allowing for the impact of capital stocks on opex requirements. 
This also has the potential of substantially improving the assessment of opex costs. Assessment 
of efficiency or performance by regulators will generally only focus on costs within management 
control. Either of these approaches would better allow for opex capex tradeoffs than Ofwat’s 
current approach. Section A.3. further discusses the appropriateness of total cost benchmarking 
in Water and Sewerage cost modelling. 
Cost interactions 
Production of water and sewerage services involves a complex multiple output production 
process (with the potential for vertical cost interactions in water and sewerage service 
production).13 Economic cost modelling theory and practice suggests that such multiple output 
production requires approaches that fully account for the potential cost interactions between 
these activities. It also suggests that, in the presence of such cost interactions, an aggregate cost 
assessment which allows for these multiple outputs is most appropriate. However, if the costs of 
two activities are economically separable, unbiased cost assessments of each activity can be 
obtained with separate assessment of each activity. In contrast, if vertical cost interactions exist 
there is strong potential for overall cost assessment estimates to be biased unless the separate 
assessments properly account for any cost interactions between other activities which influence 
the costs of the activities under assessment. 
Similarly, if horizontal integration economies are obtained by aggregating treatment plants, water 
supply zones, and other sub­company/activity operations (at least to some optimal level of 
horizontal scale), assessment at a level below that of the company may not properly allow for any 
benefits of horizontal integration and will result in upwardly biased estimates of aggregate costs 
for larger companies if horizontal integration economies are present. In contrast, if diseconomies 
of horizontal integration are present, larger firms might have downwardly biased estimates of 
aggregate costs. 
The above therefore suggests the potential need for a regulatory cost assessment process 
of identifying and testing for the presence of any relevant cost interactions between activities. 
This would include employing appropriate controls to account for such cost interactions and, if 
carrying out the cost assessment at a level where such interactions are internalized, using higher 
level assessments as consistency check of disaggregated assessment, and/or employing 
appropriate regulatory discretion to mitigate any potential assessment biases. 
Scale 
Given the possible cost interactions, sufficient model flexibility is required in order to properly 
assess the relationship between a firm’s output scale and its costs. Fully flexible modelling 
techniques allow for variable returns to scale (i.e. constant, increasing and decreasing), and are 
12 
Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1982) note that consideration of potential cost interactions between multiple outputs is 
necessary to properly assess costs. 
13 
See Bottasso & Conti (2009b) and Saal, Arocena & Maziotis (2010) for evidence of vertical integration in the 
English & Welsh water and sewerage sector. 
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therefore able to result in estimates reflecting the likelihood that smaller firms would benefit 
more than larger firms from increases in their scale of operations. Work commissioned and 
published by Ofwat, suggested the presence of variable returns in the English & Welsh water 
industry, with the smallest firms characterized by increasing returns to scale and larger firms in 
the industry characterised with decreasing returns to scale.14 
While, it can be argued that regulators should assess performance based on the costs of a firm 
operating at the optimal scale, and thereby penalise firms that are below and above this scale, it 
may not necessarily be the case that regulated utilities are fully in control of their scale as they 
must serve their licensed operating area and its population. Thus, utilities should be assessed 
with a methodology that can consistently capture the cost implications of their scale of 
operations. 
Heterogeneity 
The costs associated with water and sewerage services are substantially influenced by 
heterogeneity in operating characteristics. These include differences in topography, settlement 
patterns, water source type, quality, location, and required water and sewerage treatment 
technologies, etc. These characteristics can also vary substantially within reasonably small 
geographic distances; they also can, and do, change considerably over time. Including improved 
controls for such heterogeneity directly within cost assessment models should improve the 
assessment. Moreover, such direct controls would potentially give Ofwat the ability to allow the 
model to determine whether an exogenous company specific cost driver is in fact a significant 
determinant of cost variation between firms. 
The potential for input substitution and the incentive for managers to minimise costs given the 
input prices they actually face, suggests the need for careful controls of input price variation 
between firms, particularly when there exists considerable cross­sectional variation in relative 
input prices.15 
Technical change 
Ofwat’s regulatory practice of identifying continuing efficiency improvements is consistent with 
an assumption that technical change (or equivalently frontier shift), does occur in the water 
industry. 
The appropriate modelling of technical change in a fully specified water industry cost model is 
likely to require a sophisticated modelling approach as, over time, technical change may not 
influence in a proportional way the relationship between all inputs, outputs, and costs. This 
implies that approaches such as including time trends or time dummies, which allow only for 
neutral technical change, will insufficiently capture changes in cost functions over time. Instead, 
reliable models are likely to require fuller parameter flexibility that better reflect the impact of 
technology on costs over time. 
14 
Stone & Webster (2004a). 
15 
Saal & Parker (2000) found that there was evidence to suggest considerable gains in WaSC cost productivity 
attributable to the substitution of other inputs for capital. The findings in Maziotis, Saal & Thanassoulis (2011) also 
support this. 
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3.3. Cost modelling techniques  
This section summarises key features, strengths and limitations of different techniques that can 
be used for performance assessment. Annex A and Section 7 provide a more detailed discussion 
of the characteristics of these approaches and their potential application in regulatory cost 
assessment. We focus on three alternative approaches to estimating firm performance, which are 
the econometric (including ordinary least squares, corrected least squares, and stochastic frontier 
analysis), data envelopment analysis (DEA) and non­parametric Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
index number approaches. 
3.3.1. Econometric techniques 
Econometric approaches are regression­based approaches that rely on the specification of a 
production or cost function, thereby providing a fitted functional form capturing the underlying 
economic determinants of production and costs, such as the relative magnitude of input usage 
on outputs, or the impact of increased outputs and input prices on costs. These approaches can 
be further classified into approaches that attempt to explain the average relationship between 
costs and outputs, represented in this discussion by ordinary least squares, and those that are 
intended to identify the best practice, or frontier relationship between costs and outputs, 
represented here by corrected ordinary least squares, and stochastic frontier analysis. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
Ordinary least squares is a type of average response model. Such models estimate a line of ‘best 
fit’ to observed data points by minimising the sum of the squared deviations of the observations 
from the fitted line. An average response model therefore simply determines the expected or 
mean relationship between costs and a given level of outputs. Regulators have taken the mean 
fitted line to represent the costs that a company of average efficiency would incur. Such methods, 
when correctly specified and with sufficient numbers of observations available, provide the 
potential for extremely robust estimates of a firm’s relative efficiency.16 However, by statistical 
assumption, in an average response model any deviations from the mean are assumed to be 
noise. 
We also note that the principal potential regulatory weakness of average response approaches is 
that they do not allow for the estimation of frontier costs, and hence do not provide a direct 
estimation of inefficiency that is theoretically consistent with the efficiency catch up component 
of a regulatory X factor. Nevertheless, they are well established and particularly when coupled 
with standard econometric approaches to modelling with panel data, they have the potential to 
provide effective estimates of the underlying relationship between outputs and costs, and the 
determinants of trends in those costs. 
16 It is well established that average response techniques work well with pooled cross­section and time­series data. 
See for example, Baltagi (2005). The use of pooled data increases the available degrees of freedom and has been 
shown to improve statistical robustness. This approach was suggested in Kumbhakar & Horncastle (2010). 
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Corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA)  
COLS and SFA are both types of frontier econometric techniques which are designed to provide 
an estimate of absolute inefficiency. Nevertheless, there are considerable and important 
differences between deterministic approaches such as COLS, which do not allow for statistical 
noise, and SFA, which does attempt to separate measures of inefficiency from measurement 
error (or noise).17 
COLS has generally perceived benefits related to simplicity and transparency. The COLS 
approach relies entirely on an underlying estimated average response OLS model where the line 
of best fit is “corrected” by shifting it in parallel until it passes through the ‘frontier’ data point, 
forming a frontier model.18 COLS is based on the assumption that the estimated OLS residual, 
the distance a company is from the line of best fit, can be interpreted entirely as a measure of 
inefficiency. However, it is likely that the residual will contain some amount of measurement 
‘noise’. 
The SFA approach attempts to address this issue by explicitly separately estimating inefficiency 
and random error/noise. However, this advantage does come at the cost of a more complex 
econometric specification and it also requires relatively strong assumptions in regard to the 
statistical distribution of inefficiency. These assumptions are needed to identify the 
decomposition of the residual into inefficiency and random error and, if these assumptions are 
not valid, the resulting estimates and decomposition will be biased. SFA also requires a 
minimum of at least two more degrees of freedom than an average response model in order to 
separate noise and inefficiency in the estimated model. The period covered, available variables, 
and data consistency of Ofwat’s accounting separation databases will therefore be the 
fundamental determinant of the feasibility of applying SFA in future cost assessment.19 Even if 
it is used, it is important that SFA results are compared with the estimates from other and less 
complex methods to test their robustness. 
A general advantage of all econometric approaches relative to DEA and non­parametric index 
number approaches is the potential to conduct hypothesis tests between alternative model 
specifications. This allows for direct comparisons between models and also, provides greater 
statistical confidence in the reliability of the chosen model. A general disadvantage, though, is 
the need to specify a functional form for the cost function. 
17 
See Greene (2008) for a detailed discussion focussed on the cross­sectional estimation of deterministic and 
frontier efficiency econometric models. 
18 
Regulators do not necessarily use the most “extreme” frontier company as the frontier data point (see, for 
example, the discussion of Ofwat’s and Ofgem’s use of COLS in Section 4). 
19 
There are a number of academic papers that support the use of SFA, for example Kumbhakar & Horncastle 
(2010), and ORR also uses SFA as its main approach. However, an UKWIR (2007) study found that SFA was not 
appropriate for the Water industry. 
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3.3.2. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique 
Traditional DEA models rely on linear programming techniques to construct a non­parametric 
frontier or envelope around the data, thereby providing a fitted production frontier detailing the 
relationship between a firm’s outputs and efficient input quantities. Firms using inputs in excess 
of those indicated on the DEA frontier are therefore defined as productively or technically 
inefficient, with the distance from the frontier indicating the level of inefficiency 
Appropriate estimation of cost or allocative efficiency in the DEA framework requires data on 
both input prices and quantities, as well as a specification of additional constraints (e.g. 
convexity, variables returns to scale) to the DEA programme. The latter have the effect of 
identifying the unique cost minimising point on the estimated production frontier.20 Thus, while 
it is common for many researchers to specify DEA “cost models” by simply employing opex or 
other measures of cost as an input, this approach is consistent with neither economic nor DEA 
theory. Thus, as with econometric approaches, it is likely that regulatory DEA­based cost 
assessments can be substantially improved with appropriate controls for input prices, as 
managers will choose to use alternative combinations of inputs if the relative prices of inputs 
vary substantially across companies or time. 
The principle advantages of DEA relate to its relative simplicity and the intuitive and fully 
flexible relationship between actual data points and the identified firms (peers) that define the 
production frontier. 
The principle disadvantage of the traditional DEA approach is its failure to allow for random 
error and noise, as can be done in econometric modelling. In addition, while DEA estimation 
strategies do allow for the inclusion of operating characteristics as a determinant of costs, it is 
our opinion that traditional DEA models are far less capable of controlling for heterogeneity 
between firms or at the sub­company/activity level than econometric approaches. 
As with econometric approaches, extending DEA techniques to panel data requires 
consideration of the possible presence of technical change, and if present an appropriate 
modelling approach to allow for it is required. One possible approach is to estimate a distinct 
DEA frontier for each year in the data, thereby allowing for the determination of efficient 
frontier costs in each year, as well as technical and efficiency change between years. However, 
this approach amounts to the estimation of separate cross­sectional DEA frontiers in each year, 
and would not help to overcome the issue of estimating costs if the number of cross­sectional 
observations was limited. We therefore believe there is unlikely to be any strong potential for 
developing this approach, or even any simple cross­sectional DEA assessment with Ofwat’s 
regulatory data at firm level. 
An alternative approach is sequential DEA modelling of panel data. This approach estimates a 
series of yearly frontiers, which are estimated for each year by sequentially adding each new 
year’s data to a common data pool and re­estimating the frontier. This approach allows the 
identification of efficient costs in a given year, and hence allows for the separate identification of 
both technical change and efficiency change. However, if cross­sectional data is sparse, it would 
See for example Thanassoulis (2001). 
21 
20 
 
 
                               
                
                             
                     
               
          
                       
                                 
                           
                                
                             
                             
                     
                               
                   
                           
                 
                       
                           
                           
                         
                     
                          
                           
                             
         
                       
                         
                             
                     
                         
                       
                             
                             
                       
                                                 
                                     
                                     
   
         
                                       
            
still require the pooling of several years’ data before the year of assessment to allow the 
estimation of frontier costs in that year.21 
We conclude that while it would be worthwhile to further explore the potential application of 
DEA approaches, on balance, econometric approaches are potentially superior for direct 
regulatory benchmarking in the England & Wales context.22 
3.3.3. Non­parametric index number techniques 
Non­parametric TFP index numbers essentially use input and output prices to provide 
information on the relative costs of inputs and the relative value of outputs. This allows the 
construction of aggregate indices of outputs and inputs, from which TFP indices can be 
constructed.23 The clearest benefit of this approach is that it can be easily employed to provide 
relative performance estimates with limited data as only data on input and output quantities, total 
costs, total revenues and prices are required. The approach requires a minimum of only two 
firms to allow meaningful cross­sectional performance comparisons between firms, and similarly 
requires only two years of data for a single firm to consistently assess trends in performance. 
Moreover, cross­sectional indices provide easily understandable measures of relative productivity 
between firms, which are inversely proportional to the potential efficiency catch up of the 
laggard firm relative to the best practice firm. 
This ready applicability does however come with some shortcomings. Firstly, non­parametric 
index number approaches require the availability of reasonable proxies for output prices as well 
as input prices, thereby making their application infeasible in the absence of output prices. 
Secondly, the approach is relatively inflexible with regard to controlling for differences in 
operating characteristics and output quality between firms, thereby making appropriate controls 
for cross firm heterogeneity relatively difficult to implement. Thirdly, the approach assumes the 
presence of constant returns to scale, which is a significant disadvantage given our above 
discussion with regard to the appropriateness of allowing for fully variable returns to scale when 
conducting cross company comparison. 
Nevertheless, despite these potential shortcomings, there is sufficient potential to apply index 
number techniques at company level, and to gauge relative performance trends between firms 
and across time. We therefore suggest, that particularly because of their applicability with an 
extremely low number of observations, Ofwat could potentially employ index number 
approaches as a readily applicable company level consistency checking tool, with which relative 
company performance measures derived with econometric or DEA methodologies can be cross 
checked. Further, it is possible that future industry structures could improve the availability of 
output prices at different points in the value chain. Consequently index numbers may become 
more easily applied. This point is discussed further in Section 7. 
21 
For example, if only 10 cross­sectional observations were available, and the analyst believed that a minimum of 30 
observations were required to adequately model firm costs, a frontier could only be specified for the third and any 
subsequent years. 
22 
Bogetoft & Otto (2011). 
23 
Chapter 4 of Coelli, et al. (2005) provides a general introduction to the economic theory of index numbers and 
productivity measurement as does Hackman (2008). 
22 
 
 
                       
                             
                                   
                           
                                
                             
   
                        
                     
                          
                         
                     
                             
                     
           
                             
                         
                       
                        
                     
                         
                             
                               
                         
                       
                         
                         
                                 
                      
                             
                           
                             
                           
                              
                               
                        
                                  
                               
                                                 
                    
                               
                         
3.4. The use of panel data in water and sewerage cost modelling 
A panel data set includes both a cross­sectional and time dimension and therefore can include 
multiple observations of firms in different years. A balanced panel data set is one in which all 
the cross­sectional units (companies) are captured in each time period and an unbalanced data 
set is one in which the cross­sectional units are not necessarily captured in each time period. 
There is however, no clear advantage from an econometric perspective to having a balanced or 
unbalanced panel. 
With panel data, there is potential for both cross­sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity. 
These cross­sectional differences can, for example, come from heterogeneity between the 
underlying operating environment and costs of a firm. Similarly, intertemporal variation across a 
firm's observations can, for example, be attributable to technical change. Thus, panel data 
modelling generally requires controls for such cross­sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity. 
A pooled model simply pools the available panel observations in the database and estimates a 
standard cross­sectional model without allowing for differences in parameters or model 
specification to allow for heterogeneity.24 
The employment of panel data has the potential to improve cost assessment in the water 
industry by increasing the available degrees of freedom and thereby allowing improved model 
specifications which will allow for better modelling of firm heterogeneity. Heterogeneity will 
exist in both the cross­sectional and intertemporal dimension. Operating characteristics such as 
customer demographics, water source reliability and quality, mandated water and sewage 
treatment levels, operational quality of networks (leakage, pressure, etc), etc, will vary across 
time, and such variation will increase with the length of the panel data set.25 
Beyond the general increase in degrees of freedom provided by panel data, there is also clear 
demonstrated potential to allow direct estimation of cost productivity trends, as well as 
decomposition of these trends into technical change, efficiency change, and other potential 
components. This implies the potential directly to estimate past achievements in overall 
productivity growth, efficiency change, and frontier shift, which could be employed to inform 
Ofwat with regard to a firm’s potential future “X” factor cost savings. It could also make 
regulatory cost assessment models more consistent with economic cost modelling approaches. 
Hence, the regulatory use of panel data could provide Ofwat with the necessary degrees of 
freedom required to model more closely the relationship between scale and firm costs. 
Whenever panel datasets of more than trivial length are employed, there is the potential for 
technical change. Thus, with panel data, models should make allowances for technical change, 
thereby allowing for the potential that any or all parameters may change over time.26 However, 
even if only a short dataset is available pooled data may allow more robust estimates than 
Ofwat’s existing model(s). In consequence, the following estimation strategy is appropriate with 
pooled data. First, it should be tested for technical change and, if technical change is not present 
then a straight pooling approach is appropriate; second, if technical change is neutral than a time 
24 
See Section A.7.1 for further discussion on pooled specifications. 
25 
Coelli (1999) provides a simple example of how such heterogeneity can influence estimates of efficiency. 
26 
As suggested by Botasso & Conti (2009b), and Stone & Webster (2004b). 
23 
 
 
                                 
                             
         
                         
                           
    
                               
                            
                                 
                          
                         
                             
                           
                                 
                                   
                            
                                 
                       
                           
                             
                               
                       
                           
                       
                               
                       
                         
                       
                           
                                    
                        
                         
 
                           
                           
                         
                       
                                                 
                                 
               
                                     
                           
             
variable or year dummies should be included to control for this; but, third, if technical change is 
present but is either output or input biased then a more sophisticated model specification is 
needed to allow for that. 
The statements above particularly apply to the econometric approaches, but past academic work 
has shown that panel data can be employed with econometric, DEA, and index number 
approaches.27 
The use of panel data also opens up the potential for benchmarking techniques that better allow 
for opex­capex tradeoffs. This is because panel models have the potential to provide sufficient 
data to allow for high level total cost benchmarking, or alternatively modelling of opex costs as a 
function of input prices, MEA capital stocks, and operating characteristics. Panel data therefore 
could facilitate the adoption of benchmarking approaches that result in better incentives for 
companies to improve their overall cost efficiency. However, any movement to the use of panel 
data assessment will require substantially greater consideration of the impact of input prices on 
assessed costs. This is because it is implausible to assume that input prices will not change 
across time, and that relative input prices, for either the inputs used by a single firm, or those 
reflecting price differences across firms will stay constant across time. For example, the relative 
price of labour to capital tends to increase over time, in tandem with a steady substitution of 
labour with capital in most production processes where this is feasible. 
Classical panel econometric models such as the random and fixed effects specifications allow for 
a firm specific error term in addition to the standard white noise regression residual, and 
therefore provide a form of control for firm specific heterogeneity. However, there is the risk 
that this heterogeneity includes persistent inefficiency as well as differences in operating 
characteristics. Thus, recent developments in panel techniques such as Greene’s (2005) true 
random fixed effects model attempts separately to estimate inefficiency from firm specific 
heterogeneity.28 However, as with SFA, this comes at the cost of greater complexity and a 
reliance on the statistical assumptions used to identify the different effects. 
Finally, it is worth noting that as appropriate controls for cross­sectional and intertemporal 
variation in operating characteristics requires the inclusion of further explanatory variables in 
assessed models, the additional degrees of freedom provided by panel data, may not increase 
proportionately with the length of the panel data set. This is most likely to be a significant issue 
with short panels e.g. those at the sub­company or sub­activity level. 
3.5.	 The use of sub­company and sub­activity data in water and sewerage cost 
modelling 
There is no reason in principle that sub­company/activity data modelling could not be employed 
by Ofwat to model firm costs, provided there was sufficient regulatory commitment to data 
collection. This would require appropriate data collection on outputs, inputs, input prices, capital 
stocks, and operating characteristics at the sub­company/activity level. However, the data 
27 
For example, Stone & Webster (2004a); Bottasso & Conti (2009a); Saal, Arocena, & Maaziotis (2010); Green 
(2005); Kumbhakar & Horncastle (2010); and Lawrence (2004). 
28 
Application of this approach by Saal, Parker, & Weyman­Jones (2007) to a WaSC database, reveals that even after 
allowing for a fixed group specific heterogeneity term, firm specific operating characteristics still significantly 
influence input requirements in the water sector. 
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requirements for pooled or panel data sub­company/activity modelling are significant, including 
maintaining consistency of classifications. 
Given substantial geographic heterogeneity in water industry operating characteristics, sub­
company/activity data may well allow better understanding of the determinants of costs. 
Allowing for this heterogeneity through the use of sub­company/activity performance models 
could lead to improved efficiency estimates. Modelling at this level may be particularly beneficial 
if policies are implemented which are meant to improve performance by facilitating competition. 
This is because high heterogeneity implies the need for effective access pricing and the 
development of local access prices over time. 
Sub­company/activity data analysis may also be supported by the evidence of company internal 
operations based around multiple operational areas – effectively sub­company/activity 
information. Many companies operate on the basis of more than one internal operational area, 
possibly in part reflecting the company’s views about the optimal size of operations. If 
consistent data is available on the basis of these operational areas then this would support sub­
company/activity analysis. 
Modelling with sub­company/activity data, however, raises issues around the potential for biases 
related to aggregation. Companies may be horizontally integrated because of the benefits 
accrued from multiple plant operation.29 If this is the case then appropriate aggregation 
techniques will need to be employed. Sub­company/activity analysis must also contend with 
issues related to vertical cost interactions if these influence costs. In addition, sufficient model 
flexibility may also be required in order to properly assess the relationship between a company’s 
output scale and its costs. Thus, utilities should be assessed with a methodology that can 
consistently capture the cost implications of their scale of operations.30 
3.6. Key considerations for the use of sub­company/activity and panel data 
Table 3.1 below summarises the key things we believe that Ofwat needs to consider when 
deciding whether or not it should use sub­company/activity and/or panel data. We pick these 
issues up later in this report when we discuss the feasibility and appropriateness of sub­
company/activity and panel data. 
29 
Although, it should be noted that companies existing structure may reflect its historical base rather than an 
optimal structure. 
30 
It should be noted that under some models of competition the scale of operation could change. 
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Table 3.1: Cost modelling key considerations summary table  
Issue Concern and implications Possible solutions 
Specification and 
application of 
underlying economic 
theory 
Input costs – changing relative and intertemporal input costs 
over time can make model estimation difficult and 
introduce biases if specific input costs change relative to 
RPI (i.e. changes in relative input prices will affect firms 
cost minimisation decisions). 
Heterogeneity – companies (and sub­company segments) 
have different operating characteristics (e.g. source of 
water, urban density, etc) owing in part to different mixes 
of inputs and also different outputs (such as changing 
quality levels over time). 
Opex capex substitution – the shift towards greater capex and 
the impact this has on the estimate of performance when 
only one element, opex, is evaluated by Ofwat. 
Theoretical underpinnings of the model – is the model 
specification appropriate? 
Input costs – Ofwat could address this by making real price effect (‘RPE’) 
adjustments,31 and consequently it may not be an issue. Ofwat could make 
these adjustments to specific costs feeding into the models (i.e. a regional 
cost adjustment). Even if Ofwat did not make these adjustments, many 
models ignore this concern, and Ofwat could take account of this issue in 
the way it used the results of the model. 
Heterogeneity – If Ofwat increased the number of explanatory variables and 
ensured that aspects like quality were adequately captured in the outputs 
then this would capture at least some aspects of heterogeneity. (Increasing 
the number of variables will require a greater number of observations.) 
Opex capex substitution – Ofwat could overcome this concern by using 
models that capture both types of cost, such as totex or opex with an 
MEAV capital value. Totex has additional definitional issues (i.e. does it 
include capex, or depreciation and return on planned capex?) which may 
make it a less preferred solution.32 
Theoretical underpinnings of the model –Ofwat should sense check the cost 
function to ensure that it conforms to economic principles. Ofwat should 
also use statistical checks of the model(s) specification. 
Technical change Technical change can lead to shifts in the production 
frontier which may be captured as efficiency 
improvements. Technical change should be controlled for 
in order to determine the efficiency catch­up that may be 
achievable by a company/ sub­company/sub­activity. 
The way that Ofwat undertakes the performance assessment is important 
for addressing this concern. Ofwat could: 
• use sequential DEA structure; or 
• include additional parameters within an econometric panel data 
approach to control for technical change. 
Cost interactions If the performance assessment is undertaken at a level 
where vertical cost interactions are not internalized then 
biased estimates may be derived. 
Ofwat could assess vertical cost interactions by undertaking performance 
assessment at a higher level within the structure so that it can produce an 
unbiased estimate. It could then use this to inform its decision about 
31 
Real price effect adjustments refer to making adjustments for observed differences between input price indices, i.e. an adjustment to an input if the input’s price was growing 
faster (slower) than RPI. 
32 
For example see Frontier (2010), a report commissioned by Ofgem as part of RPI­X@20 which investigated the use of totex in future price controls. 
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Issue Concern and implications Possible solutions 
If the performance assessment is undertaken at a sub­ targets at a lower level or more generally when applying regulatory 
company/activity level where horizontal cost interactions discretion to setting the target. Alternatively it could include controls in the 
are not internalized then biased estimates may be derived. modelling to allow for cost interactions (e.g. in a similar way to controlling 
for heterogeneity). 
Ofwat could assess horizontal cost interactions by undertaking 
performance assessment at a more aggregated level within the industry 
segment to produce an unbiased estimate. It could then use this result to 
inform a decision about targets at a lower level or more generally when 
applying regulatory discretion to setting the target. 
Scale If different companies are at different points relative to the 
optimal size for an industry, say some have economies of 
scale while others have diseconomies of scale then the 
model specification becomes very important otherwise 
biased results may be found. 
Ofwat could: 
• use a “more flexible ” model definition that better allows for variable 
returns to scale within the industry; and/or 
• use sub­company/activity data where appropriate – for example, if a 
water company has several separate operating units that are closer to 
the optimal scale than the whole business and which are treated like 
separate/independent operations, then measuring performance for 
those units rather than the aggregated business would be appropriate. 
These solutions mean Ofwat would need a good understanding of the 
economies of scale within the industry. 
Length and breadth of 
panel 
A sufficient number of observations is needed, this is a 
function of both the number of years of data as well as the 
number of cross­sectional observations 
While ideally a long (and wide) panel would be available to Ofwat, it could 
also use a short panel. It would need to consider: 
• Pooled panel data specifications – this has other concerns relating to 
technical change but may be an acceptable approach in the short­term; 
• Testing for the presence of technical change and controlling for it if 
evidence for it is found, which is likely in a longer and well specified 
panel model; and 
• Use of sub­company/activity data to enhance the number of 
observations. 
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4. REGULATORY APPROACH TO COST MODELLING  
Key themes and lessons 
UK based regulators have historically adopted a building block approach to setting base revenue 
allowances. They have focused on determining efficiency targets for each of the major cost areas 
separately and then using ex post incentives to ensure that the capex opex trade­off that regulated 
companies face is taken into account. This differs from the approaches put forward by numerous 
academics (see Annex A) which emphasise the importance of taking account of this trade­off in the 
modelling either: (a) by controlling for capital in the opex modelling; or (b) by focusing on total 
economic cost modelling. 
Regulators have to date avoided more complicated models for, but not limited to, the following 
reasons: 
•	 concerns about the data quality; 
•	 concerns about the complexity of the modelling and the reproducibility of the models; 
•	 difficulties with developing accurate and consistent (across companies and over time) measures 
of capital stocks; 
•	 the costs of greater data requirements and transparency of the modelling; and 
•	 concerns that the benefits may be marginal. 
Regulators have, in general, been less willing to adopt more sophisticated statistical techniques for their 
modelling, but there has been an increasing use of panel data and, where appropriate, sub­company 
data. However, in the case of sub­company data this has primarily been in assessing different areas of 
costs rather than separate vertical integrated segments. Ofgem has successfully used panel data across 
opex and capex, and as part of the electricity distribution price control review to expand the number of 
observations. It is also looking to extend the use of panel data by benchmarking forecast data points 
for the transmission and gas distribution price control reviews. Postcomm has made significant use of 
sub­company data in its analysis and ORR has used panel data (from international operators) to 
benchmark Network Rail against. 
All regulators note the importance of conducting top­down benchmarking as well as bottom­up analysis 
given that bottom­up analysis may not capture the full scope for overall efficiency improvements. For 
example, not all mechanisms available to a company for increasing efficiency can be foreseen at the 
start of the price control. Bottom­up analysis focuses on identified initiatives and therefore may 
underestimate the scope for forward efficiency gains. 
4.1. Introduction 
This section briefly reviews Ofwat’s PR09 methodology as well as that of other regulators. In it 
we consider how lessons from the economic cost modelling theory, as well as regulatory 
modelling considerations influence the appropriateness of these models. 
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4.2. Building blocks approach 
4.2.1. Overview 
Historically, utility regulation in the UK has relied heavily on a building block approach to setting 
the price path under a RPI­X regime. At its most simplistic, a building blocks approach involves 
splitting a regulated company’s revenue requirements into different categories and assessing 
them separately. The highest level of assessment is more often than not conducted on the 
following three categories: return on their regulatory asset base; operating expenditure (opex); 
and capital expenditure (capex), including depreciation allowance. Other building blocks (e.g. 
tax, non­regulated revenue) can be assessed depending on the needs of the regulator, or the 
requirements of the regime. The RPI­X form of control used by many regulators contains 
numerous incentive mechanisms designed to incentivise quality and innovation, as well as 
equalising incentives across opex and capex (where these expenditure types are assessed 
separately). 
Regulators usually define companies’ revenue requirements through the three broad categories, 
but often require companies to report opex and capex in greater granularity, e.g. expenditure on 
IT; fault repairs; maintenance; replacement capital expenditure; capital expenditure related to 
load growth; etc. In addition to reviewing expenditure at the more granular level, regulators have 
required companies to provide ‘splits’ of opex and capex for various stages of the value chain, 
e.g. large sewage treatment plants. The extent to which companies are required to provide cost 
splits across their different business units varies across regulators. Figure 4.1 below illustrates 
how the cost ‘blocks’ can be built up across a regulated business. Analysis and/ or performance 
measurement is theoretically possible for each block. 
Figure 4.1 – Building blocks 
Regulated business/ Vertical segment Sub-activity 
Price cap level 
Total expenditure 
Total operating expenditure 
Maintenance cost 
Fault repair cost 
Etc... 
Total capital expenditure 
Replacement expenditure 
Load-related expenditure 
Etc... 
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A building blocks approach assists in setting a price path through: (i) determining allowable costs 
for a base year; and (ii) estimating the scope for efficiency improvements over the price control 
period. These efficiency adjustments can be applied at the start of the price control period 
(sometimes referred to as a P0 adjustment) or spread across the price control period. When the 
regulator has determined the revenue requirements for each separate category of costs, they 
aggregate these up in order to determine the efficient cost path for each company over the 
period of the price control. The overriding assumption of the modelling, that the cost 
assessment is conducted on comparable companies, infers that the same cost interactions would 
exist across the companies. This assumption allows this approach to be adopted no matter what 
economies of scale, scope or integration exist. As long as companies have similar cost structures 
then it can be assumed that cost interactions are implicitly included. Figure 4.2 below illustrates 
how an efficient cost path can be set. 
Historically regulators have focused on using actual data for benchmarking purposes and relied 
on forecasts in order to help project base year costs forward. However, Ofgem has proposed 
that it will use forward looking data in its benchmarking for the next gas distribution and 
transmission price control reviews. 
4.2.2. Approach to comparative analysis 
The lower half of Figure 4.2 illustrates some of the different approaches that can be used by 
regulators in determining the scope for achievable efficiency improvements (both catch­up and 
technical change). These approaches include qualitative, relatively simplistic quantitative 
assessments and more sophisticated benchmarking approaches. The more simplistic quantitative 
assessments include: (a) reviewing simple financial ratios; and (b) unit cost comparative analysis. 
We focus less on these approaches given their relative simplicity, (generally) lower data 
requirements and reduced model specification, i.e. these approaches can be conducted with 
few(er) observations and, if the correct ratios are chosen, on sub­company data. 
Figure 4.2: Setting an efficient cost path 
Projection of baseline allowable
costs for price control period 
Assessment of base year
allowable costs 
Projection of efficient cost
targets for the price control
period 
Determination of efficiencies
achievable over price control
period 
Projection of changes in base
year allowable costs to end of
price control period due to
volume effects and existing
management initiatives 
Qualitative and quantitative
Qualitative and
‘Top-down’ evaluation of Econometric and/ or non-
quantitative ‘bottom-up’
evidence from other parametric benchmarking
detailed review of strategy
operators / industries / time of cost areas 
plans 
periods 
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Regulators have used a number of different methodologies in benchmarking relative efficiency 
and technical change, the methods used include COLS, SFA, DEA, and Indices. A discussion 
on the advantages and disadvantages of these approaches was set out in Section 3.3. 
While regulators make use of statistical tools for benchmarking, the analysis has generally been 
done: 
•	 with less sophisticated methodological approaches than those more recently employed by 
academics; 
•	 with various cost drivers; 
•	 at different levels of aggregation; and 
•	 with cross­sectional analysis or shorter panels than those used in more recent academic 
studies (as discussed in Annex A). 
A regulator’s decisions about the best approach to benchmarking involves implicit cost benefit 
analysis regarding the amount of resources (both in terms of the regulator and the regulated 
companies) to devote and the approaches to be adopted. Consideration is particularly given to 
achieving a balance between accuracy and discretion (e.g. allowing for outperformance). 
Regulators are also – and understandably – cautious about relying on sophisticated statistical 
methods that are difficult to explain to non­experts and which depend for their reliability on 
strong assumptions. 
In general, while it may be possible to justify committing a relatively large amount of resources 
on the basis of possible efficiency savings, a more sophisticated set of considerations are 
relevant, including: 
•	 the robustness of the results that are likely to arise from each approach; 
•	 the number of observations, and the accuracy and stability of available (or requested) 
data; 
•	 the transparency of the approach used and its reproducibility; and 
•	 differences in the operating environment (heterogeneity) of the businesses, including 
historic network/ asset setup. 
Where regulators have used econometric, DEA or index models, they have generally adopted a 
number of approaches to mitigate potential issues in the model (e.g. misspecification, 
measurement error, etc) on the modelling results and how these impact on the regulated 
companies. These approaches have included: 
•	 setting an efficiency target that is less challenging than indicated by the modelling; and 
•	 taking a more discretionary approach to using the modelling outputs to set efficiency 
targets, i.e. using them to inform the targets rather than deterministically setting them. 
In addition, we consider that Ofwat should treat evidence from comparative analysis carried out 
at lower levels of costs with care as disaggregation of the data can highlight comparability issues 
between the benchmark companies/ decision making units. Section 3 provided a discussion on 
some of these issues. 
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In the following sections we present examples of regulators’ use of comparative analysis, and 
more specifically their use of sub­company and panel data in the UK and internationally. 
4.3. Ofwat’s PR09 approach 
At PR09 Ofwat set price limits for 10 WaSCs and 12 WoCs, however Cholderton Water was 
excluded from the comparative analysis due to its small size. Ofwat relied on building block 
analysis to determine the revenue allowance for the WaSCs and WoCs. Ofwat analysed opex 
and capex costs separately – as explained below. 
Relative efficiency methodology – operating costs 
Ofwat’s most extensive use of econometric techniques in analysing efficiency covers the 
operating expenditure of each of the companies. At PR09 Ofwat relied on COLS and unit cost 
models applied to cross­section data for 2008­09 to determine an overall efficiency level and 
benchmark. For the water service Ofwat employed four different functional models (based on 
specific operating activities of the companies) at a sub­company level (where a sub­company is 
considered to be a vertical segment of the companies’ value chain) to assess relative operating 
cost efficiencies across the water companies and the water side of the WaSCs. The models were 
for: 
• water distribution; 
• water resources and treatment; 
• water power; and 
• water business activities. 
Ofwat combined the results of these models to give an overall water service operating 
expenditure efficiency band. 
On the sewerage side, Ofwat employed two sub­activity based COLS operating expenditure 
models (where sub­activity refers to an activity at a sub­company level, for example, large 
treatment plants) and three unit cost models to determine overall efficiency scores. Again these 
models used one year of cross­section data. The models covered were: 
• sewerage network (including power); 
• large treatment works; 
• small treatment works unit costs; 
• sludge treatment and disposal unit costs; and 
• sewerage business activities unit costs. 
As with water services the sewerage models Ofwat combined the results from the models to give 
an overall sewerage service operating expenditure efficiency band. Ofwat made adjustments to 
ensure consistency and comparability between the companies. These included an adjustment for 
capex­opex interaction and for pensions costs. Ofwat combined these adjustments with the 
modelling results in order to determine the overall efficiency levels for WaSCs and WoCs. 
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While Ofwat relied on statistical and financial methods in its benchmarking it employed a 
number of techniques that compensated for possible measurement or misspecification (e.g. 
explanatory variables not included) errors. These reduced the emphasis on using the resulting 
overall efficiency scores in a deterministic way. 
The main allowances Ofwat made in the application of its modelling in PR09 were to: (i) reduce 
the residuals to take into account the possible errors in the data and the statistical process; (ii) 
determine the benchmark company taking into account other factors about the company; and 
(iii) use bands for companies’ efficiency based on their distance from the benchmark. If 
companies were close to the upper border of the band then Ofwat promoted them to the next 
band ­ which resulted in a lower efficiency target. 
In addition to relative efficiency analysis (catch­up), Ofwat engaged Reckon LLP to analyse the 
scope for frontier shift or a ‘continuing improvement factor’.33 Ofwat set separate continuing 
improvement factors for total capex and opex. 
Relative efficiency methodology – capital expenditure 
For PR09 Ofwat did not use any econometric cost modelling for capex (unlike previous price 
controls). Instead Ofwat used the cost base comparative tool, as used in previous price controls, 
and the capex incentive scheme (CIS). 
The cost base comparative tool was used to assess relative efficiency in companies' procurement 
and delivery of capital projects. The cost base comparative tool works by comparing company 
estimates of capital works unit costs for a representative range of standardised capital projects.34 
This analysis was used to inform a base line level of capex which then formed the starting level 
of the CIS. 
The CIS is not in itself a relative efficiency assessment tool, rather it is a menu regulation 
mechanism which was used by Ofwat to set expenditure assumptions and associated rewards for 
outperformance, for capital maintenance and enhancement expenditure. Menu regulation works 
by offering companies a trade­off between the allowed level of capex and the benefits/penalties 
associated with the target and under­/over­performance. 
4.4. Other regulators’ approaches 
As noted at the start of this section, the building blocks approach is a common approach used by 
regulators in the UK. Below, we have set out a number of examples of recent price controls 
where the regulators have used one or both sub­company or panel data. We also provide an 
example of a non­building blocks approach to setting relative efficiency targets that was used by 
the New Zealand (NZ) Commerce Commission for its 2004­09 electricity distribution businesses 
price control review. 
33 
Ofwat engaged Reckon LLP as part of PR09 to produce a report investigating the scope for efficiency studies, see 
Reckon (2008). 
34 
Ofwat (2009). 
33 
 
 
 
                           
                     
                         
                               
                           
                          
                             
                               
                         
                           
                             
                                 
                               
    
                           
                           
                           
                             
                             
                           
                         
                           
                               
                           
                               
                     
                             
                                 
   
                           
                             
                            
                                   
                             
       
                             
                           
                                 
                           
                                                 
     
Ofgem 
Ofgem’s approach during its most recent price control review (DPCR5) relied heavily on panel 
data for sub­activities for setting both opex and capex allowances. 
To inform its network operating and indirect cost allowances for DPCR5, Ofgem applied 
corrected ordinary least squares (COLS) based on a panel dataset. The use of a panel dataset 
allowed for 56 observations to be included in the modelling (14 distribution network operators 
[DNOs] with four time periods each [2006­2009]), rather than a cross­section of 14. 
In the first instance, Ofgem undertook OLS to determine the weights for a composite scale 
variable (CSV) to use as the driver to regress the costs against. Given the group ownership 
existing across a number of licences, Ofgem also conducted regressions on indirect (e.g. 
overheads) costs where costs were grouped together by DNO ownership. There were eight 
separate ‘blocks’ of regressions with the cost base, driver, driver weights and outliers varying for 
each. The drivers used by Ofgem varied from MEA value to the number of spans where tree 
cutting occurred. While a CSV was created for most cost items, some costs/ groups only had 
one driver. 
These variations resulted in over 40 separate efficiency scores being produced for each DNO. 
Ofgem weighted these scores together to form an overall efficiency score, a network operating 
costs (NOC) efficiency score and an indirect costs efficiency score. The difference between the 
efficiency scores and the benchmark, based on either the upper third percentile or upper quartile 
(for NOC and indirects respectively), was used to determine an efficient baseline for each DNO. 
We consider that the approach taken by Ofgem, i.e. using efficiency assessment at group, 
company and sub­activity levels, and weighting the resulting scores together (but placing more 
weight on the high aggregation modelling), in effect took account of the cost interactions 
occurring at the more granular level. In other words, Ofgem put less weight on sub­activities as 
assessment at this level does not allow for the full scope for efficiency improvements. 
For capex, Ofgem used panel data to analyse unit costs and volumes to determine allowances for 
load related capex, replacement capex (depreciation), and connection expenditure. There were 
other costs areas which Ofgem assessed, but we have focused on the main areas where sub­
company or panel data was used. This was then incorporated into the IQI, the Ofgem version of 
a menu. 
A recent change in Ofgem’s approach to efficiency assessment has been brought about with 
Ofgem’s move away from a RPI­X based regime to “Regulation = Innovation + Incentive + 
Outputs” (RIIO). The ‘toolkit’ methodologies set out for RIIO focus on totex benchmarking 
first and then if it is deemed necessary Ofgem will drill down on a step­by­step basis into further 
detail (i.e. from totex benchmarking to project by project review), this staged approach is shown 
in Table 4.1 below. 
In addition to moving toward totex benchmarking, Ofgem has announced that as part of the 
next transmission price control review (T1) and gas distribution price control review (GD1) it 
will conduct benchmarking on forecast costs.35 As discussed in Section 2.3, it is not yet clear the 
extent to which Ofgem intends to use forecast costs in its benchmarking. A report 
Ofgem (2011b). 
34 
35 
 
 
                           
        
            
                          
                           
       
                           
                              
                             
                           
   
         
 
                   
                           
                               
                              
                                 
               
 
                     
                             
                               
                             
                         
                                                 
     
     
commissioned by Ofgem, RPI­X@20: The future role of benchmarking in regulatory reviews,36 notes that 
benchmarking future plans can: 
•	 minimise distortion of opex­capex trade­off; 
•	 give a high level assessment of value for money for customers; and, 
•	 reduce the regulatory risk of stranding assets through the assessment of future costs 
against future output. 
However, the report also notes risks associated with this approach including: an incentive to 
inflate plans; and uncertainty over future activity. Given the onus that RIIO places on long­term 
value for money and business plans, Ofgem does not intend to use benchmarking in a 
mechanistic way, rather it will be used to inform Ofgem’s assessment of companies cost 
forecasts. 
Table 4.1: RIIO Assessment toolkit 
Source: Ofgem, Handbook for implementing the RIIO model, October 2010 
Ofgem intends to use a COLS methodology for the transmission price control review rather 
than SFA given that “it provides more reliable estimates than SFA when applied to small sample 
sizes.”37 Ofgem stated that it preferred COLS to DEA as the underlying statistical properties of 
the method allows for tests on the reliability of the estimates. Ofgem intends to use DEA to 
cross check the results of the COLS modelling. 
ORR 
ORR’s efficiency benchmarking approach for PR08 considered total maintenance and renewal 
expenditure. SFA was the main technique used, but checks were performed with COLS and 
DEA. ORR used an 11 year panel dataset of international rail network operators (12 other 
European operators) with which to benchmark Network Rail against. As well as undertaking a 
‘top­down’ econometric analysis of Network Rail’s costs, ORR also carried out a ‘bottom­up’ 
36 
Frontier (2010). 
37 
Ofgem (2011a). 
35 
 
 
                           
           
                             
                           
                           
           
 
                             
                           
                       
                             
                           
                   
                        
                         
                             
                            
                           
                         
                     
       
                             
                     
                       
                             
                               
                                
                               
                       
                         
                              
                           
             
                                 
                           
                             
                                                 
                                           
               
                                          
                             
         
engineering based review which it relied on to validate and better understand the efficiency 
targets produced via the econometric analysis. 
The overall efficiency saving determined and imposed during the price control by ORR was an 
important part of setting the access prices that Network Rail charges train operating companies. 
The efficiency assessment has particular impact on determining the variable usage charge that is 
part of the overall access charge. 
Postcomm 
Postcomm is responsible for regulating one company, Royal Mail. As part of the 2005 price 
review LECG (an economic consultancy) were engaged by Postcomm to review the scope for 
efficiency savings in Royal Mail. LECG undertook comprehensive top­down and bottom­up 
reviews of Royal Mail costs. It carried out internal benchmarking across Royal Mails’ mail centres 
(70) and delivery offices (1383) using DEA analysis and econometric frontier analysis. The 
analysis was conducted on a single year of data (2003/04). 
LECG also undertook four different approaches to the top­down assessment. These approaches 
included comparing TFP ratios to other international mail operators and other regulated sectors 
in the UK.38 LECG used previously determined real unit operating costs (RUOCs) for the 
comparators, therefore the period covered by the TFP indexes varied. There was also significant 
variation in the growth rates recorded for international comparators ranging from ­7% to 7.4% 
(compound annual growth rate, adjusted for volume differentials). The degree of variation 
across the international comparators indicated that this measure was not reliable. 
New Zealand Commerce Commission 
As part of its second price control review (2004­09) for electricity distribution business the New 
Zealand (NZ) Commerce Commission engaged Meyrick (an economic consultancy) to undertake 
a review of the scope for industry productivity improvements, relative efficiency improvements 
and profitability. The Meyrick study relied on a panel data set covering 29 distribution businesses 
over six years. The Meyrick study used a parametric index number approach that allowed for the 
determination of both a firm’s relative efficiency level and its growth over time. Based on these 
results a business was placed into one of three bands which either required no change in 
efficiency, relatively faster efficiency gains or relatively slower efficiency gains. While this 
technique provided insight into the different efficiency levels of the distribution business, the 
businesses cited issues with the robustness of the results and the predictability of the modelling.39 
The regulator noted the concerns raised, but on balance considered that the proposed approach 
was appropriate for setting the price paths. 
Interestingly, the Act under which the 2004 price control was set has since been amended and a 
‘default price path’ is now set for the electricity distribution businesses. The amendments 
stipulate that comparative analysis cannot be used in setting the default price path. The 
38 
The TFP ratio was based on a real unit operating cost (RUOC) ratio, which is equal to firm TFP growth less 
economy­wide growth less an input price adjustment. 
39 
A cost based function was used to determine weights for the outputs. Given the use of panel data this increased 
the scope for companies’ efficiency rankings to retrospectively change compared to estimates determined using a 
different length panel data set. 
36 
 
 
                 
                         
                                  
electricity distribution operators concerns about the transparency, robustness and 
appropriateness of the comparative benchmarking approach were again raised as part of the 
consultation process reviewing the Act and are likely to be one of the reasons for the change. 
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Table 4.1: Regulatory examples – Relative operating cost efficiency assessment  
Sample Ofwat – PR09 Ofgem – DPCR5 ORR – PR08 Postcomm – 2003 NZ Commerce 
Commission – 
Electricity distribution 
price control 2004­09 
Methodology COLS and unit cost 
models. 
COLS. SFA analysis. COLS and 
DEA used as a cross 
check 
DEA, econometric 
frontier analysis and 
SFA used. TFP ratio for 
top­down analysis. 
Multilateral TFP 
analysis(Index) 
Sub­company 
segment 
– vertical Yes. 
Models used to assess 
different segments of the 
water value­chain and 
the sewerage value­
chain. 
No. 
Network companies are 
legally separated from 
other parts of the value­
chain. However, 
multiple licence 
ownership by some 
companies. 
No. 
Single regulated 
company with separate 
assessment of vertical 
companies. 
No. 
Single regulated 
company with separate 
assessment of vertical 
companies. 
No. 
Network companies are 
legally separated from 
other parts of the value­
chain. Analysis was 
done on aggregate 
expenditure. 
Sub­company 
type 
– cost Yes. 
Assessment conducted 
on activities/ cost areas 
e.g. large treatment 
works, power costs, etc. 
Yes (sub­activity). 
Different cost types are 
modelled separately i.e. 
tree cutting, IT, property 
etc. 
No. Yes (sub­activity). 
Benchmarking using 
DEA was carried out on 
the Royal Mail’s deliver 
centres and mail offices. 
No. 
Panel No. 
Single cross­section 
used. 
Yes. 
Four years of data. 
Yes. 
13 years of data from 14 
European rail 
infrastructure managers. 
No (for internal 
benchmarking). 
RUOC growth rates 
across a number of years 
from different countries 
and sectors were used 
for top­down 
benchmarking, but were 
not calculated in the 
same model. 
Yes. 
Six years of data 
(Companies were asked 
to back fill data and 
consistency issues were 
identified). 
38 
 
 
     
       
                             
                
                   
                             
                   
                               
                         
             
                       
             
           
                   
                           
                           
                                
                         
                                 
     
                       
                                
                               
                         
                     
                       
                                 
                             
                
                               
                
 
 
                                                 
                                   
5. OUR APPROACH  
Key themes and lessons 
Uncertainty about the future industry structure means it is appropriate to develop a flexible assessment 
approach. This is built around a decision tree. 
The two key questions that need to be considered are: 
1. At what level of the value chain will the price control(s) be set? And 
2. What is (are) the chosen, corresponding performance measurement requirements? 
With respect to the latter, the increasing focus on competition in the sector means that performance 
measurement to facilitate competition, either through increased transparency of cost data or by 
ensuring efficient access prices, is more appropriate. 
Consequently this means that there are three possible uses of performance measurement: 
1. determining efficient costs for price determinations; 
2. facilitating and monitoring competition; and 
3. providing a consistency check on costs within the sector. 
In this section we present our approach to determining the feasibility of using sub­company 
and/or panel data with different models under various regulatory structures. Our approach is to 
create a decision tree based around key questions and selection factors. This provides a tool that 
can be adapted to different industry/regulatory structures as the industry develops. Our 
approach relies on the concepts and issues set out in Section 3 above (and Annex A). 
5.1. Decision tree 
The industry/regulatory structure is a key determinant of overall requirements for performance 
measurement and as such is the starting point for any evaluation. Given the potential scope for 
changes to the existing industry structure and hence the level along the value chain at which 
Ofwat applies cost efficiency modelling, we have developed a simple decision tree for 
determining the feasibility of different performance measurement options. Consequently the 
choice of industry structure is the first step on the decision tree. 
The shape of the decision tree for a given industry structure is driven by two key questions: 
• At what level of the value chain will the price control(s) be set?40 And 
• What is (are) the performance measurement requirement(s)? 
Based on the answers to the preceding questions, a second ‘stage’ of the decision tree determines 
the feasibility of performance measurement at this level. 
This is concerned with both the legal price control and any indicative controls that may be set. 
39 
40 
 
 
                           
                               
                              
                                 
                       
                           
                       
                       
                           
   
                                     
   
               
                             
                           
             
       
                             
                               
          
                 
                           
           
                    
                             
                             
                                   
                         
                                   
                             
           
                                                 
    
                               
         
5.2. At what level of the value chain will the price control be set?  
The level at which price caps are set determines the minimum aggregated cost level at which 
performance measurement should be conducted. It is important to note that while the price cap 
level may be set at, for example, the level of the regulated company, this does not preclude 
performance measurement being undertaken on sub­company or sub­activity data. The price 
cap reflects the level at which the performance measurement should be undertaken, but further 
information may be gathered through performance measurement at a more disaggregated level. 
In contrast, conducting performance assessment at a lower level of aggregation, generally 
necessitates additional cost assessment at a higher level to ensure consistency of the estimated 
costs. 
We note that Ofwat is considering having more than one price cap when it sets price limits in the 
future.41 
5.3. What is (are) the performance measurement requirement(s)? 
The next step on the decision tree is to consider the purpose of undertaking performance 
measurements. We believe that the requirements for the performance measure fall into three 
broad categories, which are not mutually exclusive. 
5.3.1. Efficient cost determination 
Efficient cost determination refers to the use of the performance measure to assist Ofwat in 
setting efficiency targets for the companies over the price control period. Within this use, the 
performance measures assess the following: 
•	 the potential for efficiency catch­up by lagging companies; 
•	 the potential for continuing efficiency change across the industry as a whole (TFP 
growth at the frontier); and/ or 
•	 appropriate access prices for a monopoly or essential facility.42 
Efficient cost determination is the most common use of a performance measure and it is 
theoretically possible to use some form of measurement at any level of the value chain. 
Although, as explained in Section 3, the fact that it can be applied does not mean that a 
meaningful or unbiased estimate of efficiency will be found from sub­company estimation. If 
economies of scale or scope exist, then a biased estimate may be found and Ofwat may also need 
to undertake the measurement at a different level of aggregation and/or consider some form of 
adjustment to the modelling or results. 
41
Ofwat (2011a). 
42 
Water pipes are typically natural monopoly facilities whereas treatment works and similar are often essential 
facilities but not natural monopolies. 
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5.3.2. Facilitating efficient competition 
The use of the performance measure for facilitating efficient competition is dependent on the 
industry structure and the objectives of the regulation. At the given level where it is applied, the 
performance measure could be used to provide further information on: 
•	 the regulated incumbent’s costs in potentially contestable markets; and/ or 
•	 the appropriate access prices for a monopoly or essential facility. 
Given the nature of the industry, the scope for using the performance measure will be restricted 
to areas where contestability has been identified and may be viable over time (not necessarily in 
the short­term). 
For example, as suggested in Ofwat’s January 2011 assessment of hypothetical upstream water 
markets,43 efficient competition will require access pricing at the sub­company level, and location 
specific information on an incumbent’s marginal costs in potentially contestable markets. Sub­
company modelling, would in principle provide useful information to meet both of these needs. 
5.3.3. Consistency checks 
A performance measure can be used for two forms of consistency checks: 
•	 Cost interaction. To ensure that cost interactions and cost allocations between activities of 
an integrated firm which are assessed at a lower level of vertical or horizontal aggregation 
have not resulted in a biased overall cost assessment (discussed in Section 3 and Annex 
A). 
•	 Performance assessment (continuity). A consistency check between past performance 
assessment measures and new forms of performance assessment under development. 
Simply put, the first ensures that the sum of the parts equals the whole; while the second checks 
for consistency in results across different models. The first check may be done on a level above 
that at which the price cap is set. This would be done where the price cap is set at a level below 
company ownership, or potentially where there is group ownership of multiple companies within 
the regulated segment. 
In an ideal world the second objective would be achieved by running the old and new models 
concurrently (as Ofwat has done in the past when changes occur) to check for robust consistent 
results. It may not be possible, however, to do this and consequently an approach based around 
running several alternative approaches, or some higher level checks, could be considered to 
check the robustness of the new model. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 9. 
5.3.4. Possible performance measurement requirements for PR14 
Table 5.1 below illustrates the possible requirements for performance measures for PR14 if 
efficiency modelling were to be conducted based on data provided in line with the current 
accounting separation guidelines. As noted above, performance measurement can feasibly be 
Ofwat (2011b). 
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used at any level of the value chain for efficient cost determination. The use of performance 
measurement for facilitating competition is, however, less useful at an aggregated level, i.e. it is 
unlikely competition could be introduced, by PR14, at the current regulated business level or the 
potential regulated business level. A ‘higher level’ performance measure could be used to help 
set efficient access prices, but the appropriateness of this is dependent on the level of 
heterogeneity at the access level. 
Performance measurement can be used as a consistency check at any cost aggregation level 
above sub­activity. For PR14, the intertemporal performance measurement check can be done 
at the current regulated business level. It is also feasible that Ofwat’s current opex sub­company 
models could be used as a partial consistency check, depending on the similarities in the 
structure of the cost data between PR14 and PR09. 
Table 5.1: Example of the possible performance measurement requirements at PR14 
Performance 
measurement 
Current regulated 
business (i.e. 
WaSC or WoC) 
Potential 
regulated 
business (e.g. 
Water excluding 
retail) 
Vertical 
segment (e.g. 
Water 
treatment) 
Sub­activity 
(e.g. large 
sewage 
treatment 
plant) 
Efficient cost 
determination 
� � � �
Facilitating 
competition 
� � � �
Consistency ­ cost 
interaction 
� � � �
Consistency – 
performance 
assessment (continuity) 
� � � �
5.4. Data availability 
The first consideration for the option assessment is to determine the extent to which data is 
available to undertake the performance measurement. 
Data collection at levels of disaggregation below those traditionally reported in regulatory 
accounts (or in company accounts), are likely to suffer in the near future from low accuracy and 
stability. (Anecdotal evidence would suggest that at least two years need to elapse before the 
data stabilises at lower levels of disaggregation.) Given the changes to data collection imposed 
by Ofwat’s new accounting separation guidelines in 2009/10 it is likely that only data at the 
highest level(s) of aggregation indicated in Table 5.1 (i.e. current regulated business) will be 
available for significant amounts of panel analysis at PR 14. So, when determining whether 
appropriate data is available for performance measurement the length of the dataset needs to be 
considered against the reliability of early observations. Ofwat will need to decide whether it is 
confident enough about the accuracy and stability of the data to use it in its cost modelling. 
Given the discussion above the key questions at this step in the decision tree are: 
• Are there a sufficient number of observations available? And 
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• Are there a sufficient number of comparators available? 
As discussed in Sections 3.4, 3.5, and Annex A, modelling at a sub­company or sub­activity level 
may require a number of additional variables to control for heterogeneity, scale effects etc. As 
the number of comparators at the sub­company level are limited (and may reduce through future 
mergers although this is not necessarily the case e.g. the number of treatment plants), this would 
suggest that panel or pooled data would be required to provided sufficient observations to 
produce robust estimates. While there are likely to be more ‘comparators’ at the sub­activity 
level, pooled or panel data may be a requirement as well if insufficient numbers are available. 
As we have posited in Section 3.4 and Annex A.6, if shorter datasets (e.g. less than four years) 
are only available then applying panel models on a pooled basis may be applicable if tests for the 
presence of technical change prove to be statistically insignificant. However, if a longer database 
(of consistent comparators) is available then we would suggest that any panel cost modelling be 
conducted with controls for technical changes. If technical change is present, but only a short 
data set is available, then year dummy variables may be sufficient to control for technical change. 
However, this would require the assumption that the time specific effect is individually invariant 
(i.e. all companies experience the same year­on­year change).44 
5.5. Performance measurement methodology 
The choice of performance measurement is driven by the requirements and objectives of Ofwat. 
This is an important decision, and we have discussed the different approaches available to Ofwat 
in Section 3.4, however we do not propose an in depth review of the various different 
methodologies at each level. Rather we need to consider, at a high level, the appropriateness of 
the specific types of methodologies – econometric, DEA and non­parametric index – at the 
given level of the value chain. 
Table 5.2 below indicates the likely feasibility of different methodologies at different levels of the 
value chain. This assessment is based on the assumption that there is suitable data available (i.e. 
the previous step of the decision tree has been passed). As can be seen from the table, it is our 
view that econometric methods and DEA are feasible at all levels of the value chain – at least on 
a cross­sectional basis and possibly with pooled, non­panel data. However, it needs to be 
recognised that the potential for biased estimation increases substantially as one moves to greater 
levels of disaggregation. This is primarily because of the various issues discussed earlier regarding 
the impact of potential vertical and horizontal linkages. We do not consider that non­parametric 
index number approaches are likely to be feasible at lower levels of the value chain because of 
their requirements for measuring capex or total cost, their relative inflexibility in dealing with 
different operating characteristics, and their requirement for output price proxies. 
Please see Section A.7.1 for further discussion on issues around technical change in a pooled model. 
43 
44 
Table 5.2:  Feasible methodologies at different levels of the value­chain 
Performance  Current  Potential  Vertical  Sub  Activity 
methodology   Regulated  Regulated   Segment  Level 
Business    Business 
�  �  �  � 
(COLS, SFA)  
Econometrics  
 
�  �  �  �DEA  
�  �  �  � 
index  (Tournqvist, 
Fisher)  
Non­parametric 
5.6.  Summary 
This  section  sets  out  our  proposed  decision  making  steps  and  options  assessment  for 
determining the appropriateness of using panel, sub­company and/or performance measurement 
at different  levels of  the value chain.   Figure 5.1 below  illustrates  the decision making process 
(i.e. Decision tree) for a given industry structure.   The first three stages (‘price control  level’ to 
‘measurement  use?’)  of  the  decision  tree  determine  the  requirement  for  sub­company  data.  
During  the  option  assessment  stage  the  use  of  panel  data  and  feasible  methodologies  are 
considered.  
In the next section we demonstrate how this decision process could be applied. We have used an 
example  of  the  data  that  companies  report  to  Ofwat  in  line  with  the  current  accounting 
separation guidelines.    
Figure 5.1:  Decision tree 
Price control level Sub-activity Measurement use? Option assessment 
Efficient Cost 
Determination
�
Performance 
Regulated Facilitating 
Data availability measurement 
business unit Competition 
methodology 
Consistency 
Check
�
Efficient Cost 
Determination
�
Performance 
Facilitating 
Vertical segment Data availability measurement 
Competition 
methodology 
Consistency 
Check
�
Efficient Cost 
Determination
�
Performance 
Facilitating 
… Data availability measurement 
Competition 
methodology 
Consistency 
Check
�
Performance 
… Etc… Data availability measurement 
methodology 
Performance 
… … Etc… Data availability measurement 
methodology 
Performance 
Consistency 
Company* Data availability measurement 
Check 
methodology 
*If  regulated business unit is not the company then 
consistency check at higher level may be required.    
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6. POTENTIAL APPLICATION AT PR14  
Key themes and lessons 
The companies currently report their costs under nine business units using the accounting separation 
guidelines. Based on existing Ofwat statements, 45 we understand that at PR14 it may set separate 
wholesale and retail price controls but with possible sub­caps for some of the business units within the 
wholesale control. Consequently: 
•	 Performance measurement for price setting is likely to be needed across all the industry 
segments although this does not necessarily mean that a price cap will be set for each business 
unit; 
•	 Performance measurement at sub­company and sub­activity levels may be needed in a small 
number of areas to facilitate competition, this is more likely to be important for sludge 
treatment and disposal, water resources and possibly competitive retail; 
•	 Depending on policy around the speed of the growth of more general competition there may 
be a need for Ofwat to undertake performance measurement at the sub­company level for 
distribution activities to be able to set efficient access prices, although this may be something 
that occurs beyond the PR14 determination; 
•	 It may be necessary for Ofwat to undertake consistency checks across a range of levels, 
including at the company level, given potential issues around cost allocation, cost interactions, 
etc; and 
•	 We believe that most forms of performance measurement are possible at PR14, however, we 
consider that non­parametric index number approaches are less desirable, than econometric or 
DEA approaches, at sub­company or sub­activity level as there is less scope in these models to 
control for heterogeneity and the requirement of output price indices. (Note that we do not 
discuss further whether separate opex and capex or totex benchmarking should be undertaken 
as this is outside the remit of this project.) 
The existing price control was set at the level of the entire business for WoCs and WaSCs 
(separate indicative price controls were set for water and sewerage services), with efficiency 
analysis being conducted separately for water and sewerage. Ofwat used models for this 
efficiency analysis which varied from being conducted on vertical segments within each company 
type (e.g. water distribution) to sub­activity (e.g. large sewage treatment plants). Ofwat has 
introduced accounting separation guidelines that require regulated companies to provide 
accounting information split between nine different business units – four water, four sewerage 
and one retail. 
Modelling using accounting separation data is a logical extension of the modelling approach 
behind Ofwat’s PR09 benchmarking approaches as well as its sub­company data approach for 
performance measurement, e.g. breaking the whole into its parts allowing better understanding 
of the cost drivers. Moreover, if the vertical lines between units of assessment are drawn 
“appropriately” accounting separation allows assessment of “parts” which may be economically 
valid “wholes”. However, as explained in Section 3, if the levels chosen are not appropriate then 
Ofwat (2011a). 
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biased estimates may be found and Ofwat would need to undertake the consistency checks 
discussed earlier to determine if controls were needed for cost allocation issues. 
Accounting separation may provide sufficient data to allow Ofwat to implement sub­company 
price caps in 2014 or beyond. However, without legal separation, estimating the costs of 
integrated operations may suffer from cost allocation issues and be subject to potential 
regulatory gaming. Even with legal separation, if costs are non­separable and/or if substantial 
vertical integration (dis)economies exist between all or some accounting separation parts, failing 
to properly control for these cost interactions may well result in potentially biased cost 
assessments. This may still be the case even if efficient cost transfers were in place, as economies 
of scope and scale may still exits. However, if all companies have the same organisational 
structure then although the performance measure may be biased, it is biased for everyone and it 
is not an issue when comparing companies or assessing their costs. If some companies have a 
different organisational structure then it is possible that the bias in the cost assessment will be 
uneven. 
Ofgem does not appear to carry out consistency checks across the vertical segments in the 
energy value chain. This may be because Ofgem is satisfied that cost interactions in the value 
chain are not creating biased costs assessment (for example, the electricity distribution business 
may be close to the optimal size [or size range]). 
In this section we place the greater focus on how the decision tree applies to water supply, but 
with some consideration of sewerage and retail in the later sub­sections. This emphasis is 
because the same types of issues arise no matter which of the segments of the industry are being 
evaluated. Under the accounting separation guidelines, companies’ retail business units are 
required to be reported separately. Retail business units are considered in Section 6.3. 
For the purpose of illustrating the approach set out in Section 5 in the analysis below we have 
assumed certain price cap levels and activity breakdowns for PR14. These assumptions are 
based on plausible, but not necessarily probable, outcomes given Ofwat’s accounting separation 
guidelines. In addition, we also make the following two assumptions: 
•	 no further competition would have developed by PR14, however, if it were to develop 
then the access pricing issues discussed in Section 7 would need to be considered; and 
•	 the allocation of capital and the privatisation discount between business units will have 
been satisfactorily dealt with. Our analysis of data availability and performance 
measurement feasibility does not take in to account the capital allocations and 
privatisation discounts.46 
The privatisation discount is the discount provided on the asset base when the companies were privatised. 
46 
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6.1. Water 
6.1.1. Possible structure 
Figure 6.1 provides an illustration of the possible structure of the water sector under Ofwat’s 
accounting separation guidelines.47 The vertical segments are based on Ofwat’s business units, 
while the sub­activity level illustrates plausible (not necessarily probable) smaller decision making 
units (DMUs). Note, the water structure excludes retail, which is discussed in Section 6.3. 
Figure 6.1: Possible structure of ‘water’ 
Water resources 
Possible regulated business Sub-activity 
Zone 
Source 
Water 
Raw water
distribution 
Trade 
Water treatment 
Plant 
Treated water
distribution 
Vertical segment Current regulated business 
WoC or WaSC 
WS Zone 
Sub business
operating unit 
While the sub­activity splits are for illustrative purposes, it is plausible that the vertical segments 
could be broken down in to further DMUs. Sub­activity DMUs in Figure 6.1 refers to: 
•	 Zone. The resource zone in which all water resources, including external transfers, can be 
shared.48 
•	 Source. The DMU in control of abstracting from a source (e.g. aquifers, lakes, reservoirs, 
rivers and third parties). 
•	 Trade. Covers the DMUs involved in trading bulk supplies of treated or untreated water. 
•	 Plant. The ‘plant’ involved in the treatment of raw water (or partially treated raw water). 
•	 WS Zone. Water supply zone. 
•	 Sub business operating unit. A functional business unit with the ability to make decision 
regarding its own activities, such as distinct water supply units within a regulated firm. 
47 
Summaries of the business units defined by Ofwat are set out in Appendix 1 of the accounting separation 
guidelines, see http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/competition/rrq_jr09­10_acountingsepappen1.pdf. 
48 
Ofwat’s definition of resource zone is set out in the glossary for the accounting separation guidelines, see 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/pap_tec_lrmcglossary.pdf. 
47 
 
 
                         
                                 
   
   
                           
                     
                               
                           
                            
                         
 
                                      
                           
                         
                           
                             
                                   
                                   
                               
                                       
                             
                                   
                           
                               
                               
                         
                                
                             
                             
                               
   
                           
                               
                                 
                            
             
                           
                     
                         
Of course, were further competition to be introduced over time, some sub­activities may 
become more dependent on the form and level of access prices. This issue is considered in 
Section 7. 
6.1.2. Evaluation 
As noted in Section 5, the requirements for performance measurement are determined by the 
industry structure, requirements for the regulatory regime and Ofwat’s objectives. 
We have applied the decision tree to what we consider to be plausible outcomes under Ofwat’s 
existing accounting separation guidelines at PR14. In order to restrict the number of independent 
assessments we have grouped the different DMUs at similar levels across the water business. 
The summary results for these are set out in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 
Water 
We have assumed that this is the level that Ofwat will set the price controls. At this level, Ofwat 
will need to use performance measures for efficient cost determination and as a consistency 
check (for cost allocation issues). Moreover, for water operations contained within a WaSC, 
Ofwat should carry out higher level consistency checks to properly control for cost interactions 
between water and sewerage activities. Ofwat will not need to use the performance measure at 
this level to facilitate competition as this is infeasible by PR14 at this level of the value chain. 
For PR14, we consider that there is likely to be a stable dataset with approximately three to four 
years of data available as: (i) the accounting separation guidelines have been in place since the 
2009/10 reporting year; and (ii) as this is a high level of the value chain (e.g. high level of cost 
aggregation), cost allocation issues will be relatively minor. A model based on panel data is 
possible with a dataset of this length and breadth, however Ofwat may also consider the use of a 
pooled data specification, if it determines that technical change is not significant, rather than 
panel (i.e. pool all observations together and run through a standard OLS model). If Ofwat 
determines that there is sufficient data, then given the benefits outlined in Section 3.5, e.g. the 
ability to control for cross sectional and intertemporal heterogeneity, we would recommend a 
panel based model. At this level there may be potential for Ofwat to conduct assessments using 
data from the pre­accounting separation guidelines period, thereby allowing it the use of a longer 
panel. However, Ofwat should carefully consider and test the data, and controls for structural 
breaks may be necessary to ensure that structural breaks in the data did not influence the 
estimated costs. 
Table 6.1 below summarises the key factors that Ofwat needs to consider and potential 
implications and solutions. Ofwat may need to introduce a number of variables to control for 
various factors (e.g. heterogeneity) at this level, if this is the case then a sufficient number of 
observations will be needed to provide robust modelling estimates. Panel data may be required 
to provide sufficient degrees of freedom. 
At this level of the value chain any performance measurement methodology is feasible, including 
non­parametric index numbers. While non­parametric index numbers provide less scope to 
control for different operating characteristics, if Ofwat determined this was not a significant 
48 
 
 
                                    
                         
                       
                            
                                     
                               
             
                           
               
  
      
     
             
           
       
           
         
  
             
           
       
        
         
       
               
           
            
             
            
             
           
               
           
             
                 
             
             
           
         
       
           
           
             
       
             
       
       
       
       
       
             
   
           
           
           
             
               
             
             
       
           
             
           
             
             
             
                 
             
               
                                                 
               
issue at this level then it would be suitable to use them.49 However, the choice of methodology is 
dependent on Ofwat’s objectives. Requesting data on variables potentially required to control 
for heterogeneity, scale, etc, would create additional regulatory burdens on companies and 
Ofwat. A number of variables that might potentially be needed are, however, currently collected 
as part of the June return process. Therefore, we believe this issue is more a matter of being 
careful to retain necessary control variables, if Ofwat were to revise the required content of the 
June return to reduce regulatory burden. 
Table 6.1: Key considerations for performance measurement for water (excluding retail) at PR14 
Issue Relevance to this part of the value 
chain 
Implication and solutions 
Underlying economic theory 
Input prices Input price differentials across water 
businesses are likely to be mainly 
driven by geographical differences 
(e.g. one region’s labour costs are 
relatively lower than in another 
region). 
The possibility of a longer dataset at 
this level allows the possibility of 
capturing input substitution over 
time as prices change. 
Intertemporal price changes will also 
need to be considered. 
At this level Ofwat could deal with relative 
input price differentials through regional price 
adjustments (e.g. ONS regional wage data). 
Ofwat could also include controls in the 
modelling to allow for input substitution. 
Alternatively, it could make adjustments to the 
input data or post­model (i.e. discretionary 
adjustment to the allowance) to take account of 
these differences. Both approaches require 
information on price changes across the regions 
(and over time) which, in some cases, may be 
difficult to obtain, and could increase the 
regulatory burden. Ofwat would need to 
explore, in conjunction with the regulated 
companies the scope for (independently 
verified) input prices. 
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity at this aggregated level 
will be less easily identifiable in 
relation to its impact on costs (i.e. 
some heterogeneity across business 
units will be ‘averaged out’ at this 
level). However, key operating 
differences like density of 
connections can be identified. 
Intertemporal differences related to 
operating characteristics such as 
levels of service might need to be 
controlled for 
When possible, Ofwat should control for 
heterogeneity, through the use of appropriate 
variables and controls that capture statistically 
significant differences at this level of operation. 
Ofwat may need to collect additional data in 
order to include controls for the heterogeneity. 
Opex­capex Opex­capex trade­off will be a key 
consideration at this level. 
Economic cost modelling states that opex 
modelling could include controls for changes in 
capital stocks. Ofwat should, where possible, 
include controls for changes in capital stocks 
(e.g. quasi­fixed capital stocks) in its opex 
modelling. Totex modelling is an alternative 
for Ofwat to use, however we consider this to 
be slightly less preferable as there are 
definitional issues in relation to what should be 
49 
This was discussed further in Section 3.3. 
49 
 
 
             
            
   
 
 
               
         
     
               
             
               
               
                 
               
                 
 
 
         
             
         
     
         
     
           
               
             
           
         
 
               
         
         
         
 
               
    
   
   
 
         
           
           
               
         
         
             
       
           
               
         
           
             
                 
            
             
           
             
 
         
                     
                               
                         
                                    
                             
                                 
                       
                       
                               
                               
                                                 
                                       
   
included (e.g. does it include capex, or 
depreciation and return on planned capex). 
Other factors 
Technical At this level it is likely that technical Ofwat could include variables in the model to 
change change will impact on the 
performance measure. 
control/ allow for technical change. At this 
level the panel data length should be sufficient 
to allow for technical change to be controlled 
for. For PR14 pooled data over three to four 
years may be an option for Ofwat, accepting 
that the level of technical change is limited. 
Cost Vertical cost interaction issues are Ofwat could assess horizontal cost interactions 
interactions likely to be relatively minor at this 
level of aggregation. Some 
potentially horizontal cost 
interactions may exist between water, 
sewerage and retail. 
by carrying out a consistency check at the 
company level. If interactions exist, then Ofwat 
can control for them through additional 
explanatory variables or through regulatory 
discretion. 
Scale Water companies may not be at the 
optimal size for the industry, 
meaning some may be experiencing 
economies of scale while others, 
diseconomies. 
Ofwat could use ‘flexible models’ that allow for 
variable returns. 
Length and Panel data would have been There should be sufficient stable observations 
breadth of collected since 2009/10 and there is available at this level of aggregation to allow 
panel some potential for the possible use 
of data at this level from before this 
period.50 Note, data definitions can 
change and explanatory variables can 
be updated over time resulting in a 
reduction in data consistency. 
Ofwat to undertake robust performance 
measurement. There should also be sufficient 
observations to allow Ofwat to include controls 
for the some of the factors identified (e.g. cost 
interactions, heterogeneity) if they are required. 
Ofwat may also need to control for 
intertemporal changes in data (i.e. including 
dummy variables to take into account structural 
breaks). 
Vertical activity level (i.e. sub­company) 
The vertical segments considered under Ofwat's existing accounting separation guidelines are: 
water resources, raw water distribution, water treatment and treated water distribution. At this level the 
performance measure can provide information on cost drivers and assist in determining efficient 
costs, but it is not necessarily a requirement if the price control is not applied at this level. 
At PR14 it is unlikely that Ofwat would need the performance measure to facilitate competition 
at this level, but it may provide a further check (in addition to the water level performance 
assessment) of cost allocation consistency if performance measurement is carried out on sub­
activities. However, beyond PR14 a performance measure may be required to facilitate 
competition for water resource and possibly water treatment activity levels and there may be value in 
the early establishment of these models, and by extension data requirements, for these segments. 
Note, mergers will reduce the number of comparators, and the affect on the temporal element would need to be 
controlled for. 
50 
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As with the ‘total’ water level, there is likely to be a stable panel dataset available but the length of 
the data set may be more appropriate for facilitating pooled panel models and greater reliance on 
more advanced panel models may need to be set off until future price reviews (beyond PR14) 
when longer panel data sets could be available. 
Broadly, the key considerations for performance measurement at this level are the same as 
outlined for water in Table 6.1, i.e. controls for input price differentials, heterogeneity, technical 
change, etc, are required. However, some key considerations for Ofwat to consider if it were to 
conduct performance measurement at this level are: 
•	 Ofwat should include capital stock measures to take account of the opex­capex trade­off. 
•	 Cost interactions between vertical segments are likely to be high. In practice water 
supply costs are highly interactive through the water supply value chain. For example, 
companies will aim to minimise pumping and treatment costs so the cost experienced at 
zonal level is directly related to the availability of the source, raw water distribution, and 
treatment plant. 
•	 Scale issues are still likely to exist at this level as the vertical segments should reflect the 
size of water for each company. Ofwat could use flexible models that allow for variable 
returns. 
•	 There should be sufficient stable accounting data available at this level of aggregation to 
undertake robust performance measurement. However, Ofwat may need to collect 
additional information on input and output explanatory variable in order to control for 
factors outlined above. 
Table 6.2 below provides more specific considerations for cost modelling in each of the water 
vertical segments. As the reporting requirements have only recently been introduced (2009/10) 
and the costs for these segments have yet to be analysed, the considerations presented in the 
table are our assumptions and are intended to illustrate the potential considerations. As with any 
cost modelling, Ofwat would need to analyse and test the data to determine the characteristics of 
each of the vertical segments. 
We note that, at this level of the value chain any performance measurement methodology is 
feasible in principle. However, the choice of methodology is dependent on Ofwat’s objectives. 
As discussed in Section 3.3 econometric approaches provide the greatest scope for controlling 
for heterogeneity, but more advanced DEA techniques also allow for some degree of 
heterogeneity. Both methods could be used to provide Ofwat with additional information. Non­
parametric index number techniques are less plausible at this level given the inflexibility in 
controlling for different operating environments and the requirement for output prices proxies, 
which may not exist at PR14. If Ofwat requests data on variables potentially required to control 
for heterogeneity, scale, etc, the regulatory burden on companies would increase (unless already 
received as part of the June reporting requirements) and so Ofwat should consider this as part of 
their cost benefit analysis. 
51 
 
 
                               
                       
                    
         
       
        
           
         
           
   
         
             
         
         
     
         
             
       
     
       
           
         
           
     
           
     
       
         
           
       
 
 
       
       
       
         
         
       
     
 
       
             
       
       
     
           
         
         
         
           
       
       
     
 
       
           
       
         
       
       
     
 
               
           
           
         
         
       
       
           
 
           
               
           
     
 
             
       
         
         
           
     
             
         
             
           
           
         
         
       
         
   
                                                 
                                                     
     
                                               
Table 6.2: Water vertical segments (i.e. business units) ­ summary table of segment specific key considerations  
Issue Key considerations for each of the Water business units (at PR14) 
Water resources Raw water distribution Water treatment Treated water distribution 
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity will exist between 
the different companies (e.g. 
borehole versus reservoir). Ofwat 
would need to undertake tests to 
check the significance of the 
heterogeneity and allow for it if 
necessary. 51 
Heterogeneity is likely to be 
driven by the source of the water, 
i.e. type of water (groundwater, 
upland river, lowland river, upland 
reservoir, lowland reservoir, 
brackish, sea water), the distance 
and terrain to the treatment plant. 
Significant heterogeneity is likely 
between different treatment 
technologies. The cost of treat­
ment is dependent on the source 
e.g. borehole or upland reservoir 
supplies are often cheaper to treat 
than brackish water.52 
There is likely to be reasonable 
heterogeneity across companies 
due to different operating 
characteristics such as the distance 
from the treatment plant and the 
density of customer connections. 
Cost Vertical cost interactions are Vertical cost interactions are Vertical cost interactions are likely Vertical cost interactions between 
interactions likely, particularly with water 
treatment and water distribution. 
Ofwat should test for cost 
interactions and, if required, make 
appropriate controls or an 
adjustment through regulatory 
discretion. 
possible. Ofwat should test for 
cost interactions and include 
appropriate controls or an 
adjustment through regulatory 
discretion. These may differ for 
different types of water sources. 
to exist, particularly with water 
resources. Ofwat should test for 
cost interactions and include 
appropriate controls or an 
adjustment through regulatory 
discretion. 
water resource and water treatment are 
likely and particularly for 
boreholes. Ofwat should test for 
cost interactions and include 
appropriate controls or an 
adjustment through regulatory 
discretion. 
Scale Scale issues are likely to exist for 
water resources. There may be 
scale aspects in relation to the 
different type of sources (e.g. 
large reservoirs may have different 
economies compared to small 
reservoirs). Similarly efficient 
scale may vary for boreholes and 
reservoirs. 
We consider that there are likely 
to be scale issues for raw water 
distribution as a result of different 
network lengths across 
companies. 
Scale issues are likely to exist for 
water treatment, e.g. different 
economies of scale between large 
and small treatment plants, and 
these are influenced by source of 
water being treated. 
Scale issues are likely to exist for 
treated water distribution, e.g. there 
are likely to be variable returns to 
scale with at first increasing and 
then decreasing returns to scale as 
size increases, but these scale 
economies are also influenced by 
settlement patterns as larger 
settlements will have a larger 
optimal scale. 
51 
For example, Ofwat allowed for heterogeneity in its PR09 model for ‘Water resources and treatment’ by including the number of sources divided by distribution input (to capture 
average source size). 
52 
For example, Ofwat allowed for heterogeneity in its PR09 model for ‘Water resources and treatment’ by including the proportion of supplies from boreholes. 
52 
 
 
    
                               
                                    
                              
                         
                       
                   
 
                                     
                                  
                           
                            
                         
                       
                           
                                  
                       
                             
                           
                       
    
                                 
                           
                               
                     
                               
                         
                       
                  
                                 
                             
                                 
                       
               
                             
                             
       
 
 
Sub­activity level 
As noted above, we have based the sub­vertical activity units on possible DMUs at lower levels 
of the value chain. A performance measure for PR14 is plausible at this level of the value chain 
and it may be required for determining efficient costs – especially to support greater competition. 
However, as with the vertical segments, we recommend that Ofwat should undertake a cost­
benefit analysis (Section 8) considering the additional data requirements, accuracy issues and 
resource requirements against the additional information provided by the performance 
measurement. 
If reporting requirements are put in place soon, it is plausible that two or more years of data may 
be available for PR14, but with caveats around the stability and accuracy. For PR14, one year of 
data may be sufficient for performance measurement, however, this is dependent on the number 
of comparators available and the number of variables required for the models. Therefore, Ofwat 
could begin collecting this information, but it should consider the modelling requirements before 
it can commit to undertaking performance measurement at this level for PR14. 
The key considerations for performance measurement of sub­activity units in water are similar to 
those set out for the water vertical segments. Some key issues that Ofwat would need to consider 
to be able to carry out performance measurement at this level include: 
•	 Heterogeneity will be more apparent at this level of analysis and Ofwat will almost 
certainly need to use some controls for differences identified. For example, the water 
resource sub­activity is likely to have different operating characteristics within and across 
the companies. 
•	 The ability to trade­off opex for capex will exist at this level e.g. introduction of remote 
monitoring at a treatment plant as a substitute for labour. Ofwat should introduce 
controls for capital, however at this level it may be more difficult (or a least require 
further information) to establish the asset base for each sub­activity unit. 
•	 There will likely be significant difference in scale which may result in biased estimates if 
(dis)economies of scale are not taken into account. Where possible Ofwat should use 
controls for different sized DMUs, this may be through additional explanatory variables 
or different models for groups of different sizes. And 
•	 Data is not currently being collected at this level. Given the time required to develop and 
consult on reporting guidelines, it is unlikely that more than two years of panel data 
would be available by PR14. There is likely to be a reasonably high additional cost, to 
both Ofwat (processing the data and ensuring consistency) and the regulated companies, 
to collecting the required variables at this level. 
We do not present a more detailed breakdown of specific considerations for each of the sub­
activities as further analysis would need to be undertaken to inform any consideration of cost 
modelling at this level. 
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6.1.3. Summary 
Given the accounting separation guidelines set by Ofwat, at PR14 a stable but relatively short 
panel dataset (three to four years) would be available for conducting performance assessment at 
the potential regulated business (water) and vertical segment levels (water resources, raw water 
distribution, water treatment and treated water distribution). Given the potential cost interactions 
between sewerage and water activities for WaSCs, company level consistency checks are 
important to determine if economies of scope exist and whether these need to be controlled for. 
Analysis done at the potential regulated business level will be required for the price control. 
As cost data is currently collected at the vertical segment (sub­company) level, performance 
measurement by Ofwat at this level will likely result in relatively low levels of additional resource 
cost, e.g. collection of output and input explanatory variables. Issues around accurate cost 
allocation, vertical integration economies, and (dis)economies of scale would need to be 
considered as part of a cost benefit analysis, however it is likely that performance measures at 
this level will provide significant information on cost drivers. 
Undertaking performance measurement at the sub­activity level would appear to offer few 
benefits as it would not be required for facilitating competition or consistency checks at PR14. 
In addition, given the shorter ‘settling’ period for the collection of the data from the regulated 
companies there is a risk that the data would be less robust (in relation to cost allocation) and 
stable. 
The conclusions of this section as they affect PR14 are set out in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 below. 
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Table 6.3: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­activity level Performance measurement requirement Continue? 
Efficient cost 
determination 
Facilitating efficient 
competition 
Consistency check 
Water ­ Yes No Yes Yes 
Water resources ­ Yes No *Yes Yes 
Water resources Zone **Yes **Yes No ** 
Water resources Source **Yes No No ** 
Water resources Trade **Yes **Yes No ** 
Raw water distribution ­ Yes **Yes No Yes 
Water treatment ­ Yes **Yes *Yes Yes 
Water treatment Trade **Yes **Yes No ** 
Treated water distribution ­ Yes **Yes *Yes Yes 
Treated water distribution WS Zone **Yes **Yes No ** 
Treated water distribution Sub business operating 
unit 
**Yes **Yes No ** 
* Consistency check required if benchmarking performed at sub­vertical activity level.  
** Theoretically feasible, but dependent on Ofwat’s requirements/ objectives Facilitating competition is unlikely at PR14, however potentially needed  
beyond PR14 and is discussed further in Section 7.  
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Table 6.4: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­vertical activity 
level 
Data availability 
(years)1 
Methodology Continue? 
Econometrics DEA Non­parametric 
index2 
Water ­ <4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Water resources ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Water resources Zone <2 Yes Yes No * 
Water resources Source <2 Yes Yes No * 
Water resources Trade <2 Yes Yes No * 
Raw water distribution ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Water treatment ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Water treatment Trade <2 Yes Yes No * 
Treated water distribution ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Treated water distribution WS Zone <2 Yes Yes No * 
Treated water distribution Sub business operating 
unit 
<2 Yes Yes No * 
1 Based on the assumption of only using historical data for benchmarking. 
2 Non­parametric indices are feasible at lower levels of the value chain, however we consider that they are less desirable at lower levels (see Section 3.3.3 
for a further discussion around non­parametric indices). 
* Feasible, but dependent on the number of observations available. 
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6.2. Sewerage 
As with water above, we consider the use of accounting separation data is a logical extension of 
Ofwat’s current modelling approach. 
6.2.1. Possible structure 
Figure 6.2 provides an illustration of the possible structure of the sewerage sector under the 
current accounting separation guidelines. As with the water sector the vertical segments are based 
on Ofwat’s business units, while the sub­activity level illustrates plausible (not necessarily 
probable) smaller DMUs. Note, the sewerage structure excludes retail, which is discussed in 
Section 6.3. 
Figure 6.2: Possible structure of ‘Sewerage’ 
Sewage
collection 
Possible regulated business Sub-activity 
Zone 
Sewerage 
Sewage
treatment 
Sludge
treatment 
Sludge disposal 
Vertical segment Current regulated business 
WaSC 
Transport 
Zone 
Facility 
Large plants 
Small plants 
Plant 
6.2.2. Evaluation 
As with Water supply, we have grouped the different DMUs at similar levels across the business 
in order to restrict the number of independent assessments. 
Sewerage 
We assume that the price control is applied at this level, therefore a performance measure is 
required for efficient cost determination and potentially required consistency checks (for cost 
allocation issues if analysis is undertaken below this level of aggregation). The performance 
measure is not required to facilitate competition as this is infeasible at this level of the value 
chain for PR14. 
57 
 
 
                                       
                             
                                   
            
                                   
                    
                             
                             
                  
                               
                        
                     
                             
                           
               
                               
                           
                         
                              
                    
                               
                     
                         
                         
                 
                             
                             
                                 
                             
                                 
                         
   
                             
                             
                             
                               
                                    
                           
                                 
                           
                               
As with water there is likely to be a stable three to four year panel dataset available as: (i) the 
accounting separation guidelines have been in place since the 2009/10 reporting year; and (ii) as 
this is a high level of the value chain (e.g. high level of cost aggregation), cost allocation issues 
will be relatively minor. 
The key factors that Ofwat needs to consider in relation to Sewerage are very similar to those in 
Water (please refer to Table 6.1). Briefly, they are: 
•	 The potential need to include variables in Ofwat’s cost modelling to control for various 
factors (e.g. heterogeneity) at this level, this may require Ofwat to use panel or pooled 
data in order to provide sufficient degrees of freedom. 
•	 Sewerage companies may not be at the optimal size for the industry, meaning some may 
be experiencing economies of scale while others, diseconomies. Ofwat could use flexible 
models that allow for variable returns to scale for different companies. 
•	 Geographically driven input price differentials are likely to exist. Ofwat would need to 
consider whether there is a requirement to make these adjustments and, if so, the 
appropriate data and adjustment to use, e.g. ONS. 
•	 Heterogeneity will exist across companies, but at this level it is unlikely variables could be 
included to sufficiently capture this (i.e. as the aggregated costs include costs from all 
Sewerage vertical segments, controlling for differences in each at this level would be 
difficult). Given the change in outputs that has been occurring in sewerage, this is likely 
to be an important consideration – especially for treatment. And 
•	 While vertical cost interactions issues are likely to be relatively minor at this level of 
aggregation, some potential horizontal cost interactions will exist, particularly with water 
in the case of WaSCs. Ofwat could assess horizontal cost interactions through a 
consistency check at the company level. If interactions exist Ofwat could control for 
these or take them into account through regulatory discretion. 
At this level of the value chain any performance measurement methodology is feasible. There 
are, however, relatively fewer comparators in Sewerage (10, in comparison to the 21 in Water) 
meaning that there would be a smaller panel data set available for cost modelling than in Water, 
i.e. Sewerage would have fewer observations and hence degrees of freedom than for Water (40 
observations available in a four year panel data set). This raises concerns that there may be 
insufficient observations at the company or sub­company level for robust estimates to be 
produced. 
We believe that there should be a sufficient number of observations to allow for additional 
variables to take account of, for example, technical change (if tests indicated that these variables 
are required) – although this may restrict the modelling techniques available (e.g. SFA may not 
be possible). Alternatively, Ofwat can use pooled data rather than panel, if tests showed that 
technical change did not need to be controlled for. If the panel was shorter (e.g. less than four 
years) Ofwat would need to consider whether the number of observations were sufficient to 
provide robust estimates. We note that there is no definitive rule in regards to the minimum 
number of degrees of freedom required, however we note that: (i) Ofwat undertook regressions 
using only 22 observations for PR09; and (ii) Ofgem carried out modelling with panel data on 
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group ownership for DPCR5 rather than company ownership, which meant only 28 
observations (seven comparators over four years) were available. These examples indicate that 
regulators consider that relatively fewer numbers of observations can produce useable estimates. 
Of course a greater number of observations are always preferred in order to increase confidence 
in the results. 
While we believe that there will be sufficient observations available, we have not conducted tests 
regarding the degree of heterogeneity and technical change in Sewerage. Ofwat would need to 
conduct these tests before determining the number of variables required, and hence whether 
there are sufficient degrees of freedom to: (a) run a correctly specified model; and (b) produce 
robust estimates. 
Vertical activity level (sub­company) 
The vertical segments considered under the accounting separation guidelines are: sewage collection; 
sewage treatment; sludge treatment; and sludge disposal. At this level the performance measure can 
provide information on cost drivers and assist in determining efficient costs. Ofwat has 
previously investigated modelling sludge using econometric (or DEA) approaches, however 
given the multiple alternative uses of sludge and the degree to which this is beyond the 
managerial control this has so far been unsuccessful. For example, the cost structure for 
incineration of sludge is quite different from agricultural use. Ofwat has, however, used a unit 
cost model for ‘sludge treatment and disposal’. The water industry is currently producing a 
report looking at modelling sludge opex efficiency and Ofwat is on the steering group. 
It is important to note that policymakers may determine that competition should be introduced 
for sludge treatment and sludge disposal, as a recent report commissioned by Ofwat noted.53 Ofwat 
has recently announced a joint study with OFT into the treatment of organic waste.54 Therefore, 
given the potential scope for competition in Sludge treatment and disposal this is an area where 
performance measures for facilitating competition may be required, possibly at PR14 but more 
likely beyond PR14. 
As with the ‘total’ sewerage level, there is likely to be a stable panel dataset available given the 
existing accounting separation guidelines. However, greater reliance on more advanced panel 
models would need to be held off until future price reviews when longer panel datasets would be 
available. 
The considerations for the use of performance measures at the sewerage vertical segment level are 
very similar to those for water vertical segments and sewerage (outlined in the preceding section). 
Table 6.5 below provides some specific considerations for cost modelling for each of the 
Sewerage vertical segments. 
53 
London Economics (2010). 
54 
Ofwat press release, 21 February 2011. 
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Table 6.5: Sewerage vertical segments ­ summary table of segment specific key considerations  
Issue Key considerations for each of the Sewerage business units (at PR14) 
Sewage collection Sewage treatment Sludge treatment Sludge disposal 
Heterogeneity There is likely to be reasonable 
heterogeneity across companies 
due to different operating 
characteristics such as the 
topography, rural/urban split, and 
density of customer 
connections.55 
Other local factors may also be 
important. For example 
infiltration of ground water to 
sewers may have a significant 
effect on pumping costs in some 
catchments. In catchments with 
relatively large non­domestic 
flows, input costs may be 
dominated by trade effluent. 
There is likely to be reasonable 
heterogeneity across companies 
i.e. effluent consents vary by area 
(more expensive to meet tighter 
effluent consents).56 
In addition to the variation 
introduced by discharge consents, 
the presence of specific trade 
effluents may affect the choice of 
treatment process and hence the 
capital and operating costs of the 
treatment plant. 
There is likely to be reasonable 
heterogeneity across companies, 
driven by the distance to transport 
sludge to the treatment plant and 
the different approaches to 
treating it. 
There is significant heterogeneity 
between different companies in 
relation to the routes to disposing 
of treated sludge e.g. incineration 
has quite different costs from 
agricultural use. 
Cost Vertical cost interactions are Vertical cost interactions are There are cost interactions Vertical cost interactions are 
interactions possible for this segment. Ofwat 
should test for cost interactions 
and, where required, adjustments 
made. 
possible for this segment. Ofwat 
should test for cost interactions 
and, where required, adjustments 
made. 
In particular there will be 
interactions between trade and 
domestic effluent treatment costs 
that may be difficult to separate, 
because the balance and extent 
between sewage treatment, sludge 
treatment and sludge disposal (for 
instance, dewatering). 
Large sewage treatment plants are 
likely to have adjacent sludge 
treatment facilities, providing 
economies of land, transport and 
management. 
Ofwat should control for these 
possible for this segment. The 
distance to ‘market’ for the 
disposal route, and choice of 
technology, will have a significant 
effect on cost. 
In some cases the choice of 
disposal route is limited, e.g. some 
urban sludge is not suitable for 
agricultural use. This may provide 
55 
For example, Ofwat allowed for heterogeneity in its PR09 model for ‘Network including power’ by including variables taking into account density of the network. 
56 
For example, Ofwat allowed for heterogeneity in its PR09 model for ‘Large sewage treatment works’ by including  variables taking  into account the nature of the effluent 
consents. 
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may differ on a site­by­site basis. 
Ofwat may need to make an 
assessment of trade effluent 
effects and adjusted for these if 
required. 
factors , or make allowance for 
them in the regulatory discretion 
decision. 
a further interaction with the 
trade effluent effects on collection 
and treatment. 
Scale Economies of scale are likely to 
exist, and Ofwat should therefore 
test for and, where required, 
adjusted for this.57 
Economies of scale are likely to 
be significant, and Ofwat should 
therefore test for and, where 
required, adjusted for this. 
Economies of scale are likely to 
exist at the plant level if there is 
sufficient feedstock within 
economic transport distance.58 
Ofwat would need to test for 
these and, where required, adjust 
for. 
Economies of scale are likely to 
exist, but subject to transport 
distance. Ofwat would need to 
test for this and, where required, 
adjusted for. 
57 
For example, Ofwat allowed for scale in its PR09 model for ‘Network including power’ by including variables taking into account population serviced and network length. 
58 
Feedstock refers to the material used as the main input to the sludge treatment process. For example, in the case of anaerobic digestion, this will consist of organic material such 
as sewage sludge, green waste, food processing waste and some industrial process waste. When selecting feedstock operators will also consider: whether it contains materials that 
may affect handling within the process; its impact on digestion of other feedstock; and/or the suitability of the digestate for the preferred final disposal route. 
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As with water we note that, at this level of the value chain any performance measurement 
methodology is feasible. However, the choice of methodology is dependent on Ofwat’s 
objectives. As discussed in Section 3.3 econometric approaches provide the greatest scope for 
controlling for heterogeneity, but more advanced DEA techniques also allow for some degree of 
heterogeneity. Both techniques could be used to provide Ofwat with additional information. 
Non­parametric index number techniques are less desirable at this level given that they are less 
flexible when controlling for different operating environments and the requirement of output 
price proxies (which may not be available at PR14). If Ofwat requests data on variables 
potentially required to control for heterogeneity, scale, etc, the regulatory burden on companies 
would increase (unless already received as part of the June reporting requirements) and so Ofwat 
should consider this as part of their cost benefit analysis. 
Sub­activity level 
As noted above, we have based the sub­activity units on possible DMUs at lower levels of the 
value chain. At this level of the value chain a performance measure for sewerage at PR14 is only 
plausible for determining efficient costs. However, given the potential scope for competition in 
sludge performance measures for sludge treatment ‘transport’ and ‘plant’ and sludge disposal ‘zone’ 
and ‘facility’ may be required to determine efficient access prices. Separate models for different 
plant types (etc) may be more suitable given the level of heterogeneity; however this is dependent 
on available observations and controlling for environmental differences. The objectives of 
performance measures need to be clear, whether it is: 
•	 to increase information available to new entrants; 
•	 to determine more accurate access pricing; and/or 
•	 as an ongoing performance measure. 
If Ofwat puts accounting requirements in place soon it is plausible that two or more years of 
data may be available, but with caveats around the stability and accuracy. Given the potential 
importance of this information for competition, significant work will need to go into ensuring 
that the cost allocation is correct. 
DEA methodologies are feasible at this level of the value chain. However, given their greater 
ability to cope with heterogeneity between comparators, econometric techniques would probably 
be superior. But, the difficulties experienced in developing cost models for sludge suggest that, 
even though models at this level are theoretically feasible, they may not be practical. 
The key considerations for performance measurement of sub­activity units for sewerage are similar 
to those detailed for water sub­activities, however we note some examples of issue for Ofwat to 
consider below: 
•	 Heterogeneity will likely be apparent at this level of analysis. For example, treatment 
plants needing to comply with different effluent consents. In addition, the trade effluent 
that plants have to deal with is also very variable (e.g. dairies, ice­cream makers and meat 
processors produce very strong effluent whereas others may not). 
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•	 There will likely be significant difference in the scale which may result in biased estimates 
if (dis)economies of scale are not taken into account. Large sewage treatment plants 
generally have lower per output operating costs compared to smaller plants. 
6.2.3. Summary 
While on the whole our view of the use of panel and sub­company data is similar for water and 
sewerage, it is clear that one area where facilitating competition places a greater reliance on sub­
company data within sewerage is sludge treatment and sludge disposal. This raises a number of issues 
particularly given Ofwat’s inability so far to estimate stable and robust econometric models for 
these activities. 
The conclusions for the Section as they affect PR14 are set Table 6.6 and 6.7. 
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Table 6.6: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­vertical activity 
level 
Performance measurement requirement Continue? 
Efficient cost 
determination 
Facilitating efficient 
competition 
Consistency check 
Total Sewerage ­ Yes No Yes Yes 
Sewage collection ­ Yes No *Yes Yes 
Sewage collection Zone **Yes No No ** 
Sewage treatment ­ Yes No *Yes ** 
Sewage treatment Large plants **Yes No No ** 
Sewage treatment Small plants **Yes No No Yes 
Sludge treatment ­ **No **Yes *Yes Yes 
Sludge treatment Transport **No **Yes No ** 
Sludge treatment Plant **No **Yes No Yes 
Sludge disposal ­ **No **Yes *Yes Yes 
Sludge disposal Zone **No **Yes No ** 
Sludge disposal Facility **No **Yes No ** 
* Consistency check required if benchmarking performed at sub­vertical activity level 
** Theoretically feasible, however the level of heterogeneity and but dependent on Ofwat’s requirements/ objectives. Facilitating competition is unlikely at 
PR14, however potentially needed beyond PR14 and is discussed further in Section 7. 
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Table 6.7: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­vertical activity 
level 
Data availability1 
(years) 
Methodology Continue? 
Econometrics DEA Non­parametric 
index2 
Total Sewerage ­ <4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sewage collection ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Sewage collection Zone <2 Yes Yes No * 
Sewage treatment ­ <2 Yes Yes No * 
Sewage treatment Large plants <2 Yes Yes No * 
Sewage treatment Small plants <4 Yes Yes No Yes 
Sludge treatment ­ <4 **Yes **Yes No Yes 
Sludge treatment Transport <2 **Yes **Yes No * 
Sludge treatment Plant <4 **Yes **Yes No Yes 
Sludge disposal ­ <2 **Yes **Yes No * 
Sludge disposal Zone <2 **Yes **Yes No * 
Sludge disposal Facility <2 **Yes **Yes No * 
1 Based on the assumption of only using historical data for benchmarking. 
2 Non­parametric indices are feasible at lower levels of the value chain, however we consider that they are less desirable at lower levels (see Section 3.3.3 
for a further discussion around non­parametric indices) 
* Feasible, but dependent on the number of observations available.  
** Theoretically feasible, however Ofwat has attempted to model this and the degree of heterogeneity has prevented robust models from being developed.  
Also the choice of plant is to some extent outside the control of management.  
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6.3. Retail 
6.3.1. Possible structure (Retail) 
In this section, as per Figure 6.3, we are focusing on the third and final aspect of the accounting 
separation guidelines split, that of retail. Ofwat’s existing accounting separation guidelines only 
require one retail business unit’s to be reported, i.e. Ofwat does not require water and sewerage 
retail costs to be reported separately. 
Figure 6.3: Possible structure of ‘‘Retail’ 
Franchise 
Possible regulated business (vertical segment) Sub-activity 
Retail 
Competitive 
Current regulated business 
WaSC/ WoCs 
Sewerage retail 
Franchise 
Competitive 
Water retail 
Franchise 
Competitive 
When thinking about retail it is possible to see a few ways in which sub­activities could be 
identified. These include a split between: 
•	 Water and sewerage – given the existence of WoCs, some WaSCs have different 
coverage for their water retailing and sewage retailing (although this may often be 
addressed through existing contractual relationships between the WoC and WaSC). And 
•	 Competitive and franchise (non­competitive) customers – the latter being primarily 
households where it is not envisaged (at least in the Cave Review) to introduce 
competition in the short­ to medium­term. 
6.3.2. Evaluation 
We consider below which uses of measurement could usefully be applied to retail at the regulated 
and vertical levels. 
Retail 
This is the assumed level that the price control is applied i.e. to a retail segment comprising water 
(WoCs) or water and sewerage (WaSCs). At this level a performance measure is required for 
efficient cost determination and consistency check (for cost allocation issues). The performance 
measure is not required to facilitate competition as we consider that it is infeasible for this to 
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occur at this aggregated level of the value chain by PR14 as household competition is very 
unlikely and how competition for non­household customers will develop is very dependent on 
the forthcoming Water White Paper. 
For PR14, there is likely to be a stable three to four year panel dataset available as: (i) the 
accounting separation guidelines have been in place since the 2009/10 reporting year; and (ii) as 
this is a high level of the value chain (e.g. high level of cost aggregation), cost allocation issues 
will be relatively minor. 
At this level of the value chain any performance measurement methodology is feasible. 
However, the choice of methodology is dependent on Ofwat’s objectives. 
We consider that separate analysis of water retail and sewerage retail should be undertaken by 
Ofwat since the WoCs will only be providing the former while WaSCs provide both. Or at least 
these potential cost interactions and economies of scale should be controlled for. Note, this split 
is not set out in the accounting separation guidelines, but it could be controlled for using a 
explanatory factor. The implications of this are discussed under sub­company analysis below. 
Table 6.8: Key considerations for performance measurement for retail 
Issue Relevance to this part of the value 
chain 
Implication and solutions 
Underlying economic theory 
Input costs Geographical differences likely to be 
the main driver of input differentials. 
However, these may be less than for 
the water and sewage businesses as 
all retail activities do not need to be 
located in the area of water or 
sewage supply. 
At this level it is likely that input price 
differentials will lead to biased estimates. 
Ofwat could control for these with the 
introduction of additional variables. However, 
it is not clear that these should be controlled 
for. As, especially over the medium­term, 
inputs to Retail are less prone to significant 
price differentiation (since they can be sourced 
nationally, such as a call centre) and industry 
reform may also change the nature of the 
businesses. A proportion of cost may be 
mobile and companies could control some of 
the costs through a move to lower input price 
areas. 
Heterogeneity There is likely to be relatively low 
heterogeneity given the nature of the 
outputs. 
If required, Ofwat could introduce variables to 
control for heterogeneity between the different 
companies. 
Opex­capex The ability to trade­off opex for 
capex will exist at this level. 
However, it is likely these business 
units will be ‘asset light’ and 
consequently the scope for opex 
capex trade­off will be limited. 
Given the likely low proportional levels of 
capex to opex, allowing for a trade­off may not 
be needed. Ofwat should test the scope for 
trade­off within these business units. 
Other factors 
Technical 
change 
Technical change will potentially 
exist for retail units, for example, 
newer billing techniques, etc. 
Where possible Ofwat should control for 
technical change if tests show it to be present in 
the data set. 
Cost Vertical cost interactions are less Cost interactions can be assessed by Ofwat at a 
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interactions likely for this business unit (than in 
Water or Sewerage), however 
horizontal cost interactions will need 
to be considered. 
higher level and Ofwat could introduce 
controls into the modelling if interactions are 
found to exist, or alternatively these could be 
dealt with through regulatory discretion. 
Scale Scale issues may exist for this 
business unit. 
It is not clear that this is a concern for retail, 
especially as outsourcing/joint working already 
happen. Ofwat would require a better 
understanding of how the retail function is 
going to work in the future to provide a 
definitive answer to whether scale is (or should 
be) a concern. It is likely that economies of 
scale would exist for this type of services and 
Ofwat will need to decide whether to include 
this in its models. 
Length and 
breadth of 
panel 
Panel data would have been 
collected since 2009/10. 
We consider that there should be sufficient 
stable observations available at this level of 
aggregation to undertake robust performance 
measurement. 
Sub­activity level 
As noted above, we consider two separate sub­activity splits for retail: (i) a vertical split into water 
retail and sewerage retail; and (ii) a horizontal split into franchise and competitive. 
For the water/ sewerage split, the key considerations are similar to those set out in Table 6.8 
above, Given the likely horizontal cost interactions between the segments (for WaSCs), Ofwat 
should employ economies of scale consistency checks to test for biased results. If checks indicate 
economies of scale and/ or scope then the performance measure should control for these. 
For franchise and competitive, the performance measure can provide information on cost drivers 
and assist in determining efficient costs and also facilitate competition for the customers within 
the Competitive segment. If contestability in the Competitive segment was sufficient then 
performance measurement may not be required. Given the likely cost interactions, economies of 
scale and scope unless consistency checks are employed biased results are likely. 
6.3.3. Summary 
While in some respects retail may be the simplest of the activities, the uncertainty about whether 
the two vertical activities will be considered as separate activities for sub­price caps or 
performance measurement does create some issues. It is clear that panel data offers a feasible 
way of assessing performance at PR14. It is also likely that performance measurement at a lower 
level will be needed either for price setting for the WoCs or to facilitate competition for the 
competitive customer segment of the market. As such, it will be important to undertake 
consistency checks so that any bias in the results can be addressed. 
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Table 6.5: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­vertical activity 
level 
Performance measurement requirement Continue? 
Efficient cost 
determination 
Facilitating efficient 
competition 
Consistency check 
Retail ­ Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Water Retail ­ **Yes Yes *Yes Yes 
Water Retail Franchise **Yes No No Yes 
Water Retail Competitive No Yes *Yes ** 
Sewerage Retail ­ **Yes Yes *Yes Yes 
Sewerage Retail Franchise **Yes No No Yes 
Sewerage Retail Competitive No Yes *Yes ** 
Franchise ­ **Yes No No Yes 
Competitive ­ No Yes *Yes ** 
* Consistency check required if benchmarking performed at sub­vertical activity level 
** Feasible, but dependent on Ofwat’s requirements/ objectives. 
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Table 6.6: Evaluation of performance measurement feasibility at PR14  
Activity level Sub­vertical activity 
level 
Data availability1 
(years) 
Methodology Continue? 
Econometrics DEA Non­parametric 
index 
Retail ­ <4 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Water Retail ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes* 
Water Retail Franchise <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
Water Retail Competitive <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
Sewerage Retail ­ <4 Yes Yes No Yes* 
Sewerage Retail Franchise <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
Sewerage Retail Competitive <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
Franchise ­ <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
Competitive ­ <2 Yes Yes No Possibly 
1 Based on the assumption of only using historical data for benchmarking. 
2 Non­parametric indices are feasible at lower levels of the value chain, however we consider that they are less desirable at lower levels (see Section 3.3.3 
for a further discussion around non­parametric indices) 
* Feasible, but dependent on the number of observations available. 
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6.4. Consistency check 
An important aspect of undertaking analysis based on data reported in line with the accounting 
separation guidelines is the need to undertake a consistency check at the (vertical segment) 
ownership level. It is widely acknowledged that undertaking bottom­up assessment does not 
necessarily capture the full scope for efficiency gains that a company can achieve (for example, if 
cost interactions exist between segments/ activities then biased results would be found). This 
will become a key consistency check for the overall performance targets being set at PR14 and 
beyond. 
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7. BEYOND PR14  
Key themes and lessons 
What happens beyond PR14 is much less certain since the degree of competition in elements of the 
industry may well be greater and, consequently, there may be less need for performance measurement 
for price­setting but possibly more needed for facilitating and supporting competition. Further industry 
structure changes may also take place, such as separation of system operators. 
It is likely that Ofwat will need to consider both panel and sub­company data beyond the next price 
review. The precise need will depend on the final industry structure and the way that competition 
develops. However, what is clear is that some elements of the industry, especially related to the pipes 
and other essential facilities, will require ongoing conduct regulation. Where conduct regulation is 
needed price determinations will be needed which in turn requires cost assessments and performance 
measurement. 
As competition develops in some elements of the value chain, both for water and sewerage, 
requirements for greater cost transparency and localised access prices may be needed. If this is the case 
a role for performance measurement may arise, especially at the sub­company and sub­activity levels. 
There will be much greater scope for the use of more sophisticated panel data methods beyond PR14 as 
the length of relevant data series could be up to five years longer. This in itself would help improve 
estimates derived from panel data models, including their robustness. 
7.1. Introduction 
There is much greater uncertainty about both industry structure and the focus of regulatory price 
controls beyond PR14. In part the possibilities for the future will be guided by the Water White 
Paper due from Defra later this year. New industry structures may arise as greater competition 
in areas like water resources and sludge treatment/disposal create new opportunities and 
requirements for the sector. Consequently we need to consider performance measurement in 
two areas: 
•	 cost assessment for aspects of the sector that require conduct regulation; and 
•	 facilitating new entrants through greater cost transparency and, where necessary, local 
access charge in the contestable aspects of the sector. 
This section considers ways in which the industry may develop beyond PR14 and builds on 
elements of the recent Ofwat publication Future price limits – a preliminary model (informal 
consultation).59 However, the lack of precision with respect to future industry structures means 
that the discussions in this section are high level. 
7.2. Possible future structures 
As shown in Section 6, Ofwat’s accounting separation guidelines provide a greater scope for 
applying price caps at lower ‘functional’ levels of a company’s structure. Section 6 set out three 
plausible price caps levels, water, sewerage and retail, to illustrate our approach for determining the 
Ofwat (2011a). 
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60 
use of performance measure at these levels. However, there are many possibilities for regulating 
the sector in the future. Ofwat’s recent publication sets out a preliminary model of how it might 
set price controls in the future. The preliminary model is based on Ofwat’s assumption that the 
structure of regulation should reflect the different characteristics of the activities in the water and 
sewerage value chain. Ofwat’s proposed preliminarily model outlines three main business units, 
two wholesale (‘network plus’ and ‘resources’) and one retail, for which price controls could be 
set.
For this report we need to consider how the value chains for water and sewerage might develop 
beyond PR14. Tables 7.1 and 7.2 consider the four elements of each of the two value chains and 
how structures may change and their implications for regulation. In part the comments in the 
tables build on the evidence from other regulated sectors. Some discussion of the implications 
for panel and sub­company/activity data are included in the tables below. Further consideration 
is provided later in this section, along with some initial thoughts on the implications for the 
approach to performance measurement that could be used. 
Table 7.1: Possible developments in the water value chain 
Element of the 
value chain 
Possible developments Implications for regulation and performance 
measurement 
Water Forms of competition are Regulation should become less necessary as the 
resources possible, either “for the 
market” or “in the market”. 
This has been a focus of 
recommendations from the 
Cave Review. 
Ofwat has also considered the 
possible development of a 
system operator handling 
aspects of the value chain. 
degree of competition develops. This should mean 
that the need for price determinations will also 
disappear and consequently there will be less need for 
Ofwat to undertake performance measurement in this 
area. 
There may be transition issues around information 
requirements depending on the type of competition. 
For example, if competition develops in stages then 
more disaggregated data may need to be collected. 
This would mean that Ofwat would still need to 
undertake performance measurement, although it 
may be at a sub­company/activity level. 
How a system operator would be regulated, or 
whether it needs to be regulated, also needs to be 
considered. For example, unless a form of 
competition is chosen for the system operator, such 
as franchising, it is likely that Ofwat would need to 
undertake some form of performance measurement 
to determine a revenue requirement. 
Raw water 
distribution 
How this element develops 
will depend on the way in 
which the raw water 
distribution system is treated. 
If it is included in the water 
resources then it could be 
subject to the development of 
competition. If it is treated 
separately then it is likely to 
be viewed as an essential 
If included in the water resources element of the 
value chain, then the discussion above is relevant. 
If treated as an essential facility then ongoing conduct 
regulation will be necessary. This will imply the need 
for cost assessment through performance 
measurement. 
60 
Ibid, p.19. 
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facility that needs to be 
subject to ongoing conduct 
regulation. 
Water Again, this is an area where If competition develops then the focus for 
treatment competition might develop, 
although initially this may be 
through “for the market” 
rather than “in the market”. 
performance measurement, at least in a transitional 
phase, would be for information provision. This 
would be to help facilitate competition and inform 
new entrants. As such, a focus on total costs for the 
sub­activity (treatment works) and their levels of 
efficiency could be appropriate. 
If competition does not develop then a need for 
ongoing conduct regulation will exist. Then 
performance measurement will need to focus on cost 
assessment. Ofwat’s choice on the degree of 
aggregation for the assessment will depend on 
Ofwat’s views of the separability of the water 
treatment plant costs. It will also depend on the way 
in which this segment is price regulated – would there 
be a cap for water treatment or would each plant 
have a separate allowed cap? Clearly sub­
company/activity are both possible here, the question 
is whether they would be needed 
Treated water This activity is a local The local monopoly status means ongoing conduct 
distribution monopoly and competition is 
unlikely (except for 
competition to build new, or 
replacement, distribution 
assets). There may be a role 
for performance 
measurement with respect to 
facilitating competition which 
requires more granular pricing 
depending on the way that 
upstream competition 
develops. 
regulation will be necessary. This will imply the need 
for cost assessment through performance 
measurement so that prices can be set. Given the 
likely ongoing nature of the conduct regulation panel 
data approaches would seem to be appropriate. 
Depending on the way competition develops there 
may be a need for local access prices to be set. These 
would be at a more granular level than the existing 
price controls. Ofwat would need to focus on sub­
activity performance measurement to provide 
efficient cost reflective access prices. 
Table 7.2: Possible developments in the sewerage value chain  
Element of the 
value chain 
Possible developments Implications for regulation and performance 
measurement 
Sewage This activity is a local The local monopoly status means ongoing conduct 
collection monopoly and competition in 
any form is unlikely. (except 
for competition to build new, 
or replacement, distribution 
assets). 
regulation will be necessary. This will imply the need 
for cost assessment through performance 
measurement so that prices can be set. Given the 
likely ongoing nature of the conduct regulation panel 
data approaches would seem to be appropriate. 
It is unlikely that a role with respect to facilitating 
competition through sub­activity analysis will exist 
since sewerage networks tend to be local. This may 
still, however, require local price determination but 
that would depend on the form of competition that 
develops. 
Sewage 
treatment 
This is an area that might be 
subject to the development 
If competition develops then the focus for 
performance measurement, at least in a transitional 
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of competition, although 
initially this may be through 
“for the market” rather than 
“in the market”. 
phase, would be for information provision. This 
would be to help facilitate competition and inform 
new entrants. As such, a focus on total costs for the 
sub­activity (treatment works) and their levels of 
efficiency could be appropriate. 
If competition does not develop then a need for 
ongoing conduct regulation will exist. Then 
performance measurement will need to focus on cost 
assessment. Ofwat’s choice on the degree of 
aggregation for the assessment will depend on 
Ofwat’s views of the separability of the sewage 
treatment plant costs. It will also depend on the way 
in which this segment is price regulated – would there 
be a cap for sewage treatment or would each plant 
have a separate allowed cap? Clearly sub­
company/activity are both possible here, the question 
is whether they would be needed. 
Sludge This is an area where If competition develops then the focus for 
treatment competition may develop. 
The form of competition is 
unclear but the OFT is 
currently examining it in a 
market study. 
performance measurement, at least in a transitional 
phase, would be for information provision. Similar 
issues to sewage treatment would then need to be 
considered. 
If competition does not develop then a need for 
ongoing conduct regulation will exist. Then 
performance measurement will need to focus on cost 
assessment. 
Whether competition develops or does not, similar 
issues to sewage treatment would need to be 
considered. 
Sludge This is an area where If competition develops then the focus for 
disposal competition may develop. 
The form of competition is 
unclear. 
If competition does not 
develop then it is possible 
that this could be an essential 
facility allowing upstream 
competition. As such, access 
issues might be important. 
performance measurement, at least in a transitional 
phase, would be for information provision. 
If competition does not develop then a need for 
ongoing conduct regulation will exist. Then 
performance measurement will need to focus on cost 
assessment. Since sludge disposal may be important 
for sludge treatment it is vital to ensure that it can 
play a facilitating role if needed. 
Whether competition develops or not, similar issues 
to sewage treatment would need to be considered. 
Retail, the third business area, is unlikely to face issues that are different to those outlined for 
PR14. The two options of sub­company focus – competitive/franchise and water/sewerage are 
likely to remain key for the period beyond PR14. Consequently the issues addressed in Section 6 
with respect to PR14 are still relevant for the period beyond PR14. 
This high­level analysis of what may happen beyond PR14 suggests that there are several 
elements of the value chain where competition could develop – although the form of 
competition is unclear (and there may not be a uniform approach to competition across England 
& Wales depending on the circumstances). However, it is also clear that some elements will 
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remain either monopolies or essential facilities that will be subject to ongoing conduct regulation. 
Finally, there are some potentially new areas, like the system operator, which may require 
conduct regulation, although that again is uncertain. 
7.3. Implications for panel, sub­company and approaches 
Having considered the way in which the water and sewerage industry may develop, we believe it 
is clear that even with a changing industry structure there will be a need for Ofwat to undertake 
performance measurement. Specifically: 
•	 conduct regulation of monopoly areas (and contestable areas where competition fails to 
develop) will need to continue for the foreseeable future and we expect that Ofwat will 
need to undertake performance measurement for cost assessment; 
•	 where competition is developing there may be a transitional information provision role 
for regulation which will need to incorporate performance measurement – the length of 
the transition will depend on factors like the development of new facilities, degree of 
competition while the types of performance measurement would be focused on 
providing information on the costs of existing facilities and their level of efficiency; and 
•	 depending on the form of competition that develops it is possible that local access prices 
will be needed for essential facilities, such as the monopoly networks, as a way of 
facilitating competition. If this is the case, Ofwat will need to undertake performance 
measurement at that local level to ensure cost reflective efficient prices are set. 
Given these likely developments it is now possible to consider the implications for both the use 
of panel and sub­company/activity approaches as well as a more general consideration of the 
approach to performance measurement. 
What is clear with respect to panel analysis is that: 
•	 some areas, which require ongoing conduct regulation, are likely to be areas where it is 
feasible for panel data analysis to be employed since price determinations are needed and 
all the issues linked to the discussion in Section 6 will be relevant concerning the number 
of comparators available for performance assessment in these cases; 
•	 for areas where facilitating competition could require more localised access prices then it 
is feasible to consider that Ofwat could use panel data analysis as a way of undertaking 
performance assessment since again there is likely to be a long term need for such 
regulation. A separate question as to whether Ofwat needs to move to more 
disaggregated price setting would also need to be considered at some time if this role 
proves to be important; and 
•	 where transitional information provision is required to facilitate competition it is feasible 
for Ofwat to use panel data analysis although it would need to consider whether any 
costs associated with the panel data collection outweighed the short­term benefits (owing 
to the transitional nature). 
The type of cost benefit analysis that would be necessary when considering the use of panel data 
is discussed in the following section. 
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For sub­company/activity analysis the following implications can be drawn: 
•	 it is feasible for Ofwat to use sub­company/activity analysis for those areas with ongoing 
conduct regulation if it is needed, which will in part depend on where the price­cap is 
being applied and the other issues that were discussed in Section 6; and 
•	 for those areas where competition will be facilitated either through local access prices or 
cost information on existing operations then it is both feasible and important for Ofwat 
to consider the use of sub­company/activity analysis. This is because the focus will be 
on local networks or specific plant which are unlikely to have been the level where price 
controls were previously being set. 
Again, it will be important to consider the cost benefit assessment to determine where sub­
company/activity analysis should be undertaken, but when it is vital to facilitating competition 
then the likelihood is that the approach will need to be employed. As noted above, sub­
company/activity analysis can be linked with panel data approaches and should be when the cost 
benefit assessment undertaken by Ofwat is positive – whether this is for transitional or ongoing 
facilitation of competition. 
With respect to the available approaches to performance measurement, building on the 
comments in Section 6, the following comments can be made: 
•	 econometric and frontier analysis approaches are likely to remain valid options; and 
•	 index number approaches may become more applicable as competition increases the 
transparency of intermediate output prices which can be used in the estimation process. 
It is also possible that Ofwat will be able to move, over time, to techniques like index numbers 
which have a lower regulatory burden for those areas where competition develops as the role of 
performance measurement will be as a regulatory check rather than an element of price 
determination or detailed information provision to facilitate competition. As such, there may be 
a short­ to medium­term increase in Ofwat’s use of detailed performance measurement 
approaches but then an ability to lighten the regulatory burden at least in some areas. 
As such, Ofwat will need to consider the specific opportunities that arise as the industry 
structure beyond PR14 becomes clearer. 
In addition, the possible changes in industry structure could have implications for cost 
interactions. These may exist between activities which become separated as part of the changing 
industry structure and imply the potential for biased cost assessment if not tested and controlled 
for. We therefore recommend that consistency checks are undertaken so that efficient estimates 
can be determined to encourage efficient competition. 
7.4. Summary 
Overall, it is likely that Ofwat will need to consider both panel and sub­company data beyond 
PR14. The precise requirements will depend on the final choice of industry structure and the 
way that competition develops. Ofwat should be able to use the framework developed in this 
report to assess those situations and determine exactly what is needed once there is greater clarity 
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about the future of the industry and the associated market and industry structures after the 
publication of Defra’s Water White Paper. 
Establishing exactly what performance measurement is feasible and appropriate will depend on 
the way that the industry develops. We believe that: 
•	 Ofwat will continue to need to set prices for the monopoly elements of the industry. As a 
minimum it will need to measure the performance of networks businesses for water and 
sewerage (as, for example, Ofgem continues to do with transmission and distribution); 
and 
•	 Ofwat would need to conduct some form of regulation, probably price regulation for 
elements of the industry, such as franchise retail. Ofwat would also need to measure the 
performance of these elements. For these activities Ofwat should consider: 
o	 panel data when an ongoing need for conduct regulation exists and should carry 
out a cost benefit assessment to assess whether it is appropriate; and 
o	 sub­company and sub­activity analysis when there is a need for greater 
information to facilitate the development of competition markets. 
While this analysis suggests that both panel and sub­company/activity analysis is feasible beyond 
PR14 whether they are actually used will depend on the cost benefit analysis, described in the 
following section. 
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8. COST­BENEFIT ASSESSMENT  
Key themes and lessons 
The fact that it is feasible to use panel and sub­company data does not mean that it is necessarily 
appropriate to do so. Rather it is necessary to consider the costs and benefits of the approaches in those 
situations. 
Establishing quantitative costs and benefits for panel and sub­company models in possible future industry 
structures is not possible. Instead, we have used a qualitative approach to provide an overall assessment. 
In addition we need to understand the counterfactual against which we have measured any change. We 
have used the approach to performance measurement Ofwat took at PR09 and its existing data collection 
as the best available counterfactual, although the performance measurement and data collection 
requirements are unlikely to be exactly what would be used at future price reviews. 
We believe that panel data has a positive cost benefit assessment in those cases where: 
•	 there is little need to build historic datasets through retrospective data collection; and 
•	 there is an ongoing need for price regulation/performance measurement which requires the use of 
both annual reporting and periodic forward looking price determinations. 
Given these conditions, we believe that Ofwat should consider panel data for the “traditional” regulated 
elements, i.e. the network businesses and other essential facilities. There may be other cases where panel 
data is appropriate and Ofwat should assess those situations on a case­by­case basis, but as a minimum it 
should consider the use of panel data for the networks within the industry. 
Our focus on using panel data for the segments of the industry with an ongoing need for price regulation 
creates a clear link across to sub­company data. In other words, to allow price setting for the natural 
monopoly elements the use of sub­company data will be important, such as treated water distribution. 
Additional data collection costs (to the regulated companies and Ofwat) are likely to arise through the 
collection of additional explanatory variables for output and input measures, and to control for 
heterogeneity, etc, where required. Initial additional costs for establishing this data collection may be high, 
while the additional ongoing costs will relatively low (compared to the existing requirements). 
For sub­activity data we believe that the cost benefit assessment provides the following recommendations: 
•	 Ofwat should consider using sub­activity data for improving cost transparency in 
contestable/potentially competitive segments of the value chain; 
•	 Ofwat should consider using sub­activity data in setting cost­based access prices to facilitate 
competition. However, it is not clear that the benefits here will outweigh the costs, so Ofwat 
would need to consider on a case­by­case basis if the specific details/circumstances would be 
appropriate; and 
•	 it is unlikely that conditions will be such that Ofwat should use sub­activity data for standard price 
determination efficiency analysis. 
In those cases where circumstances for price setting, such as access charges, make the use of sub­company 
or sub­activity data appropriate we would recommend that Ofwat do this in conjunction with ongoing 
panel data usage. 
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The choice of modelling technique is dependent on Ofwat’s objectives. We consider that OLS or DEA is 
generally a more transparent technique than SFA. However, there are benefits to an SFA approach such as 
explicitly attempting to take into account measurement error. We consider that, non­parametric index 
number techniques are less applicable at levels below the price cap, and Ofwat may prefer to use them as a 
consistency check at the price cap level. 
Having considered the conditions in which it might be appropriate to use panel and sub­company 
data it is now possible to consider whether a cost benefit assessment supports their actual use. It 
should be noted that we do not believe it possible, or even meaningful, to try to quantify the costs 
and benefits associated with panel and sub­company data. The estimates would be dependent on 
the industry structure, form and level of regulation, approach to performance measurement etc. 
Rather, we have focused on providing a high­level qualitative assessment that seeks to establish an 
overall cost benefit assessment which allows us to see under what circumstances either of the 
approaches might deliver a positive assessment. 
When undertaking a cost benefit assessment it is necessary to measure against a counterfactual. We 
have chosen the approach Ofwat took at PR09 as our counterfactual although it is not clear that this 
is necessarily the right one since it is not clear that this approach would, or could, be applied at 
future price reviews. 
8.1. Panel Data 
Costs 
As has been discussed in this report, one of the key issues linked to either panel or sub­company 
data is that of data availability. When considering the costs and benefits of panel data the key cost 
that we need to assess is linked to data. 
There are two ways in which data costs could occur: 
•	 as a one­off cost through establishing a new consistent time series historic dataset at the 
outset so that sufficient minimum data exists for panel analysis to be undertaken; and 
•	 on an ongoing basis as the dataset is updated each year. 
Clearly in both cases the cost will depend in part on the level of aggregation that is sought. However, 
experience to date (e.g. UKWIR) has been that building historic datasets through retrospective data 
collection has proven difficult and costly. Ongoing data collection costs, while potentially high, 
would not necessarily show an incremental increase as the cost of additional data required for the 
panel data analysis is likely to be low or zero if the assessment is undertaken at the company level. 
In principle, the ongoing data collection costs may be less intrusive and costly than they currently are 
owing to the refinement and refocusing of regulation. If Ofwat were to make any change to the 
models and reporting requirements this would result in additional costs. A further point to consider 
however is that given the potential for additional (or different) performance measures required in 
future price controls, Ofwat may either need to collect additional data for the use in future controls 
or rely on shorter datasets once the performance measurement requirements have been determined. 
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There is also a risk that data will be collected which is then not needed for later determinations. As 
described in section 7, there are obvious areas where an ongoing need for conduct regulation will be 
needed and consequently these should be the focus for panel analysis. The risk of unnecessary data 
collection is then low. 
Table 8.1 below summarises our views concerning panel data requirements and modelling issues. 
Table 8.1: Implications of the modelling issues (including data requirements) for the assessment of panel data 
Issue Solutions Impact on costs and benefits 
Underlying economic theory 
Input costs While potentially not a major concern, 
solutions include: 
Address through real price effects This may impose some additional ongoing data 
collection costs, however we believe that these 
will not be significant (especially in relation to the 
impact on the allowed cost base) as high level 
price indices on different types of inputs could be 
used.61 
Regional price adjustments Data is available from the ONS and Ofgem 
provides an example of the way in which this can 
be used. However, in some cases sufficient public 
data may not be available and Ofwat may need to 
source additional data. 
Heterogeneity Introduction of additional variables to 
capture aspects of heterogeneity 
While in principle this could require additional 
information to be requested we do not think this 
is a significant issue for panel data per se because 
this would need to be considered even if cross­
sectional data was used. 
Opex­capex Modelling of opex with quasi fixed 
capital or totex 
Again, this is not a panel data issue per se. 
Additional data may be needed, especially relating 
to the capital stock, but that is probably true of 
any improved performance assessment model. 
Other factors 
Technical Introduction of additional variables to While we do not believe that this is significant for 
change capture aspects of technical change the areas where panel data is likely to be used, it 
will necessitate further testing and the possible 
collection of additional information. 
Cost Testing for cost interactions and This is not an issue for panel data per se, but 
interactions possible use of additional models at 
aggregated levels 
could place some additional periodic cost on 
Ofwat as more modelling would be needed than 
is currently the case (although any improvement 
in performance assessment is likely to 
incorporate some additional modelling). 
61 
We note that Ofgem applied RPEs to some cost areas as part of DPCR5. 
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Scale Use of appropriate model definition Not a panel data issue per se because this would 
need to be considered even if cross­sectional data 
was used. 
Length and Retrospective data collection As discussed above, retrospective data collection 
breadth of could be costly. Ongoing data collection is likely 
panel 
Consistency over time 
to impose little or no additional cost compared to 
the existing approach. 
Data definitions can change over time. Ofwat 
would need to ensure that it understands the 
basis on which companies are collecting and 
reporting data to it. Explanatory variables may be 
updated over time and Ofwat may need to take 
this into account (if these variables are used in its 
modelling). An overlap year could be collected 
when definitions change. This would allow for 
an adjustment for structural breaks in the data. 
Pooled data analysis at PR14 
No additional cost but a reduction in likely 
benefits compared to a panel data specification. 
Use of forward looking data 
Ofwat could use data which companies submit in 
their business plans for other purposes, so there 
would be no additional cost. However, we note 
that there is little evidence on the use of forward 
looking data for benchmarking, and it would be 
up to Ofwat to consider the feasibility of it in 
their modelling. 
Table 8.2 summarises our views, based on table 8.1, of the costs, both for the companies (collection 
and consistency) and Ofwat (consistency and analysis) of utilising panel data analysis. The table 
takes the existing level of regulated company data collection costs (i.e. under accounting separation 
guidelines) as a starting point and then considers the implications for costs of building an historic 
panel data database and the ongoing costs of data collection. The table also considers the cost 
implications of collecting panel data at the sub­company and sub­activity level which shows that 
there would be an increase in costs even if this was not a panel data issue. As only accounting data is 
currently collected under the accounting separation guidelines at the sub­company level, there would 
be an additional cost to collecting explanatory variables for use in cost modelling at the sub­
company and sub­activity level. This cost is likely to be reasonably high given the need to establish 
reporting requirements and regulated companies' initial attempts to gather this data. 
Given the data that is currently collected at the regulated company level, in our view an ongoing 
panel data model would not impose significantly greater cost than is currently faced by the sector. 
However, if sub­company and sub­activity data has to be collected on an ongoing basis the cost will 
be relatively higher given the greater volume of data need to be collected and processed. Costs at the 
sub­company/activity level are discussed further in Section 8.2 below. 
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Table 8.2: Assessment of the data costs for panel data  
Initial ‘set­up’ cost Building an historic 
database for panel data 
Ongoing panel data 
model 
At regulated company 
level 
Low 
(a number of costs and 
explanatory variables are 
already collected at this 
level) 
Low cost 
(Ofwat has collected data at 
this level for a number of 
years) 
Zero or low additional 
cost 
(data would be collected 
annually) 
At sub­company level Medium cost 
(cost of collecting data 
at a more granular level 
e.g. explanatory 
variables) 
High cost 
(retrospectively building a 
panel data set would be 
costly) 
Low/Medium cost 
(cost of collecting data at 
a more granular level) 
At sub­activity level High cost 
(cost of collecting data 
at a more granular level 
e.g. accounting data, 
explanatory variables) 
Very high cost 
(retrospectively building a 
panel data set would be 
costly) 
Medium/High cost 
(cost of collecting data at 
a more granular level) 
We have noted previously in this report (Section 2.3 and Section 4.4) that Ofgem is exploring the 
use of forward looking data. We consider that this is an area that Ofwat could also explore as it may 
offer the potential to lengthen a panel dataset. However, this would need to be approached with 
caution as there is currently little evidence on the practical issues and limitations associated with 
using forward looking data for regulatory benchmarking purposes. 
Benefits 
The key benefit from panel data is the expected improvement in terms of stability and model 
specification that arises from the longer dataset. These models should be no worse than the models 
Ofwat used at PR09 and ought to be considerably better in terms both of the information provided 
and in their robustness and stability, if controls are put in place for technical change, input 
substitution, etc (where required). 
While not a cost, a potential limitation on the benefits from panel data may be an application issue 
linked to the problems posed by different price input inflation across comparators, and the need for 
controls for inter­temporal variation in operating characteristics. We do not believe that this would 
fully off­set the benefits associated with panel data. Moreover, if panel data allowed more direct 
modelling of exogenous company specific factors this would in fact be a substantial improvement 
on the current approach where limited observations hinder this approach. 
Our assessment of the benefits of panel data is provided in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.3: Assessment of the benefits of Panel data  
PR14 Beyond PR14 
Number of explanatory 
variables that can be included 
� ��
Ability to account for 
technological change 
� ��
Where: � is positive and �� is strongly positive. 
While we believe the relative benefits for PR14 are limited, in part because of the lack of historical 
data which can only be partly overcome through forward looking information, they will be a lot 
greater beyond PR14. However, as discussed in Section 3, if appropriate consistency can be 
established between company level data available before 2009/10 and Ofwat collects data after the 
new accounting guidelines came into place, (including data on explanatory variables) there would be 
greater potential for panel data analysis at the water and sewerage level at PR14. 
Overall position 
Panel data has a positive cost benefit assessment in those cases where: 
•	 the need for building an historic dataset through additional initial data collection is limited or 
non­existent; and 
•	 there is an ongoing need for price regulation/performance measurement which requires the 
use of annual reporting. 
Given these conditions, we believe that panel data should be considered for the “traditional” 
regulated elements for PR14, i.e. the pipes businesses and other essential facilities, as: (i) for the 
foreseeable future, i.e. beyond PR14, the traditional regulated elements will require a performance 
measure (for price cap purposes), therefore Ofwat can plan its data requirements for its cost models; 
(ii) the definition of the historic data collected by Ofwat is relatively consistent with the network 
related business units (although we note that power is removed and modelled separately, this data is 
still collected and could be reapportioned to the network related business units); and (iii) adjusting 
for scale, heterogeneity, etc is relatively more straightforward. The build­up of panel data over time 
will be helpful in improving performance assessment. 
There may be other cases where panel data is appropriate (e.g. water resources) and those situations 
should be assessed on a case­by­case basis but as a minimum there is a clear need to consider the use 
of panel data for the networks within the industry. For price controls beyond PR14, if regulatory 
commitment has been made to consistent data collection for a number of years (at least three for 
data to have ‘settled’) then panel data should be considered for all separate cost areas where 
performance measurement is considered necessary. 
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8.2. Sub­company and sub­activity 
As discussed earlier in this report, sub­company and sub­activity data could be considered for the 
following possible uses: 
•	 setting price controls at the sub­company level; 
•	 estimating efficiency at sub­company and sub­activity levels; and 
•	 supporting the development of competition (either through improved cost transparency of 
potentially competitive activities or by facilitating the setting of more cost reflective access 
charges). 
The cost benefit assessment needs to take these aspects into account. 
Costs 
As with panel data, there are two possible types of data issues that need to be considered: set­up 
costs for a new dataset; and then ongoing collection costs. There are two aspects to the cost 
associated with sub­company/ sub­activity data – the volume of data and ensuring consistency 
across companies. As mentioned in the Section 8.1, the cost with respect to building historic 
datasets of sub­company and/or sub­activity data is greater than that of panel data at the company 
level due to the greater volume of data required. Although limited sub­company data and, to a lesser 
degree, sub­activity data is currently collected by Ofwat. Ofwat has discussed collecting more of this 
type of data with companies and even if only one or two previous years of data is needed, the costs 
associated with ensuring that consistent estimates are provided are viewed as prohibitive by the 
companies. However, the significance of the initial costs of collecting the volume of data will 
depend on their existing internal and external reporting requirements. What is likely to be more 
prohibitive is ensuring data consistency across companies where no existing regulator mandated 
collection occurs since companies are likely to have different data definitions and the cost of aligning 
these can be prohibitive. 
It is also likely that the ongoing collection costs of sub­company/activity data will range from low to 
high depending on the level of granularity. Regulatory reporting requirements would become more 
intrusive and may result in requests for information that the companies do not naturally collect for 
themselves or where although the data is currently collected it is not on a uniform basis between 
companies and consequently costs will be incurred to ensure data consistency. Given the greater 
volume of data required there could be an increase in ongoing collection costs above those 
associated with the existing data collection process. 
Our assessment of the data needs and other impacts of the economic and modelling issues 
associated with sub­company and sub­activity data is provided in table 8.4. 
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Table 8.4: Implications of the modelling issues for the assessment of sub­company and sub­activity data  
Issue Solutions Sub­company: Impact on costs and 
benefits 
Sub­activity: Impact on costs and 
benefits 
Underlying economic theory 
Input costs See panel data discussion 
Heterogeneity Introduction of additional variables to 
capture aspects of heterogeneity. 
While in principle this could require Ofwat 
to request additional information we do 
not think this is a significant issue for sub­
company data as at this level heterogeneity 
may not be that significant and, where 
Ofwat determines that controls are 
needed, it may be relatively easy to control 
for. 
This is likely to require significant 
additional data collection at the sub­
activity level and this could impose 
significant costs. Even if some of the data 
is currently collected by the companies 
there would be costs for ensuring that 
consistent definitions are used across 
companies. 
Opex­capex Modelling of opex with quasi fixed capital 
or totex. 
Again, this is not a sub­company data 
issue per se. Additional data may be 
needed, especially relating to the capital 
stock, but that is probably true of any 
improved performance assessment model. 
Ofwat may also need to consider whether 
companies' depreciation policies are 
consistent. 
Again, this is not a sub­activity data issue 
per se. Additional data may be needed by 
Ofwat, especially relating to the capital 
stock and this would be at a level of 
granularity beyond what is currently 
available. As such, the information costs 
are likely to be higher for sub­activity 
analysis. 
Other factors 
Technical 
change 
Introduction of additional variables to 
capture aspects of technical change. 
Not an issue specific to sub­company data 
per se. 
Not an issue specific to sub­activity data 
per se. 
Cost 
interactions 
Testing for cost interactions and possible 
use of additional models at aggregated 
levels. 
Potentially an important issue for sub­
company data analysis and will require 
testing by running models at higher levels 
of aggregation and could reduce the 
benefits of using sub­company data. 
Potentially an important issue for sub­
activity data analysis and will require 
testing by running models at higher levels 
of aggregation and could reduce the 
benefits of using sub­activity data. 
Scale Use of appropriate model definition. No additional data issues but may reduce 
the benefits of sub­company data analysis. 
No additional data issues but may reduce 
the benefits of sub­activity data analysis. 
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As noted in Section 8.1, it is clear that retrospectively building a database of historic sub­
company data would be expensive, if at all possible. Collecting sub­company/activity data on an 
ongoing basis would be relatively more expensive than Ofwat’s existing approach which 
explicitly splits cost data by sub­company, but may not collect sufficient information on 
explanatory variables. Ofwat collects little information on sub­activities (aside from a few 
specific sub­activities e.g. sewerage treatment plant information). Consequently the benefits of a 
sub­company approach compared to the PR09 approach would need to be significant and a sub­
activity approach even more so. 
Our assessment of the data costs, based on the impacts set out in table 8.4 below. 
Table 8.5: Assessment of the data costs for sub­company data 
Initial ‘set up’ cost Ongoing data model 
At sub­company level Medium cost 
(cost of collecting data at a more 
granular level e.g. explanatory 
variables) 
Low/medium cost 
(cost of collecting data at a 
more granular level) 
At sub­activity level High cost 
(cost of collecting data at a more 
granular level e.g. cost, explanatory 
variables) 
Medium/High cost 
(cost of collecting data at a 
more granular level) 
Benefits 
The benefits of sub­company data for standard price determination are clear and relate to better 
cost transparency, more robust modelling, etc; but for sub­activity the benefits are far from clear. 
While Ofwat has used this approach to overcome issues with data observation limitations for 
sewerage, economic theory, as discussed in Section 3, questions whether these results are 
meaningful or unbiased, especially for sub­activity. While that does not mean the results cannot 
be used, they need to be used carefully and preferably in conjunction with other benchmarking 
that helps address these limitations. 
With respect to competition the benefits are clearer. When seeking to provide greater cost 
transparency sub­company or sub­activity data, if focused at the level of activity where new entry 
is possible (say at the level of a treatment works) then the improved transparency and additional 
cost information should help encourage efficient new entry. Further, this increased transparency 
is likely to only be required for a transitional period as the area of contestability moves into one 
where actual competition exists. Of course, there could be an ongoing need for monitoring but 
that could probably be done at a less intrusive level of reporting (or would need to be offset 
against the expected benefits from competition). 
If sub­company or sub­activity data is needed to facilitate more cost reflective access prices then 
again there are likely to be benefits, but we are unsure of how significant they are. From an 
economic theory perspective it is clear that getting the right local access prices will help facilitate 
competition, but from a regulatory perspective what is not clear is how much of a distortion is 
created by not having precise local access charges. This will, of course, depend in part on how 
competition develops in the sector. 
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Consider the energy industry. It is the case that some locational signals are sent through the 
market design while access prices at both the transmission and distribution level may have some 
local nature, but potentially not to a significant degree (especially in transmission in some parts 
of continental Europe). The degree to which a network is interconnected etc. affects that access 
issue to a point, but what is clear is that regulators are happy to minimise the locational aspects 
under certain circumstances. Further, there are examples from other sectors, such as rail in Great 
Britain, where the efficiency analysis is undertaken at a national level but then access tariffs are 
set on a local basis (but incorporating the national efficiency issues). We acknowledge, however, 
that there are far greater local aspects to the water industry costs than in other industries. 
Consequently, while the lessons from energy and rail are informative, it is plausible that more 
local access pricing may be required in the water industry.62 
As such, we are unsure of the degree of incremental benefit achieved by using sub­activity 
analysis for local access prices. Of course, if the price­caps are being set at the local level, then 
this should be the basis for some of the efficiency analysis (subject to the usual provisos about 
cost interactions etc). As such, only once it is clear what forms of competition will develop can 
Ofwat undertake a real assessment of whether sub­activity data for “local” access prices is 
required. It is, however, clearly an issue that Ofwat needs to keep under review and may prove 
to be an important use of sub­activity data. 
Our assessment of the possible benefits of sub­company and sub­activity analysis is provided 
below. 
Table 8.4: Assessment of the benefits of sub­company and sub­activity data 
Level Purpose PR14 Beyond PR14 
Sub­activity Price setting ­/� ­/�
Facilitating competition ­/� ��
Sub­company Price setting ­/� ­/�
Facilitating competition � ��
Where: � is positive, �� is strongly positive, and ‘­‘ is neutral. 
In part our assessment of the price control beyond PR14 is predicated on the fact that it should 
be clearer as to how competition is developing in the sector and so where more information 
would be appropriate and whether local access prices are needed. 
Overall position 
Given the three possible uses of sub­company and sub­activity data we believe that the cost 
benefit assessment provides the following recommendations: 
•	 Ofwat should use sub­company data to set price controls for network/essential facility 
services in the long­term (alongside panel data); 
See for example the discussion from Bolt (2010). Available from the Ofwat website. 
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•	 Ofwat should use sub­company and sub­activity data for improving cost transparency in 
contestable/potentially competitive segments of the value chain probably as a transitional 
action; 
•	 Ofwat should consider sub­activity data when considering setting access prices to 
facilitate competition but it is not clear that the benefits here will outweigh the costs, so a 
case­by­case consideration of the specific details/circumstances would be appropriate or 
the assessment should be kept under review as the way in which competition develops 
becomes clearer and the implications of not having efficient local access prices can be 
determined more precisely; and 
•	 it is unlikely that conditions will be such that sub­activity data should be used for 
standard price determination efficiency analysis. 
In those cases where circumstances for price setting, such as access charges, make the use of 
sub­company data appropriate we would expect this to be done in conjunction with ongoing 
panel data usage. 
8.3. Cost modelling technique 
We have discussed the particular key attributes of three different cost modelling techniques in 
Section 3.4 (and Annex A.7), namely, econometric, DEA and non­parametric index numbers. 
We also noted in Section 4 that regulators have tended to use less sophisticated techniques. 
While we do not presume to recommend an approach to Ofwat, we consider that econometric 
average response techniques are generally well understood by regulators and regulated companies 
and are much more transparent than, for example SFA. However, we note that ORR do use an 
SFA approach and recent academic literature shows how this technique can be applied to water 
and sewerage (for examples, see Annex A.7). DEA and non­parametric index numbers are also 
relatively transparent and reproducible, however given non­parametric index numbers relative 
inflexibility to deal with different operating environments and it requirements of output price 
indices (or proxies) we consider that its use may be more restricted to consistency checking at 
the price cap level. 
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9. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS  
Key themes and lessons 
While this report has focused on establishing an approach to evaluating when panel and sub­company 
models are appropriate, through a decision tree, we can draw some clear conclusions and make some 
useful observations. 
Traditional network access regulation for pipes and other essential facilities will, for the foreseeable 
future, require price regulation and some form of performance measurement. For these aspects of the 
value chain we believe panel data modelling benefits outweigh the costs, and Ofwat should strongly 
consider panel data use in future price controls. This is particularly the case as the available data builds 
up beyond PR14. 
For those areas where Ofwat wants to encourage and support/facilitate competition, sub­company 
approaches are likely to be appropriate. It is only in those areas where greater cost transparency and 
possibly local access prices are needed that the benefits of sub­company approaches will outweigh the 
significant costs of collecting the additional data. 
Given the changes that may potentially occur in the sector and the way regulation is developing, it is 
important that Ofwat introduces new consistency checks to ensure that it can address any potential 
biases in estimates owing to the existence of cost interactions. 
There are a range of possible approaches that Ofwat should consider developing. These will both help 
establish the consistency checks as well as allowing the development of other approaches to 
performance measurement. 
9.1. “Traditional” network access regulation – panel data 
Regulatory commitment (and ensuring data comparability and quality over time) has provided 
regulators in the UK and internationally with relatively reliable and robust panel data sets that 
have increasingly been used for performance measurement – particularly for networks. While 
there is scope to use panel data for other areas of the water and sewerage sector, we consider 
that the clearest case is for the pipes businesses where, for the foreseeable future, some form of 
performance measure will be needed. This should allow Ofwat to commit to consistent data 
collection in this area. Ofwat’s data collection has provided it with a relatively stable high level 
dataset, i.e. total water opex and capex, and total sewerage opex and capex. There is the potential 
for such data to be consistently employed for the period before and after the accounting 
separation guidelines were introduced. Over time, data collected under Ofwat’s accounting 
separation guidelines will also yield a stable dataset available for use at PR14, which, provided 
that data consistency is maintained, should expand into a longer panel data set beyond PR14. 
We, therefore, consider that the use of panel data in Ofwat’s cost modelling offers the potential 
to improve on the approach used for PR09, in relation to the robustness of the results and the 
ability to control for a greater range of factors (e.g. input substitution, technical change). 
However, given the scope of the cost allocation requirements there will likely be a need for 
Ofwat to carry out cost allocation consistency checks. We consider the following factors are 
important considerations when deciding on the use of panel data given that traditional network 
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access regulation will almost certainly require, some form of efficient cost determination on an 
ongoing basis, beyond PR14: 
•	 relatively low number of comparators (cross­sections) suggests the need for panel data as 
this increases the confidence in the results (i.e. more robust model outputs); and 
•	 as panel data combines data across multiple years, models will require controls for 
changes in operating characteristics, input prices, and allowances for technical change. 
If regulatory commitment is made early enough to the collection of data at the vertical segment 
level (i.e. as in accounting separation) then at PR14 (and beyond) there should be a sufficient 
number of observations to produce robust sub­company cost models. However, whether these 
are needed will depend in part on the decisions about the design of the regulatory regime. 
Given the above, we recommend that Ofwat strongly consider the use of panel data for 
modelling traditional network access regulation for future price controls, with appropriate checks 
for data consistency over time and across comparators. 
9.2. Facilitating competition – sub­company 
Undertaking comparative benchmarking at levels below the price cap is theoretically feasible for 
discrete operating units and licences, at least if a sufficient number of stable and accurate 
observations is available. However, given the additional data requirements and the difficulties of 
creating models at a level below the price cap, we recommend that Ofwat’s use of comparative 
benchmarking below the price cap level should be focused on the need to facilitate competition 
and for determining appropriate access prices. As discussed in Section 7, we believe this will be 
increasingly important beyond PR14. 
Because there is considerable variation in network and treatment costs attributable to local 
operating characteristics, sub­company data and comparative benchmarking is potentially 
required. Panel data can be useful for sub­company benchmarking; however, the data for this 
needs to be both stable and accurate. 
9.3. Ensuring consistency in cost estimation and allocation 
As we have discussed in Section 3 and illustrated in Section 6, if analysis is done at a cost level 
below that of the aggregated companies’ costs then issues around cost allocation, and economies 
of scale and scope need to be considered. Therefore, if analysis is done below the company level 
the following checks should be undertaken: 
•	 Consistency checks for aggregation bias, impact of vertical and horizontal integration 
economies and other cost interactions. 
•	 Transitional performance assessment required to ensure that any transition from aggregated 
price caps to disaggregated price caps is done with consistent cost assessment measures. 
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9.4.	 Methodologies that facilitate reduced regulatory burden and consumer side 
allocative efficiency 
The academic literature (see Annex A), CC decisions, and the experience of other regulators 
suggest that possible alternative methodologies, which may lower regulatory burden but still 
meet regulatory objectives, should be considered. This is also consistent with some of the 
expected recommendations of the Gray report for Defra with respect to lightening the regulatory 
burden, something Ofwat has separately committed to seek to deliver. 
The application of panel data would allow Ofwat to assess performance at a level of company 
aggregation more closely linked to the level of price caps than the approach currently applied. 
This strongly suggests that the use of panel data has the potential of simplifying the regulatory 
process by aligning the unit of performance measurement with the unit where regulation is 
applied. Thus, appropriate panel data estimation of highly aggregated opex or total regulated 
cost models, that are estimated with due respect for economic theory (i.e. taking account of 
flexible production models, heterogeneity, economies of scale, cost allocation issues, etc), has the 
potential to reduce regulatory burden. Moreover, the data requirements for such modelling are 
likely to be less intensive than Ofwat’s current approach. Thus, if such modelling were coupled 
with assessment of key performance indicators on key outputs/outcomes it could potentially 
provide an effective approach to yardstick regulate companies. This could be achieved by 
monitoring relative firm performance, determining high level assessments of past and potential 
X factor performance, and imposing less intrusive regulation subject to the condition that firms 
meet their X factor and KPI targets. 
We finally speculate with regard to the potential for Ofwat to employ panel data techniques in 
order to jointly assess the relationship between a firm’s cost performance, profitability, and 
ensuring that consumer prices are cost reflective in the long term. Particularly if we see the 
introduction of more competition and/or alternative regulatory models, Ofwat might consider 
the further development and adaptation of firm level profit decomposition techniques such as 
that illustrated in De Witte & Saal (2010). This paper illustrates a panel performance 
measurement technique that not only provides a decomposition of the sources of firm 
productivity growth (including efficiency and technical change), but also assesses its impact on 
firm profitability and hence consumer oriented allocative efficiency. While this paper is 
implemented with a DEA based cost assessment, there are also academic examples of such 
profit decomposition techniques which employ index number and econometric estimation, and 
which could potentially be developed to satisfy such regulatory requirements. 
92 
 
 
                 
 
                             
                             
                       
           
                             
                           
                           
                          
                          
                           
                       
                           
                        
                         
                     
                       
                            
                       
                           
                           
                         
                          
                   
           
                       
                       
                                
                         
                             
                             
                           
   
                             
                             
                               
                             
                                                 
                                 
              
ANNEX A: WATER AND SEWERAGE COST MODELLING: AN ACADEMIC 
ASSESSMENT 
This annex provides a more detailed academic review of relevant issues related to the economics 
of cost modelling in the water and sewage industry and provides the background for the 
summary provided in Section 3 of the main of the report. 
A.1. Motivation for the academic assessment 
There is a substantial difference between the theory and practice of economic cost modelling in 
the academic context as opposed to the regulatory context, where cost modelling has developed 
as a necessary, pragmatic and effective tool for assessing the relative performance (and therefore 
efficient cost assessment) of regulated water and sewerage companies. Moreover, many of these 
differences are the result of differences in objectives between regulators and academics. Firstly, 
the primary objective for regulatory cost assessment in the water industry has been relative 
efficiency assessment (with a balance between accuracy and discretion), while the academic 
literature has focussed more on the impact of privatisation, and changes in regulation and 
industry structure on productivity growth and firm performance. Secondly, given its regulatory 
requirements, Ofwat has historically assessed a company’s overall allowed regulatory costs with a 
building blocks approach that aggregated separate assessments of required capital expenditure 
(capex) required operating expenditure (opex) and an appropriate return on an allowed 
regulatory capital value (RCV). This approach reflects, not only the quasi­fixed nature of capital 
in most infrastructure industries, but also a necessary regulatory approach given the post­
privatisation regulatory settlement of RCV values. In contrast, many academics model total 
economic costs or variable costs (opex), with modelling approaches that attempt to capture the 
potential for input substitution between capital and other inputs, which economic cost modelling 
theory emphasizes. In a final difference, Ofwat’s regulatory cost assessment models have almost 
exclusively employed cross­sectional approaches, while academic cost modelling has increasingly 
relied on panel data assessment. 
Given these and other substantial differences between the objectives and requirements of 
regulatory and academic cost modelling, there are clearly appropriate and necessary differences 
between the types of models employed. Therefore this section does not set out to advocate the 
wholesale adoption of an academic approach for regulatory cost assessment. However, we 
nonetheless believe that there are useful insights and considerations that can be drawn from the 
economic theory and academic practice of cost modelling,63 and this is particularly the case given 
Ofwat’s desire to consider the potential application of panel data models in regulatory cost 
assessment. 
This annex will therefore briefly consider the economic theory of cost modelling, as well as 
empirical examples, which given the focus of this report on water industry cost modelling, are 
largely drawn from the academic literature on water industry costs in England and Wales. This 
will allow us to highlight several generic modelling issues that may influence model accuracy in 
See for example, Hackman (2008) for an excellent recent treatment of economic production and cost theory, as 
well as efficiency, productivity, and performance measurement. 
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both the academic and regulatory context, and particularly issues that may have an impact on the 
use of panel data in future regulatory assessment However, we should also emphasize that this 
annex does not strive to provide an exhaustive discussion of academic cost modelling nor the 
empirical literature on water and sewerage cost modelling. Instead, the purpose is to briefly 
review the academic literature, with the intention of highlighting those issues that are most likely 
to inform and influence the potential application of panel and sub­company modelling, as well as 
carrying them out with accounting separation data, to regulatory cost assessment in England and 
Wales. 
A.2. The basic economic theory of cost modelling 
The basic economic theory of costs rests on the assumption that firms aim to minimize the long 
run total cost of production given the production technology available to them, the outputs they 
produce, and the input prices they face.64 It also highlights the need for fully flexible modelling 
approaches able to allow for a fuller specification of the underlying relationship between costs, 
outputs, input prices, and the scale of operations. As a result, economic cost modelling generally 
requires the specification of costs as a function of outputs and input prices, and the use of an 
empirical model that is sufficiently flexible to reflect how alternative methods of production 
influence a firm’s costs. Fundamentally, such flexible models allow for the cost implications of 
important economic relationships to be captured in the empirical modelling. To illustrate this, 
we focus on the economic concepts of input substitution and economies of scale, which are 
particularly relevant in the English and Welsh water industry. 
A.2.1. Input substitutability, input prices and panel regulatory cost assessment 
Input substitutability implies that if firms have the potential to substitute one type of input for 
another (such as capex for opex), they will strive to adjust their input usage so as to reduce their 
total cost of production by using more of the relatively cheaper inputs. This also implies that 
firms which face different input prices may have differences in costs. Moreover, such input 
substitution is highly relevant in the water industry given frequent discussion of capital opex 
tradeoffs in the regulatory context. These effects have also been demonstrated in the academic 
literature analysing English and Welsh water companies with panel data. Thus, for example, Saal 
& Parker (2000) provides evidence of considerable gains in WaSC cost productivity attributable 
to the substitution of other inputs with capital, while Bottasso & Conti (2009) demonstrates that 
opex costs are influenced by capital stocks. Similarly, Maziotis, Saal, & Thanassoulis (2011) 
suggests that between 1994 and 2009, such input substitution has had a considerable impact on 
reducing WaSC costs. 
From a cost assessment perspective, the potential for input substitution and the incentive for 
managers to minimise costs given the input prices they actually face, suggests the need for careful 
controls of input price variation between firms particularly when considerable cross­sectional 
variation in relative input prices exists. Moreover, the need for such input price controls 
becomes even more important in a panel context, as argued by Coelli, et al. (2003). This is 
because it becomes less plausible to assume that input prices will not change across time, and 
See, for example, Chambers (1988). 
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that relative input prices, for either the inputs used by a single firm, or those reflecting price 
differences across firms will stay constant across time.65 Thus, any movement to the use of panel 
data in regulatory cost assessment will require substantially greater consideration of the impact 
of input prices on assessed costs. Failure to do so may result in biased estimates in firm costs, 
biased estimates in cost trends, and a substantial weakening of the potential to improve 
regulatory cost assessment through the use of panel techniques. Stated differently, allowing for 
input substitutability and input prices is desirable in order to allow for allocative efficiency as well 
as technical efficiency in determining relative firm cost. E.g. if firms face different input prices 
their rational cost minimising choice of inputs will be different and we should allow for this in an 
appropriately specified cost function model. The main body of the report therefore considers 
further the potential for this in the regulatory context, taking into account related issues such as 
data availability, any resulting regulatory burden and the potential cost relative to improvements 
in accuracy this would entail. 
A.2.2. Model flexibility and the economic relationship between scale and costs 
Sufficient model flexibility is also required in order to properly assess the relationship between a 
firm’s output scale and its costs. Thus, for example, it is common for regulators to employ 
models of logged costs with logged outputs, and it is often assumed that such models allow for 
the presence of variable returns to scale. However, this is not in fact the case. Such log­log 
models allow for increasing, decreasing, or constant returns to scale, but impose the unrealistic 
restriction that all firms, regardless of their scale of operations, operate with precisely the same 
returns to scale. Only fully flexible forms such as the translog cost function, allow for truly 
variable returns to scale, and are therefore able to result in estimates reflecting the more tenable 
likelihood that smaller firms would benefit more than larger firms from increases in their scale of 
operations. Moreover, as both Coelli, et al. (2003) and Greene (2008) argue, even if efficiency 
determination is the primary purpose of cost modelling and scale economies are of only 
tangential interest, use of an appropriate flexible cost function able to adequately allow for 
potential variation in scale effects is essential as overly restrictive forms may result in distorted 
efficiency measures. 
We believe that this issue of potentially distorted performance measurement is worth Ofwat’s 
further consideration, given that recent academic literature reviews (Abbott & Cohen, 2009 and 
Saal, et al., 2011) suggests that while there are economies of scale for small water and sewerage 
firms, these economies of scale are exhausted at relatively modest firm sizes. Moreover, work 
commissioned and published by Ofwat, also suggested the presence of variable returns in the 
English & Welsh water industry, with the smallest firms characterized by increasing returns to 
scale and larger firms in the industry characterised with decreasing returns to scale.66 
The cost assessment implications of allowing for variable returns to scale are considerable. One 
could draw on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) literature to make an argument that 
regulators should assess performance based on the costs of a firm operating at the optimal scale, 
and thereby penalise firms that are below and above this scale. However, this argument ignores 
65 
For example, the relative price of labour to capital tends to increase over time, in tandem with a steady 
substitution of labour with capital in most production processes where this is feasible. 
66 
Stone & Webster (2004a). 
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the fact that regulated utilities are not fully in control of their scale and must serve their licensed 
operating area and its population. Thus, utilities should be assessed with a methodology that can 
consistently capture the cost implications of their scale of operations. Moreover, as current 
regulatory cost assessment models do not allow for fully flexible returns to scale, consideration 
of the academic literature suggests that they may result in biased estimates of the costs associated 
with various scale levels, and may thereby create perverse incentives for firms to merge. 
Moreover, we would emphasise that panel data could provide Ofwat the necessary degrees of 
freedom required to more closely model the relationship between scale and firm costs. 
A.3. Quasi­fixed capital stocks, the appropriateness of total cost modelling, and the 
modelling of opex and capex for regulatory cost assessment 
While the concept of input substitutability and the resulting emphasis on allowing for input 
prices, as discussed in Section A.2.1., is an important and relevant concept for water industry 
cost modelling, and particularly so with the potential use of panel data, consideration of the past 
academic literature suggests that this approach is not always appropriate, as in the short run, 
some inputs may not be fully under managerial control. In particular, given the reality of 
infrastructure industries, we must consider how to properly model those variable costs and 
inputs under managerial control (most opex expenditures) when it is infeasible for managers to 
quickly adjust capital stocks (perhaps proxied by Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) capital stocks) 
to their long­run cost minimising level. Stated differently, the magnitude and lumpiness of 
capital investments coupled with the long lived nature of capital assets in the water industry 
suggests that while capital stocks are always in the process of being adjusted towards some 
desired long run optimal state, managers are unlikely to reach this optimal state in a single year or 
even over many years. 
Nevertheless, this process of incrementally adjusting the quasi­fixed capital stock has resulted in 
an ongoing increase in the quantity and quality of capital available to managers, which implies 
that, particularly in a panel context, these changes over time will have an impact on a firm’s 
opex. Thus, for example Stone & Webster (2004b) found evidence that changes over time in 
both water and sewerage capital stocks had a considerable impact on opex requirements, and 
hence opex productivity growth rates.67 
The theory and practice of economic cost modelling suggests that the appropriate economic 
model for such circumstances is not a long­run total cost model where all inputs are assumed to 
be fully variable. Instead, a model of variable costs (opex) which nonetheless allows for the 
influence of such “quasi­fixed” capital stocks on variable costs is more appropriate.68 Moreover, 
this approach, which models variable costs as a function of outputs, variable input prices, and 
quasi­fixed capital stocks provides a theoretically appropriate approach to opex modelling while 
also allowing for the significant impact of capital opex tradeoffs. We also emphasise that 
particularly in a panel context, appropriate cost assessment of opex requires the application of 
such an approach, if we wish to accurately model cross­sectional and intertemporal variation in 
efficient opex levels. 
67 
A similar quasi­fixed capital approach has recently been employed with WaSC data by Bottasso & Conti (2009a). 
68 
See for example Gort & Sung (1999). 
96 
 
 
                           
                                
                               
                                      
                            
                             
                               
                               
                        
                             
                             
                                   
                         
                          
                       
                                 
                                
                               
                                   
                           
                             
                           
                         
            
                     
 
                         
                         
                         
                              
                         
                       
 
                        
       
                               
                           
                                 
Given these arguments, what are the implications for regulatory cost assessment in general, and 
in the panel context in particular? Firstly, total cost assessment has a role, particularly with long 
panel data models of 10 years or more such as those commonly used in academic assessments, 
and can help identify overall trends in the full economic costs of activities. This is the case as the 
assumption of full flexibility in capital allocations is more reasonable in this context. However, 
while such total cost models can provide a useful cross check of firm performance, the quasi­
fixed nature of capital stocks as well as the current five year regulatory cycle, suggests they 
should not be the primary tool of regulatory cost assessment in the water industry. 
Instead, consideration of the academic concept of quasi­fixed variable cost modelling, lends 
support to the continued application by Ofwat of its current building blocks approach, in which 
overall regulated costs are obtained with separate assessments of opex and capex are coupled 
with an allowed rate of return on the RCV. This approach is appropriate, as it embodies the 
quasi­fixed nature of the capital stock, while allowing for the appropriate regulatory assessment 
of the efficiency of both operating costs and efficiency in capital expenditures. 
However, while consideration of the academic literature suggests the continued assessment of 
both opex and capex, it also strongly suggests the need for better controlling for capital stocks as 
a determinant of opex, as changes in capital stocks still have a potentially significant impact on 
opex expenditures in a quasi­fixed capital setting. This will become more important in the panel 
context, where failure to allow for the impact of changes in capital stocks over time may result in 
biased estimates of required opex, biased estimates in opex trends, and a substantial weakening 
of the potential to improve regulatory cost assessment through the use of panel techniques. 
Moreover, by allowing for the impact of capital stocks within opex cost assessment, the 
regulatory cost assessment regime could potentially better capture the impact of capital opex 
tradeoffs on overall assessed costs. 
A.4. The separability of multiple output production, sub­company modelling and cost 
interactions 
As this report considers the potential application of sub­company data assessment and panel 
data techniques as well as the potential for employing such approaches with accounting 
separation data, we now consider relevant economic theory and empirical water industry work 
which relates to these issues. We therefore first consider the economic theory of multiple output 
cost modelling to provide insights with regard to cost assessment with accounting separation 
data, and then consider the implications of sub­company assessment from an economic 
perspective. 
A.4.1. The separability of multiple output production, vertical cost interactions and their 
implications for accounting separation 
The production of both water and sewerage services involves a complex process that is not easily 
characterised by a single output. Thus, for example, the academic literature provides recent 
papers in which the aggregate provision of water services by a WoC is modelled as the joint 
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production of water volumes, customer connections, and water transportation.69 Similarly, 
Ofwat’s past modelling approaches, and particularly the separation of activities in the accounting 
separation guidelines that came into effect in 2009­2010, provide alternative characterisations of 
the multiple outputs produced along the water and sewage supply chains. Moreover, 
consideration of even a single output component of the accounting separation chain reveals that 
firm activities such as “water treatment” or “sewerage treatment” are in fact the horizontal 
summation of the multiple outputs produced within the firm’s multiple treatment facilities, each 
with different output characteristics. 
While full consideration of its theoretical detail is beyond the scope of this review, the seminal 
work of Baumol, Panzar, & Willig (1982) suggests that careful consideration of potential cost 
interactions between these multiple outputs is necessary if we wish to properly assess costs in a 
multiple output context.70 Similarly, Chambers (1988) and Berndt & Christensen (1973) provide 
theoretical contributions with regard to the nature of multiple output production and the 
conditions under which the separate estimation of costs for outputs is appropriate. However, if 
the costs of two activities are economically nonseparable, unbiased cost assessments of one 
activity cannot be obtained without consideration of the other activity’s influence on the first 
activity’s costs. 
In a paper cited in a wide variety of subsequent industry studies, Evans & Heckman (1984) 
demonstrated the empirical implementation of one possible test for the separability of outputs in 
a translog cost function, and rejected the hypothesis that local and long distance costs in the US 
telecommunications industry were separable. Focussing more closely on the water and sewage 
industry, Saal & Parker’s (2000) direct application of Evan & Heckman’s approach suggests that 
water and sewage activities are nonseperable. Moreover, the primary contribution of both Saal & 
Parker (2006) and Bottasso, et al. (2011) is to suggest a strong potential bias in the assessment of 
the efficiency of one activity (water only), if we ignore what appear to be substantial negative 
cost interactions between the water and sewage activities of WaSCs. Thus, consideration of 
previous academic literature on the separability of cost functions with multiple outputs suggests 
that there is the potential for biased cost assessment if such cost interactions exist. 
We finally note that a substantial body of academic literature has considered not only whether 
cost interactions between multiple outputs exist (nonseparability) but whether such vertical cost 
interactions imply higher (or possibly lower) costs when outputs are produced in a separated as 
opposed to an integrated firm. A recent literature review by Saal, et al. (2011) summarizes the 
findings of approximately 15 published academic papers that have directly considered this issue 
for the water industry. This past literature, as well as the recent contribution by Saal, Arocena, & 
Maziotis (2010), suggests that such vertical integration relationships may be present between 
many components of the water and sewage supply chain. 
69 
See the recent literature review of Saal, et al. (2011) for an international review of a substantial number of such 
studies. Two recent examples of studies based on English and Welsh data are Bottasso and Conti (2009b, and Saal, 
D S, Arocena, P & A Maziotis (2010). 
70 
As the Baumol et al. (1982) report focussed on cost assessment, we largely leave aside this work’s central 
contribution with regard to evaluating how the cost relationships between multiple outputs influence the relative 
cost of producing in traditional natural monopoly structures as opposed to industry structures designed to facilitate 
contestability with partial or complete vertically and horizontally separated structures. 
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In summary, our brief academic review of multiple output cost modelling suggests that if vertical 
cost interactions exist there is potential for an overall cost assessment to be biased unless the 
partial assessments properly account for any cost interactions between other activities which 
influence the costs of the activities under assessment. This suggests the potential need for a 
regulatory cost assessment process of: 
•	 identifying and testing for the presence of any relevant cost interactions between 
activities; 
•	 employing appropriate controls to account for such cost interactions; 
•	 employing cost assessment at a level where such interactions are internalized;71 
•	 using higher level assessments as consistency check of disaggregated assessment; 
and/or 
•	 employing appropriate regulatory discretion to mitigate any potential biases in 
assessment. 
It needs also to be recognised that these vertical interactions are dependent on the industry and 
market structure and are likely to change, possibly substantially, were the structure of the 
industry to change e.g. to support greater competition, upstream and/or downstream. This 
implies testing carefully for structural breaks in the relationships discussed above. 
A.4.2. Consideration of sub­company modelling and potential horizontal aggregation 
bias 
The use of sub­company data with disaggregation along a horizontal dimension, such as 
treatment plant data, is subject to a different potential bias in performance assessment to that 
discussed immediately above. If, as the existence of water and sewage companies with multiple 
plants suggests, horizontal integration economies are obtained by aggregating treatment plants, 
water supply zones, and other sub­company operations (at least to some optimal level of 
horizontal scale), assessment at plant level may not properly allow for these benefits of 
horizontal integration and, if so, this would result in upwardly biased estimates of aggregate costs 
for larger companies if horizontal integration economies are present. In contrast, if diseconomies 
of horizontal integration are present, larger firms might have downwardly biased estimates of 
aggregate costs. In other words, important cost interactions and implications for economies of 
scale/integration may not be properly accounted for by simply aggregating the cost assessments 
for sub­company data, unless they are properly controlled for in the aggregation process. As 
there is evidence to suggest that both economies and diseconomies of horizontal integration are 
currently extant in the water industry (Stone & Webster, 2004a; Bottaso & Conti, 2009a) sub­
control measurement may simultaneously provide respectively downwardly and upwardly biased 
estimates of the efficiency of firms that operate with increasing or decreasing returns to scale. 
This therefore, suggests that the employment of sub­company data does not in practice provide 
We note that this particular approach was recently advocated by Oxera for the modelling of water opex costs by 
Oxera in its submission to the Competition Commission as part of the Bristol Water Inquiry. Thus, Oxera argued 
that the aggregate assessment of total opex as a function of the determinants the variable weren’t the same as in the 
current water models (some were, but some weren’t;) used in the four separate opex models employed by Ofwat in 
the 2009 price review, would internalize any cost interactions between these activities. 
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a straightforward means by which to assess the performance of firms, if for example, mergers 
substantially reduce the number of firm level observations available to Ofwat. 
Our review of the previous academic literature suggests little previous guidance with regard to 
the potential magnitude of such possible horizontal aggregation bias, nor methods to test for and 
subsequently correct for any potential bias in company level assessment that might result from 
sub­company assessment. We therefore suggest that Ofwat consider further its experience with 
sewage treatment modelling, and whether there is a need to test for and control for horizontal 
aggregation bias, if sub­company modelling were to be more widely adopted. 
A.4.3. Summary on vertical and horizontal cost interactions 
Stated most simply, the presence of vertical or horizontal cost interactions suggests that 
assessment at the aggregated level, rather than with vertically and/or horizontally disaggregated 
data is most suitable as it will ensure that such cost interactions are controlled for. Thus, under 
any form of vertical separation (accounting, functional, legal, etc.), our academic review suggests 
that policy makers need to ensure that any potential bias in cost assessment is considered, tested 
for, and controlled for. The latter point is therefore an important issue that should be considered 
in the development of new cost assessment tools by Ofwat. Failure to do so might, for example, 
result in biased network access pricing, which, if prices were set above efficient levels may 
forestall competition, while in contrast if access prices are set below efficient levels, they might 
incentivise inefficient market entry. 
A.5. Heterogeneity 
Our consideration of economic cost modelling to this point, has assumed that despite variations 
in the scale and scope of activities carried out by firms, and the potential for cross­sectional and 
intertemporal variation in input prices, the underlying production technology and operating 
characteristics faced by all firms are the same. However, this assumption is particularly untenable 
in the water and sewerage industry where differences in topography, settlement patterns, water 
source type and location, required water and sewage treatment technologies, sewerage discharge 
location, variable discharge consents, and a great variety of other operating characteristics result 
in substantial and legitimate differences in firm costs. As a result, while Ofwat’s current cost 
assessment practice does not fully control for such heterogeneity in the cost assessment models, 
it does allow for special factors, which the recent Bristol Water Competition Commission (CC) 
case revealed amounted to up to 14% of modelled water costs at PR09. Thus, cross­sectional 
heterogeneity is already an extant issue that impacts on regulatory cost modelling 
As discussed briefly in Section A.2. above, heterogeneity will exist in both the cross­sectional and 
inter­temporal dimension. Operating characteristics such as customer demographics, water 
source reliability and quality, mandated water and sewerage treatment levels, operational quality 
of networks (e.g. leakage, pressure), etc. will vary across time, and such variation will increase 
with the length of the panel data set. Thus, any movement to panel data models will require the 
development of appropriate modelling approaches to properly control for such variation, and its 
impact on efficient costs at the level of assessment. Coelli, et al. (1999) provide a simple example 
of not only how such heterogeneity influences estimated efficiency, but also demonstrates how 
the modelling approach employed to control for it influences estimated inefficiency. Moreover, 
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Green (2008) details further approaches to modelling heterogeneity with stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) and also discusses the effect of mishandling heterogeneity on inefficiency 
measurement. 
Classical panel econometric models such as the random and fixed effects specifications allow for 
a firm specific error term in addition to the standard white noise regression residual, and 
therefore provide a form of control for firm specific heterogeneity. However, there is the risk 
that this heterogeneity includes persistent inefficiency as well as differences in operating 
characteristics. Thus, recent developments in panel techniques such as Greene’s (2005) true 
random fixed effects model attempt to allow for inefficiency as well as firm specific 
heterogeneity. Application of this approach by Saal, Parker, & Weyman­Jones’ (2007) to a WaSC 
database, reveals that even after allowing for a fixed group specific heterogeneity term, firm 
specific operating characteristics still significantly influence input requirements in the water 
sector. Thus, as appropriate controls for cross­sectional and intertemporal variation in operating 
characteristics will require the inclusion of further explanatory variables in assessed models, the 
additional degrees of freedom provided by panel data, will not increase perfectly in line with the 
length of the panel data set. This again highlights that the necessary modelling considerations 
associated with panel data imply that while panel models have the potential to improve cost 
assessment, they should not be naively assumed to simply operate as a degrees of freedom 
multiplier of a cross­sectional specification. 
We note that a significant advantage of including appropriate heterogeneity controls directly in 
the cost assessment model is the ability to allow the model to determine whether a “special 
factor” is in fact a significant determinant of cost variation between firms. Thus, pursuing such 
an approach should allow Ofwat to provide a more accurate assessment of both the 
appropriateness of special factors as well as the direct quantification of their impact on estimated 
costs. However, properly implementing this approach will require retention of sufficient cross­
sectional observations to facilitate it. 
We finally consider the significance of heterogeneity in operating characteristics in relation to the 
costs and benefits associated with sub­company modelling. Focussing first on the benefits, we 
highlight that given that substantial heterogeneity exists at sub­company level within firms, sub­
company assessment would allow more appropriate cost assessment of two essential costs which 
are required to regulate for competition. Thus, as suggested in Ofwat’s January 2011 assessment 
of hypothetical upstream water markets,72 efficient competition will require access pricing at the 
sub­company level, and location specific information on an incumbent’s marginal costs in 
potentially contestable markets. Sub­company modelling, would in principle provide useful 
information to meet both of these needs. However, such modelling would not only require 
appropriate aggregation and consideration of horizontal and vertical cost interactions, as 
discussed above, it would, for completeness, also require collection of a substantially larger 
regulatory database with appropriate information on locally specific costs and operating 
characteristics. Thus, while there are clear benefits associated with this approach, the existence 
of even greater heterogeneity at the sub­company level than at the firm level implies that the 
costs associated with sub­company modelling will be substantial. Thus, from an academic point 
of view policy makers will need to evaluate whether the necessary estimates required to facilitate 
Ofwat (2011b). 
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efficient market entry have sufficient benefit to overcome the substantial costs associated with 
their unbiased estimation. 
A.6. Allowing for technical change in panel models (cost function parameter change) 
In an approachable text aimed at regulatory practitioners, Coelli, et al. (2003), argue for the 
application of sophisticated panel techniques, capable of capturing the cost reducing impact of 
technical change on assessed costs. Moreover, it is also the case that such approaches generally 
allow for technical change to be neutral, input augmenting, and/or output augmenting. This, 
consideration is important as, for example, it would explicitly allow for the reasonable possibility 
that as technology changes over time, the underlying cost function shifts and becomes more 
capex and less opex intensive, an observation which is borne out by the vast majority of panel 
based academic studies of water industry costs. This further relates to our above discussion of 
opex modelling with controls for quasi­fixed capital stocks, e.g. if capital deepening technical 
change is occurring over time, efficient opex levels will become lower over time in a panel 
database, all other things being equal. Thus, such capital deepening technical change should be 
allowed for in a panel based opex cost model, otherwise we may produce upwardly biased 
estimates of future efficient opex requirements. 
Academic approaches also suggest that if panel models are to be used in any form of regulatory 
cost assessment, careful consideration of the nature of technical change, and its relationship to 
other modelling characteristics is necessary. Therefore, if no evidence of technical change is 
found, simple pooling of a dataset is appropriate. In contrast, if evidence of neutral technical 
change is found, which effectively implies that the relationship between costs and all inputs and 
outputs is changed in equal proportion, the simple inclusion of time dummies or a time trend 
may be appropriate. However, if technical change effects inputs differently, by for example 
favouring the use of more capital, or effects the costs of producing outputs differently, input 
and/or output biased technical change should be allowed for in the specification. Thus, while 
we cannot provide any ironclad rules with regard to the necessary controls for technical change 
in a regulatory panel based specification, we do believe that careful consideration of the types of 
technical change that might have influenced an assessed activity is crucial. 
We finally note that academic literature suggests that technical change cannot be viewed in 
isolation from other modelling characteristics. Thus, for example, if technical change is capital 
biased, e.g. greater substitution of operating costs with capital over time, it may not be feasible to 
detect such technical change, unless a model allows for capex­opex substitution. We therefore 
further explore the implications of this potential pitfall in our next section, by discussing it in 
relation to econometric approaches to performance measurement. 
A.7. Empirical approaches to performance measurement 
This section briefly summarizes the salient features, strengths and limitations of several 
alternative empirical cost and productivity estimation methodologies from an academic 
perspective. The reader is referred to Coelli, et al. (2005) and Berg (2010) for more detailed but 
approachable summaries of performance measurement techniques and their application to 
infrastructure industries. We focus on three alternative approaches to estimating firm 
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performance, which are the econometric, DEA and non­parametric TFP index number 
approaches. 
A.7.1. Econometric approaches 
Econometric approaches rely on the specification of a stochastic parametric production or cost 
function, thereby providing a fitted functional form capturing the underlying economic 
determinants of production, such as the relative magnitude of input usage on outputs, or the 
impact of increased outputs on costs. A general advantage of all econometric approaches 
relative to DEA and non­parametric index number approaches is the potential to conduct 
hypothesis tests between alternative model specifications with econometrics, thereby providing 
greater statistical confidence in the reliability of the model. A general disadvantage is the need to 
specify a functional form for the cost function. However, while it is sometimes emphasized that 
this may impose an inappropriate functional form on the structure, the application of fully 
flexible cost function specifications such as translog specification substantially ameliorates this 
issue. 
Within the econometric approach there is a significant distinction between average response models 
which account for statistical noise, but otherwise model the average relationship between outputs 
prices and costs, and frontier econometric models which are meant to provide estimates of 
frontier or best practice technology. 
Average response econometric approaches 
Average response models can be estimated with ordinary least squares regression (OLS), or a variety 
of well established and broadly accepted conventional econometric techniques employed by 
economists to provide improvements on OLS estimates. Such methods, when combined with 
well specified models consistent with economic theory and controls for firm heterogeneity (see 
above), provide the potential for extremely robust estimates of the expected relationship 
between a firm’s costs and drivers of those costs, with any remaining deviations attributable to 
statistical noise. However, given the already low number of observations available to Ofwat for 
cost assessment, the potential for further mergers and the increased degrees of freedom required 
for the controls for input prices, capital stocks, and operating characteristics suggested above, the 
potential for further refinements of cross­sectional modelling at company level is limited.73 
Given the similarly well established theory of estimating average response models with panel 
data,74 there is however potential that these techniques can be employed by Ofwat with 
appropriate panel data sets. Moreover, the simplest application of panel data sets would involve 
the pooling of data to increase the available degrees of freedom and improve statistical 
robustness, as suggested by Kumbhakar & Horncastle (2010), who also summarize a series of 
studies that have employed panel data analysis in the English & Welsh water sector, while noting 
that none of these studies have been directly employed in benchmarking. 
73 
Chapter 8 of Coelli, et al. (2005) details the advantages of average response estimation of production and cost 
technologies and their appropriateness for cost assessment. 
74 
See for example, Baltagi (2005). 
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Kumbhakar & Horncastle’s modelling also suggests that such data pooling, with the inclusion of 
time dummies allowing for technical change provides more reliable estimates than Ofwat’s cross­
sectional estimates of these four models. Furthermore, they suggest that application of several 
standard tools of average response econometric estimation with panel data improve the reliability 
of assessment of Ofwat’s four water opex models. Finally, they also strongly suggest that because 
of cost interactions between these models, the simultaneous estimation of these models is also 
superior to Ofwat’s separate single equation modelling. They therefore reach the conclusion that 
the use of panel data would allow Ofwat to break its reliance on the cross­sectional corrected 
ordinary least squares (COLS) models it has employed since 1994, and that it would and should 
allow assessment of costs at more aggregated levels, thereby eliminating the need for concern 
with regard to cost interactions between assessed activities. However, while we are highly 
supportive of Kumbhakar & Horncastle’s conclusions, their models only allow for neutral 
technical change and do not include the controls for intertemporal and inter firm differences in 
input prices, capital stocks, quality, and heterogeneous operating characteristics, that we have 
argued for above. 
Oxera’s submission to the CC as part of the Bristol Water Review, also argues in favour of the 
use of panel data for regulatory benchmarking. Moreover, rather than replicating Ofwat’s four 
water opex models it adopts the recommendation of Kumbhakar & Horncastle (2010) and 
assesses all water related opex at the aggregate level rather than with separate models so as to 
avoid issues related to cost function nonseparability, thereby specifically supporting the 
recommendations of Section 3.3 above. To this extent we are highly supportive of Oxera’s 
conclusions. 
However, the Oxera submission also argues that simple data pooling is appropriate as the 
hypothesis of parameter change was rejected in the six year panel covering the 2003/4 to 2008/9 
period. We believe that both previous work for Ofwat and previous academic evidence calls this 
result into question. Thus, it is generally accepted that considerable improvements in 
performance have occurred over this period. More specifically, Ofwat’s own assessment of 
continuing efficiency improvement factors for water opex in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 price 
reviews suggests that significant changes in the underlying technology, and hence cost model 
parameters should have occurred over this period. Oxera’s finding in favour of a pooled model 
suggests, however, the absence of continuing efficiency change, or technical change as it is called 
in normal economic parlance. 
We therefore turn to two previous examples of total opex cost modelling. The modelling 
approach of Bottasso & Conti (2009b) estimates total water opex costs in a quasi­fixed capital 
stock model, as discussed above in Section A.2. They also employ a translog cost function 
allowing for fully variable returns to scale, cross firm and intertemporal variation in input prices, 
and full flexibility in the cost interactions between volumetric outputs, connections, and area 
output variables.75 The model also includes appropriate controls for input prices. As such, this 
modelling approach is by far more consistent with the economic approach to cost modelling 
detailed above in Sections 3.1­3.4 than the Oxera approach. Moreover, their model allows for 
We note that while Bottasso & Conti do not discuss their result, their reported parameters suggest the presence of 
significant cost interactions between the various water outputs specified in their model, thereby giving further 
evidence with the regard to cost interactions discussed in Section 3.3. 
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the potential for parameter change which is consistent with technical change, or equivalently 
“continuing efficiency change” in Ofwat’s regulatory terminology, as discussed in Section 3.5. 
Furthermore, we note that their approach to parameter change does not assume a simple dummy 
shifter which would imply neutral or equiproportional reductions in costs associated with 
technical change. Instead, as suggested in Section 3.5, their approach allows for the possibility 
that technical change can be output and/or input biased. Thus, for example, the model allows 
for the reasonable possibility that as technology changes over time, production tends to become 
more capital and less opex intensive. 
In contrast to Oxera, Bottasso & Conti (2009b) find statistically significant evidence of 
parameter change, and find that technical change was substantial and statistically significant for 
most years in their 1995/6 to 2004/5 sample. Moreover, in work using very similar specifications 
to Bottasso & Conti, and commissioned and published by Ofwat, Stone & Webster Consultants 
(2004b) reach similar conclusions, and find evidence of statistically significant cost function 
parameter change in both the 1995­2000 and 2000­2003 period for a model of total WaSC opex, 
and during the 2000­2003 period for their model of WoC total opex. Moreover, the Stone & 
Webster work demonstrates how considerable changes over time in WaSC and WoC operating 
characteristics influence assessed costs and hence measured productivity growth. 
Thus, we conclude that as an econometric approach employs all the data to estimate the 
underlying relationship between outputs and costs, data pooling is likely to result in an upwardly 
biased estimate of costs in the final year of the sample, if technical change is present but not 
allowed for. The results of Bottasso & Conti, and Stone & Webster demonstrate the need for 
controls for parameter change, which is consistent with the presence of technical change, and 
hence the presence of continuing efficiency improvement. It is therefore our considered opinion 
that the simple pooling of well specified economic models of costs is unlikely to be appropriate 
for all but exceedingly short panels of two to three years where it might be plausible that 
evidence of statistically significant technical change will not be found. 
However, they also strongly suggest that average response estimation can be employed to 
provide estimates of the impact of technical change, scale change, productivity growth and other 
determinants of firm performance on a firm’s costs over time, concepts which were all discussed 
in Section 3.5. It is also our opinion that econometric specifications have an advantage over 
DEA approaches in this respect, as technical change can be readily allowed for with the addition 
of a few parameters allowing for trend change in other parameters. This implies that provided 
sample sizes are sufficiently large, the additional parameters required to allow for technical 
change will be far less than then number of degrees of freedom provided by additional years of 
data. 
We finally note that the principal potential regulatory weakness of average response approaches 
is that they do not allow for the estimation of frontier costs, and hence do not provide a direct 
estimation of inefficiency that is theoretically consistent with the efficiency catch up component 
of a regulatory X factor. However, we nonetheless wish to emphasize the strong econometric 
robustness, and potential future application of average response econometric approaches to 
regulatory cost assessment in the English & Welsh water and sewerage industry. Thus, we 
believe that development of average response models along the lines of those provided by 
Bottaso & Conti (2009) and Stone & Webster (2004b) have strong potential to provide superior 
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estimates of firm costs, which might actually reduce the need for regulatory discretion in 
regulatory cost assessment. However, this would require the availability of sufficient data to 
allow economically consistent panel estimation. 
Frontier econometric approaches 
Despite this finding in favour of the potential application of economically robust average 
response models, Ofwat’s primary use of cost assessment is likely to remain the determination of 
the relative efficiency of firms, so as to both identify inefficiency and properly incentivize its 
elimination. We therefore turn to consideration of frontier econometric approaches, which are 
fundamentally designed to provide an estimate of cost inefficiency. Nevertheless, there are 
considerable and important differences between deterministic approaches such as COLS, which do 
not allow for statistical noise, and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which attempts to allow 
for both inefficiency and random error or noise.76 
COLS has generally perceived benefits related to simplicity and transparency. However, the 
COLS approach relies entirely on an underlying estimated average response OLS model. Thus 
the OLS model is “corrected” to form a frontier model, by making the assumption that the 
estimated OLS residual, which is by definition assumed to consist entirely of statistical noise, can 
be interpreted entirely as a measure of inefficiency. As Weyman­Jones et al. (2006) argue, simple 
application of confidence intervals on the predicted values in the resulting COLS model suggests 
that in many cases we should have little confidence in the resulting estimates of inefficiency. 
Thus, consideration of the theoretical underpinnings of the COLS approach suggests that 
estimated inefficiency will exceed actual underlying inefficiency. This likely bias therefore leads 
to the principle regulatory weakness of COLS modelling, which is the need for substantial 
regulatory discretion in determining what proportion of estimated COLS inefficiency should 
actually be attributed to inefficiency. This downside is therefore the reason that Ofwat’s current 
regulatory approach uses a considerable degree of discretion and only applies a portion of 
estimated COLS inefficiency in setting cost targets. We also note that Ofgem’s past practice of 
using the first quartile firm as benchmark costs is an alternative form of discretionary application 
that also implicitly acknowledges that the underlying econometric modelling approach is a 
stochastic OLS regression. 
The SFA approach addresses this concern by attempting explicitly to allow for both noise and 
inefficiency, and simultaneously estimating the cost function parameters as well as several 
additional parameters needed to estimate the relative importance of inefficiency and noise in the 
particular model. Thus, we are strongly in agreement with Oxera’s recent CC submission 
suggesting that SFA should, in principle, provide more reliable estimates of the frontier, as 
opposed to the average response technology, while also allowing for noise, and thereby 
providing superior estimates of inefficiency in comparison to the COLS approach. 
Moreover, the SFA approach should, in principle, also have the advantages detailed above for an 
average response panel model, while further allowing for the estimation of efficiency change 
over time. Thus, panel SFA based models can be applied in the regulatory context to 
decompose cost productivity growth into factors such as technical change, efficiency change, and 
See Greene (2008) for a detailed discussion focussed on the cross­sectional estimation of deterministic and 
frontier efficiency econometric models. 
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scale change, as suggested by Coelli et al. (2003), and for example demonstrated by Saal, Parker, 
& Weyman­Jones (2007), with, WaSC data. However, we emphasise that as there are only 10 
WaSCS this approach was only feasible given the application of an extended panel database 
covering 15 years. 
However, the advantages of SFA come at the cost of a substantially more complex econometric 
specification which requires relatively strong assumptions to be made with regard to the 
statistical distribution of inefficiency.77 Nevertheless, as recent application of these techniques in 
German electricity distribution benchmarking and modelling for the ORR demonstrates, SFA 
can be employed to provide improved estimates of both firm costs and inefficiency in the 
regulatory context. However, given the need for distributional assumptions and the resulting 
potential robustness issues, any Ofwat development of SFA modelling – particularly panel SFA – 
needs to allow for testing against the parameter estimates from less ambitious techniques. In 
addition, the length, number of available variables, and data consistency of Ofwat’s post 
accounting separation databases will also be fundamental determinants of the feasibility of 
applying SFA in future cost assessment. 
A.7.2. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
Traditional DEA models rely on linear programming techniques to construct a non­parametric 
frontier or envelope around the data, thereby providing a fitted production frontier detailing the 
relationship between a firm’s outputs and efficient input quantities. Firm’s using inputs in excess 
of those indicated on the DEA frontier are therefore productively or technically inefficient, with 
the distance from the frontier indicating the level of inefficiency 
Appropriate estimation of cost or allocative efficiency in the DEA framework requires data on 
both input prices and quantities, and specification of additional constraints to the DEA 
programme which have the effect of identifying the unique cost minimizing point on the 
estimated production frontier.78 Thus, while it is common for many researchers to specify DEA 
“cost models” by simply employing opex or other measures of cost as an input, this approach is 
consistent with neither economic nor DEA theory. Thus, as with econometric approaches, it is 
likely that regulatory DEA based cost assessment will be substantially improved with appropriate 
controls for input prices, as managers will choose to use alternative combinations of inputs if the 
relative prices of inputs vary substantially across companies or time. 
The principle advantages of DEA relate to its relative simplicity and the intuitive and fully 
flexible relationship between actual data points and the identified firms (peers) that define the 
production frontier. The principle disadvantage of the traditional DEA approach is its failure to 
allow for noise, as in COLS modelling. Moreover, while estimation strategies do allow for the 
inclusion of operating characteristics as a determinant of costs, it is our opinion that traditional 
DEA models are far less capable of controlling for heterogeneity between firms than 
econometric approaches. Recently, extensions of traditional DEA have been developed with the 
aim of allowing for both noise and operating characteristic heterogeneity. However, while these 
approaches now have wide academic acceptance, they involve complex modelling which is 
77 
These are, however, now available in relatively cheap off the shelf econometric packages such as LIMDEP and 
STATA. 
78 
See for example Thanassoulis (2001). 
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unlikely to be accepted as understandable and transparent in regulatory application within the 
UK.79 
DEA models can also be extended to allow for panel data. One approach is to simply pool the 
data over multiple years and thereby estimate a common frontier. The DEA pooling approach 
can be reasonably assumed to provide appropriate estimates of best practice costs in the final 
year of the pooled sample, even if technical change is present. This is because only the firms with 
the best relationship between outputs and costs will influence the frontier, and such best practice 
firms are likely to be drawn from the end of the sample if technology is improving over time. 
Thus, if one leaves aside traditional DEA’s fundamental weaknesses in controlling for both 
noises and firm specific heterogeneity, the regulatory application of DEA pooling is arguably 
superior to econometric pooling of panel data, if one’s goal is to identify best practice costs in 
the final year of a panel data. However, given the estimation of a common frontier, the DEA 
pooling approach does not allow the identification of efficient frontier costs for each time period 
in the data. Nor does this approach make it possible to distinguish movement towards the 
frontier (efficiency change) from change in the frontier (technical change).80 
An alternative approach is to estimate a distinct DEA frontier for each year in the data, thereby 
allowing for the determination of efficient frontier costs in each year, as well as technical and 
efficiency change between years. However, this approach amounts to the estimation of separate 
cross­sectional DEA frontiers in each year, and would not help overcome the issue of estimating 
costs if the number of cross­sectional observations was limited. In consequence, we believe that 
there is unlikely to be any strong potential for developing this repeated cross­sectional DEA 
approach, or even any simple cross­sectional DEA assessment with Ofwat’s regulatory data at 
firm level. We do, however, note the possible exception of the potential application of DEA in 
sub­company modelling if the number of cross­sectional observations is sufficient. However, the 
above provisions with regard to potential cost interactions between sub­activities also apply with 
DEA modelling. 
We finally consider sequential DEA modelling of panel data. This approach estimates a series 
of yearly frontiers, which are estimated for each year by sequentially adding each new year’s data 
to a common data pool and re­estimating the frontier. This approach allows the identification of 
efficient costs in a given year, and hence allows for the separate identification of both technical 
change and efficiency change. However, if cross­sectional data is sparse, it would still require the 
pooling of several years’ data before the year of assessment to allow estimation of frontier costs 
in that year. Thus for example, if only 10 cross­sectional observations were available, and the 
analyst believed that a minimum of 30 observations were required to adequately model firm 
costs, a frontier could only be specified for the third and any subsequent years. 
In summary, issues related to allowing for statistical noise and controlling for differences in 
operating characteristics, limit the applicability of traditional DEA approaches in the UK. If we 
downplay these considerable limitations, simple data pooling in the DEA context can potentially 
allow reasonably robust estimation of efficient costs in the final year of a sample, which we 
79 
See Simar & Wilson (2008), for a discussion of these recent developments in DEA theory. 
80 
See Thanassoulis, et al. (2008), for further discussion of cost change in DEA modelling and the decomposition 
of overall productivity change into technical and efficiency change. 
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believe would need to be at least three years in length. However, we have also seen that 
application of more sophisticated panel approaches that allow consistent estimation of frontier 
change over time still require a relatively large number of cross­sectional observations, or the 
willingness to apply sequential DEA techniques. These more sophisticated panel data DEA 
approaches have recently been applied for assessment at the aggregate company level for both 
WaSCs and Dutch water utilities, and illustrate the academic potential for employing these 
techniques.81 Moreover, both papers establish the feasibility of employing more sophisticated 
DEA techniques to establish longer term trends in the productive performance of companies, 
and how this influences their profitability and consumer prices. We therefore emphasise their 
potential application if Ofwat were to move from benchmarking to a yardstick regime in the 
future. However, given the relatively low number of observations available in both contexts, it is 
as yet unclear whether the underlying cost estimates provided by such models are sufficiently 
robust estimates of the efficient costs, as required for regulatory benchmarking. We therefore 
conclude that while it would be worthwhile to further explore the potential application of DEA 
approaches, on balance econometric approaches are potentially superior for direct regulatory 
benchmarking in the English & Welsh context.82 
However, before actually concluding this section we must note the recent contribution of 
Bogetoft & Otto (2011) which discusses the application of both traditional and more modern 
DEA approaches (as well as SFA) to benchmarking. We moreover acknowledge that their book 
details the apparently successful regulatory application of DEA approaches to energy regulation 
in Germany and Norway, as well as the development of a benchmarking scheme for Danish 
water utilities by the Danish Water and Waste Water Association. However, the notable 
difference in each of these applications is the presence of, by UK standards, a very large number 
of small utilities. We therefore emphasize that it is this difference in the number of observations 
available, which results in our less favourable assessment of the potential use of DEA modelling 
approaches. Fundamentally, this data limitation implies that UK regulators would need to invest 
substantial regulatory effort in developing and understanding sophisticated DEA panel models 
before DEA type approaches could be applied. 
A.7.3. Non­parametric index number approaches 
Non­parametric total factor productivity (TFP) index numbers essentially use input and output 
prices to respectively provide information with regard to the relative costs of inputs and the 
relative value of outputs, thereby allowing the construction of aggregate indices of outputs and 
inputs, from which TFP indices can be constructed.83 The clearest benefit of this approach is 
that it can be easily employed to provide relative performance estimates with limited data as only 
data on input and output quantities, total costs, total revenues and prices are required. In fact the 
approach requires a minimum of only two firms to allow meaningful cross­sectional 
performance comparisons between firms, and similarly requires only two years of data for a 
single firm to consistently assess trends in performance. Moreover, cross­sectional indices 
81 
De Witte & Saal (2010) and Maziotis, Saal, & Thanassoulis (2010). 
82 
Bogetoft & Otto (2011). 
83 
Chapter 4 of Coelli, et al. (2005) provides a general introduction to the economic theory of index numbers and 
productivity measurement as does Hackman (2008). 
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provide easily understandable measures of relative productivity between firms, which are 
inversely proportional to the potential efficiency catch up of the laggard firm relative to the best 
practice firm. When panel data is available, Maziotis (2010) demonstrates that index numbers can 
be employed to provide estimates of frontier shift and frontier catch up, and this is feasible even 
with extremely short panels and a limited numbers of firms. Moreover, Maziotis (2010) suggests 
that this approach can be readily integrated into models of firm profitability that can be 
employed to assess the link between trends in productivity, profitability, input and output prices, 
and consumer prices. Thus, such index number approaches can be seen as a potentially useful 
tool in assessing company performance even if only a limited numbers of firms are available for 
assessment. 
This ready applicability does however come with some shortcomings. Firstly, non­parametric 
index number approaches require the availability of reasonable proxies for output prices as well 
as input prices, thereby making their application infeasible in the absence of output prices. This 
issue makes their application particularly infeasible in the context of accounting separation, as 
output prices for each component of a water company’s value chain are unlikely to be available 
in the near future. Moreover, while we have argued above that economically consistent 
estimation of costs with econometric and DEA techniques should include controls for input 
prices, estimation with these techniques can still potentially proceed in the absence of some or all 
input prices. This is simply not the case for index number approaches which require input price 
and quantity data for computation. Secondly, the approach is relatively inflexible with regard to 
controlling for differences in operating characteristics and output quality between firms, thereby 
making appropriate controls for cross firm heterogeneity relatively difficult to implement. 
Thirdly, the approach assumes the presence of constant returns to scale, which is a significant 
disadvantage given our above discussion with regard to the appropriateness of allowing for fully 
variable returns to scale when conducting cross company comparison. 
Nevertheless, despite these potential shortcomings, Maziotis (2010) suggests that there is 
sufficient potential to apply index number techniques at company level, and to gauge relative 
performance trends between firms and across time. We therefore suggest, that particularly 
because of their applicability with an extremely low number of observations, Ofwat could 
potentially employ index number approaches as a readily applicable company level consistency 
checking tool, with which relative company performance measures derived with econometric or 
DEA methodologies can be cross checked. Moreover, they also have the strong potential of 
providing readily understandable, and easily estimated measures of individual company 
productivity growth performance. We also believe that this latter approach, might particularly 
complement the more outcomes focused approach to regulation that has recently been under 
consideration by Ofwat. 
A.8. The potential application of panel data models in water regulation 
Developing panel models that are consistent with the modelling approaches we have detailed 
above has the potential expand the quality of regulatory cost assessment. However, the 
development of sophisticated panel models along the lines of those suggested by Coelli, et al. 
(2003), would also open up the potential to measure and assess trends in firm productivity 
growth rates and provide better measurement of the sources of such productivity growth rates. 
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While it has not been the primary focus of the above academic assessment, many of the 
academic papers we have considered demonstrate the potential applicability of a variety of 
sophisticated panel based approaches, such as index number, econometric, and DEA based 
approaches that have provided alternative perspectives on performance trends in the English & 
Welsh water industry. These papers include, among others, studies that have analysed technical 
change (Erbeta & Cave, 2006), industry structure (Stone & Webster, 2004a ; Bottasso & Conti, 
2009a; Saal, Arocena, & Maziotis, 2010), total factor productivity growth and its relationship to 
firm profitability, the relative performance of firms (Saal & Parker, 2001, Maziotis, Saal, & 
Thanassoulis, 2009) and the total cost saving impacts of privatization and regulation (Saal & 
Paker, 2000) Moreover, opex productivity growth and the impact of regulation has been 
analyzed by Stone & Webster(2004b) and Bottaso & Conti (2009b), with the former providing 
realistic opex productivity growth estimates that effectively served as a check on the opex X­
factors set in the 2004 price determination. Similarly, Saal, Parker, & Weyman­Jones (2007) 
provides a panel based approach to assessing firm efficiency, while also decomposing WasC TFP 
into technical change, efficiency change, and scale change. This paper particularly illustrates well 
the potential link between panel econometric models, estimated productivity growth rates, and 
realized X­factor performance. Consideration of the previous English & Welsh literature as a 
whole therefore suggests that there is strong potential for applying a variety of alternative 
methodological panel approaches to regulatory performance assessment. However, we would 
also note that considerable effort would be required to reconcile these approaches with 
regulatory requirements. 
We would further argue that such sophisticated modelling approaches implement a cost 
assessment approach that is consistent with the intended cost reducing incentives of a price cap 
regulation system. This is because price cap regulation, as currently implemented by Ofwat, 
explicitly seeks to incentivise efficiency by setting regulatory catch up as well as continuing 
efficiency change X factors. Therefore if such regulation is effective, regulated firms should 
improve their productivity, and this should be attributable to both improved efficiency and 
technical change, with the latter term being fully comparable to Ofwat’s definition of continuing 
efficiency improvement. Thus, developing sophisticated panel data models that allow for 
technical, efficiency, and/or productivity change determination could substantially improve 
Ofwat’s ability to assess both the past achievement and potential future potential of firms to 
achieve X factor efficiency savings. 
There is also considerable discussion in the current regulatory context with regard to reducing 
regulatory burden and data collection, and the potential application of alternative less intrusive 
regulation, through, for example, greater reliance on competition, and more reliance on key 
performance indicators. However, it is likely that for the foreseeable future Ofwat will need to 
both appropriately incentivize cost efficiency in regulated activities, and ensure that consumer 
prices are cost reflective in the long term. Given this long term need we wish to briefly speculate 
with regard to the potential of employing sophisticated panel model approaches in this context. 
Consideration of the academic panel models detailed immediately above reveals that they are 
able to provide reasonably well specified cost models, while employing an insubstantial subset of 
the entire regulatory databases collected in Ofwat’s June Returns. While, considerable further 
research would be required to ensure that such models could be made consistent with Ofwat’s 
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regulatory requirements, the relatively low data burden of these models is suggestive. Thus, we 
are willing to speculate that if policy makers wish to reduce regulatory burden, there is the 
potential that appropriate and accurate high level cost assessment of a firm’s total regulated costs 
or its total opex costs could be achieved through the careful application of econometric, DEA, 
and/or panel data techniques. Thus, for example, such panel models could be employed to 
calculate realised firm specific relative efficiency and rates of technical change, efficiency change, 
and or productivity growth which could then be employed to determine X factors consistent 
with those currently employed by Ofwat. 
Alternatively, if policy makers were willing to contemplate the movement to a yardstick 
regulation regime such as that implemented in Norwegian electricity in 2007, and discussed in 
Bogetoft & Otto (2011), Ofwat could use determinations of average, best, or median observed 
ex post costs or productivity growth rates to set X­factors. As Bogetoft & Otto indicate, there 
are potential pitfalls to this yardstick approach as windfall profits would be retained by the 
industry, dynamic risks may be passed to consumers, and there is a potential risk of regulatory 
capture by consumers or industry. Nevertheless, if policy makers were willing to take such risks, 
it might be worthwhile to consider the potential of further developing sophisticated panel 
models for cost assessment and regulatory X­factor determination. However, given the already 
low number of observations in the English & Welsh water industry, this approach would require 
the continued collection of consistent and relatively long panel data sets similar to those 
employed in the academic studies detailed above. 
We finally speculate with regard to the potential for Ofwat to employ panel data techniques in 
order to jointly assess the relationship between a firm’s cost performance, profitability, and 
ensuring that consumer prices are cost reflective in the long term. Particularly if we see the 
introduction of more competition and/or alternative regulatory models, Ofwat might consider 
the further development and adaptation of firm level profit decomposition techniques such as 
that illustrated in De Witte & Saal (2010). This paper illustrates a panel performance 
measurement technique that not only provides a decomposition of the sources of firm 
productivity growth (including efficiency and technical change), but also assesses its impact on 
firm profitability and hence consumer oriented allocative efficiency. While this paper is 
implemented with a DEA based cost assessment, there are also academic examples of such 
profit decomposition techniques which employ index number and econometric estimation, and 
which could potentially be developed to satisfy such regulatory requirements. 
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ANNEX B: COMPETITION COMMISSION CASE STUDIES 
In this Annex we set out three case studies of Competition Commission (‘CC’) decisions which 
have analysed Ofwat’s use of comparators. These case studies note the importance of 
comparators to Ofwat’s ability to set the price caps and set out possible mitigation strategies if a 
comparator is lost. 
B.1. The Bristol Water appeal 
Following Ofwat’s PR09, Bristol Water plc disputed the price determinations made by Ofwat 
and on 8 February 2010 Ofwat made a reference to the CC.84 The full determination process 
was reviewed and each building block was assessed in turn and adjustments were made by the 
CC if it considered they were justified. However, the CC did not specifically review the 
appropriateness of Ofwat’s relative efficiency econometric modelling and did not make any 
recommendations regarding this. 
Relative efficiency 
The CC reviewed Ofwat’s operating cost econometric models and based on the data and outputs 
of the models concluded that these were sufficiently reliable to estimate inefficiency scores for 
each company. The CC considered the targets set by Ofwat for Bristol Water against its own 
analysis, the evidence provided by Bristol Water and evidence submitted by Oxera (see Box A.1 
below). The CC decided that, on balance, the weight of evidence was consistent with Ofwat’s 
classification of Bristol Water as being within Upper Band B.85 
Box B.1: Oxera report on Bristol Water’s efficiency (Independent submission to the CC)86 
The report builds on an earlier paper by Oxera that was submitted to Ofwat as part of PR09. This 
report reviews the then current methodology for assessing relative efficiency used by Ofwat (COLS) 
to determine whether this can be improved upon through the use of panel data, different econometric 
methodologies, and/or model specification. While Oxera consider that there are many aspects of 
Ofwat’s modelling that have much merit, the authors note three issues where their suggested 
improvements could increase the robustness of the efficiency estimates. 
1.	 that modelling with “panel data is statistically valid and that this results in greater precision”; 
2.	 as a panel data set is being used it is now possible to include significantly more cost drivers in 
the models. Thus, modelling at the aggregate opex level for water services is feasible and may 
offer a number of benefits, including “removing the requirement for both cost separability 
and consistency in cost allocation, and allowing for the inclusion of multiple cost drivers; and 
3.	 Ofwat’s use of COLS does not correctly account for noise in the modelling. Oxera 
considered that the use of SFA would be superior as it does not require a subjective 
adjustment to account for such noise. 
With regards to the former part of the first issue above (statically valid), Oxera posit that the data 
meets the ‘poolability hypothesis’ i.e. that the parameters (including the intercept and error variance) 
do not change over time. If this is the case then the error variance can be estimated more precisely 
and this in turn lessens predictive uncertainty. Oxera show this to be the case for its two models 
(total opex, and total opex less special factors) by rejecting the hypothesis that there is structural 
84 
Competition Commission (2010). 
85 
Competition Commission (2010), p58. 
86 
Oxera (2010). 
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change. In regards to the later (precision), Oxera show that the confidence intervals are significantly  
small when panel data is used compared to cross­sectional.  
In justifying the use of total opex, Oxera note that modelling at this level avoids the issue of cost  
separability, and reduces the impact of cost allocation differences between the companies.  
Finally, Oxera propose that SFA be used instead of COLS as SFA is able to decompose the residual  
term into inefficiency and noise (something COLS cannot do and requires a subjective judgement on  
the level of noise in the data). Oxera do note that one disadvantage of SFA is that it often requires a  
large data set.  
As the appeal was in relation to Bristol Water’s price cap the CC made no comment on the 
appropriateness of Ofwat’s modelling (aside from accepting their findings) or the use of panel 
data. 
B.2. The Competition Commission on South East Water and Mid Kent Water 
In 2007 the CC carried out an examination of the merger between water­only companies South 
East Water and Mid Kent Water.87 The final report focused on the question of how the loss of a 
comparator affects Ofwat’s ability to effectively regulate the sector. The CC considered Ofwat’s 
approach to comparative analysis, the structure of the water/ water and sewerage sector, and any 
possible solutions that may be applied to mitigate any negative impact from the merger. 
The CC noted that the loss of a comparator could affect Ofwat’s ability to carry out comparative 
analysis in one of four ways: 
1.	 it could result in the loss of a benchmark company in Ofwat’s econometric models; 
2.	 it may reduce the precision of Ofwat’s econometric models; 
3.	 it may affect Ofwat’s ability to make cost­base comparisons to challenge cost­base 
estimates; and 
4.	 it may affect Ofwat’s ability to make qualitative comparisons. 
The CC considered a range of options that might be available to Ofwat to overcome the loss of a 
comparator. These included: 
1.	 relying on additional data (such as sub­company and panel data, or international or cross­
sector comparators); 
2.	 utilising stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and/ or data envelopment analysis (DEA); and 
3.	 adopting simpler statistical approaches and qualitative comparisons, similar to those 
Ofgem rely on. 
The CC noted that it would be difficult and costly to collect robust sub­company data and that 
the integrated nature of a water network would make it difficult to allocate costs to activities 
accurately. On panel data, while noting its usefulness and the fact that it is already available, the 
CC warned that its utilisation requires the cost structure in the industry to have remained 
constant over time or be relatively simple to model. 
The CC noted that cross­sector data could be used for a range of standard activities, such as 
customer service, and that while it was difficult to collect consistent and comprehensive 
Competition Commission (2007). 
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international data, owing to the different regulatory regimes that are in place, this data could still 
serve as a useful cross­check. 
The CC argued that both SFA and DEA require large numbers of comparators in order to be 
robust, while they were also likely to be just as sensitive to the loss of a comparator as Ofwat’s 
current econometric models. 
B.3. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission on Severn Trent and South West 
Water 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) investigated the proposed merger of Severn 
Trent and South West Water, two water and sewerage companies, in 1996.88 The MMC’s 
investigation focused on the impact of the loss of an independent comparator on Ofwat and the 
Director General of Water Services’ ability to carry out comparative analysis and generate 
effective comparative competition in the water and sewerage sector. It also considered the value 
of the loss of South West Water as a comparator, how it compared to the expected benefits of 
the merger, and any potential remedies. The MMC concluded that the loss caused by the merger 
would be too big and that no effective remedy was available, so it recommended that the merger 
should be prohibited. 
The MMC noted that the number of companies required for comparative analysis varies 
according to the type of analysis performed, from direct comparisons of specific costs between 
two similar companies, to econometric models that requires a large number of comparators in 
order to provide a useful degree of precision. The MMC identified four ways in which the loss of 
a comparator could adversely affect effective comparative analysis: 
1.	 the loss of a potential benchmark if the company is at or near the efficiency frontier; 
2.	 reducing the confidence with which the regulator carries out its activities owing to fewer 
data points and possibly varying quality of information; 
3.	 efficiency and service quality could be affected through reduced cost competition 
between companies; and 
4.	 the way the Director General of Water Services carries out other tasks could be affected 
by the loss of a comparator. 
The MMC also noted that the loss of each additional comparator would have a greater adverse 
effect on the regulator’s ability to make comparisons.89 
88 
Monopolies and Merger Commissions (1996). It should be noted that a separate bid by Wessex Water for South 
West Water was assessed at the same time. Obviously the same approach to analysis was undertaken. 
89 
Ibid, para 4.37­4.38, p. 57. 
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ANNEX C: REGULATORY CASE STUDIES 
In this annex we set out a number of regulatory case studies: 
• Ofwat; 
• Ofgem; 
• Postcomm; 
• ORR; and 
• the New Zealand Commerce Commission. 
These case studies predominantly focus on operating cost comparative analysis. The regulators 
on which the case studies are based tend to rely on relatively simplistic unit cost or financial/ 
volume ratios for capex benchmarking – this can be contrasted with the more formal and data 
intensive cost base approach that Ofwat has used for investment. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, 
these benchmarking approaches generally require data that is more readily available to companies 
(or at least better understood), are applicable for sub­company analysis and the methods require 
few (if any) controls, therefore we do not consider them in great detail here. 
Regulator (country) Ofwat (UK) 
Sector (i.e. Water, Gas, 
Electricity) 
Water (PR09 relative efficiency assessment) 
Elements of the regime Description of current approach 
Market structure (e.g. 21 licenses, one each for the 21 water companies (of which 10 are water and 
degree of competition, sewerage companies and 11 are water­only companies) 
business levels, etc) There is limited competition in the form of new appointments (for a defined 
area) and water supply licenses, the latter are available to large consumers 
only. The Water Act 2003 had a provision (enabled from 2005) to allow 
competition through the supply and carriage of bulk water, however this has 
seen limited results. 
Unit of analysis (e.g. 
group, licence level, 
sub­business, activity) 
Capital efficiency assessment was undertaken using the cost base 
comparative tool to compare company estimates of capital works unit costs 
for a representative range of standardised capital projects (standard costs). 
Ofwat undertook operating efficiency assessment separately for water and 
sewerage services using econometric and unit cost models. For each service 
i.e. water and sewerage, there are sub­models based on the activities 
undertaken by water companies. Water service was divided into 4 
econometric models: 
1. water distribution; 
2. water resources and treatment; 
3. water power; and 
4. water business activities. 
Sewerage service was divided into 2 econometric models and 3 unit cost 
models. The econometric models were for: 
5. large sewage treatment works; and 
6. sewerage network, including power. 
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The unit cost models were for: 
• small sewage treatment works; 
• sludge treatment and disposal; and 
• sewerage business activities. 
Data was collected from June Return 2009. Different variables were used 
for each of the econometric models. They are(numbered items correspond 
to list of econometric models above): 
1. Length of mains/number of connected properties 
2. Number of sources/distribution input and proportion of supplies 
derived from boreholes 
3. Average pumping head and distribution input 
4. Number of billed properties 
5. Total load, activated sludge, BOD5 
6. Sewer length; area of sewer district; resident population; and holiday 
population. 
Time frame (e.g. For opex Ofwat used cross­sectional data from the June Return 2009 (i.e. 
current year, historic 
[panel, pooled], forward 
looking model) 
2008­2009 data). Ofwat used sub­company data for the opex models. 
Regulatory mechanism 
(e.g. deterministic, 
discretionary) 
For opex the results of the modelling at each functional level were 
combined and adjustments were made for atypical opex costs, company­
specific factors, leakage allocation (water only), cross­subsidies, and pension 
costs. Each company was assessed relative to the benchmark company and 
ranked into bands A to E, where A is the most efficient. The banding was 
used to assign an efficiency factor while setting price limits. 
Analytical technique 
used (e.g. unit cost 
benchmarking, DEA, 
SFA, OLS, COLS, etc) 
For opex Ofwat used Corrected Ordinary Least Squares (COLS) with some 
additional adjustments for its assessment of opex. 
Any other relevant 
factors 
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Regulator (country) Ofgem (UK) 
Sector (i.e. Water, Gas, 
Electricity) 
Electricity (DPCR5 cost assessment) 
Elements of the regime Description of current approach 
Market structure (e.g. 14 licences (one each for the 14 Distribution Network Operators – DNOs) 
degree of competition, owned by 7 groups; of which one group owns three licensees, five groups 
business levels, etc) own two licensees and one group has a single licensee. 
No competition exists between the distribution networks. 
Unit of analysis (e.g. 
group, licence level, sub­
business, activity) 
For capex, Ofgem relied on simple unit cost analysis and ratio measures to 
compare DNO performance. For example, non­load related expenditure 
was compared using unit costs for different asset types and volume based on 
age­profiles. 
Ofgem used three levels of modelling for operating costs ­ Top­down 
(operational costs), Single Groups and Groups 
Top down regressions for all Operational Costs 
Single Group: Indirect activity costs were included in a single regression 
and Network Operating Costs were split into four regressions: 
1. Low voltage (LV) & High voltage (HV) Underground Faults 
(including services), 
2. LV & HV Overhead Faults (including services), 
3. Inspections and Maintenance, and 
4. Tree Cutting 
Groups: Network Operating Costs were disaggregated as per Single Groups 
and the Indirect Activities are further disaggregated into: 
1. Group 1: Network Design, Project Management, System Mapping 
2. Group 2: Engineering Management, Control Centre, Call Centre, 
Stores, H&S and Operational Training, and 
3. Group 3: HR and Non­Operational Training, Network Policy, 
CEO, Finance and Regulation, IT and Property Management. 
Ofgem undertook the Group 3 analysis at the DNO group level (i.e. parent 
company level, for example, all EDF’s costs summed together) rather than 
at individual DNO level resulting in 28 data points compared to 56 data 
points used for other groups 
Ofgem collected data via the Forecast Business Plan Questionnaires and 
some data from the Regulatory reporting packs. 
The number of variables (drivers in this case) used in the regression analysis 
was seven. They were: 
1. Number of Faults 
2. Length of Cable Replaced 
3. Asset Work Hours 
4. Spans Cut & Spans Affected 
5. Network Investment (Labour and Contractor costs only) 
6. MEAV 
7. Total Direct Costs 
Time frame (e.g. current 
year, historic [panel, 
pooled], forward looking 
Ofgem used panel data for a 4 year time frame covering 2005­06 to 2008­09. 
Regressions were run on the 4 years of data to determine model output 
costs in 2008­09. The model output costs were compared to the DNOs' 
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model) own costs in 2008­09 to determine the overall efficiency scores. The scores 
were applied to the DNOs own costs to determine 'efficient' costs in 2008­
09. The 2008­09 efficient costs were rolled forward into the DPCR5 period 
to determine Operational Cost baselines. 
Regulatory mechanism 
(e.g. deterministic, 
discretionary) 
The results of the modelling were weighted together and efficiency scores 
were calculated and given to each of the 14 DNOs. Separate scores were 
given to Network Operating costs and Indirect costs. 
Analytical technique used 
(e.g. unit cost 
benchmarking, DEA, 
SFA, OLS, COLS, etc) 
Ofgem used an OLS estimation method for opex; with 19 sets of analyses 
undertaken; comprised of three core analysis and 16 alternatives (where a 
single cost item was either added or excluded from the core ones) 
Network Operating Costs and Indirect Costs were benchmarked to the 
upper third and upper quartile level of efficiency. 
Any other relevant factors 
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Regulator (country) Postcomm (UK); report by LECG 
Sector (i.e. Water, Gas, 
Electricity) 
Mail (Royal Mail Price Control 2005) 
Element (“axis”) Description of current approach 
Market structure (e.g. 
degree of competition, 
business levels, etc) 
Royal Mail is the only company regulated by Postcomm, however Royal 
Mail has separate mail centres and delivery offices that can be considered as 
discrete units for the purpose of internal benchmarking purposes. 
Royal Mail maintains market power in most parts of the market; however 
there has been entry into some areas of the market which has increased 
competition. Postcomm is currently investigating the scope for increasing 
competition in the sector. 
Following its November 2010 consultation, Postcomm noted that in 
markets where it had identified growing competition, they intend to give 
Royal Mail greater commercial freedoms and are therefore proposing the 
following deregulation: 
• Substantial deregulation of packets and parcels weighing more than 
2 kilograms 
• Retail price controls will be removed from all packets and parcels 
weighing more than 500 grams, and in parts of the pre­sorted bulk 
mail market 
• Royal Mail will be given greater freedom to compete in the pre­
sorted bulk mail market, where the company has lost significant 
volumes to competitors 
Since Royal Mail offers various services, it operates under a number of 
price control regimes, some of which include maximum caps on allowed 
revenue in some areas, while there are headroom controls requirements 
that restrict its ability to increase prices of some of the access products. 
Unit of analysis (e.g. 
group, licence level, sub­
business, activity) 
LECG was engaged by Postcomm to determine the scope for efficiency 
savings in Royal Mail. They did this through both top­down and internal 
efficiency benchmarking. The internal efficiency benchmarking focused 
on sub­company operating cost data, namely the mail centres and delivery 
offices. A number of different approaches were used for the top­down 
analysis, these included; reviewing and comparing separate historical 
periods of Royal Mail’s performance; a comparison to efficiency targets set 
and achieved in other regulatory sectors; comparisons of TFP ratios to 
other sectors; and looking at trends across other international postal 
operators. 
For the internal benchmarking of operating costs, data from all royal mail 
offices was used: 70 mail centres and 1383 delivery offices – some offices 
were however dropped for reasons of poor data quality. Numerous 
explanatory variables used as part of the analysis, including: 
• Number of delivery points 
• Percentage of delivery points that are businesses 
• Weighted volume of mail per delivery point 
• Length of road per delivery point 
• Delivery zones: major city centres, urban, suburban, etc.. 
• Mail reduction – i.e. redirections 
• Mail walk sorted 
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• Average distance between delivery office and mail centre 
• Number of sorting frames 
• Number of available vehicles at delivery office 
• Variations in input prices covered by variation in wage rate paid by 
delivery office 
• Competitiveness of local labour market/labour force average 
quality 
• A quality of service measure, capturing the percentage of all due 
mail delivered on time. 
Time frame (e.g. current 
year, historic [panel, 
pooled], forward looking 
model) 
Only cross­sectional data for 2003/4 was used for the analysis 
Regulatory mechanism 
(e.g. deterministic, 
discretionary) 
Postcomm adopted a discretionary approach to using the findings from the 
efficiency analysis; particularly important given the range of approaches 
used. Postcomm applied 20% or 10% discount factors to saving implied 
by deterministic and stochastic frontier analysis DFA and DEA and 
presented resulting figures. The top 10% of offices, identified through 
internal benchmarking, were used as the benchmark. 
Analytical technique used 
(e.g. unit cost 
benchmarking, DEA, 
SFA, OLS, COLS, etc) 
LECG used a range of different techniques. These included: 
1. For internal benchmarking: data enveloping analysis (DEA); and 
both DFA and SFA approaches. 
2. For top­down benchmarking: TFP ratios were used. 
Any other relevant 
factors 
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Regulator (country ) ORR (UK) 
Sectors Rail (PR08) 
Element (“axis”) Description of current approach 
Market structure (e.g. Network Rail is a single national monopoly and there are no direct domestic 
degree of comparators. It is responsible for the UK’s rail infrastructure including tracks, 
competition, business most stations and the signalling network. The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR), 
levels, etc) measures its cost efficiency in comparison with other international operators in 
the European Union. 
Unit of Analysis The ORR assesses efficiency across all of Network Rail’s activity and 
expenditure: support functions, operations, maintenance, renewals, and 
enhancements. They then calculate an overall cost efficiency level. 
Network Rail overall cost efficiency is compared with the level of efficiency of 
its European peers. This is obtained by doing top­down analysis on all cost 
drivers. However, bottom­up analysis is also considered, but used mostly for 
engineering or operational based analysis. 
ORR uses the “lasting infrastructure cost benchmarking” (LICB) dataset 
developed and maintained by the International Union of Railways (UIC). This 
covers 14 European rail infrastructure managers, including Network Rail, 
covering the 11 years from 1996 to 2006. The dataset contains maintenance 
expenditure, renewals expenditure and cost drivers. 
To assess the scope for improvement in maintenance and renewals (M&R) 
efficiency ORR conduct econometric efficiency analysis using the UIC’s LICB 
dataset. For operating expenditure, they looked at the long run trends in real unit 
operating expenditure (RUOE) across a range of UK regulated companies. 
They initially modelled M&R costs separately, and then modelled the two 
together. They conclude that their preferred model is the one based on total 
M&R cost because it means that both the trade­offs between M&R, and any 
accounting differences between countries in the way in which they record 
maintenance and renewal costs, were taken into account. 
ORR’s preferred model considers total maintenance and renewal expenditure 
(cash cost) to be explained by route km (network size), passenger train density 
(measured as passenger train km on the main line network), freight train density 
(measured as freight tonnage on the main line network), the proportion of single 
track on total track km, and a time variable to capture technological progress. 
• Cost items were mainly maintenance and renewal. 
• 6 output data: 
o Freight train km; Freight tonne km; Total tonne km; Total train 
km; Passenger tonne km ; 
Network features data: Proportion of track electrified; Number of switches per; 
track km; Stations per route km; Main track or route km; Ratio of single track to 
track km 
Time frame (e.g. 
current year, historic 
[panel/pool], forward 
looking model 
Data used is obtained from the LICB dataset. Only 12 out of the 14 European 
rail managers data mentioned above were used for the analysis. Two were 
dropped because of data incompatibility reasons. The data covers 11 years. 
Regulatory ORR makes discretionary adjustment for Railtrack/Network Rail’s renewal cost 
mechanism (e.g. figures, before and after the Hatfield derailment when computing Network 
deterministic, Rail’s “steady state” level. 
discretionary) 
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Analytical technique 
used (e.g. unit cost 
benchmarking, DEA, 
SFA, OLS, COLS, 
etc.) 
The final preferred econometric model is SFA with a Cobb Douglas production 
function. However, OLS was used at an earlier stage in order to determine 
explanatory variables which were the most significant. The final model was 
cross­checked against COLS and an attempt was made with DEA. 
Any other relevant 
factors 
• Three aspects of efficiency considered: catch up efficiency, frontier 
efficiency and input prices. 
• Following PR08, it was agreed with Network Rail that they would work 
with ORR to conduct further work to explain the drivers behind the 
maintenance and renewals cost efficiency gap. The analysis was to 
potentially include a wide range of factors such as technologies and 
working methods, network/infrastructure configuration, wage rate 
differentials, differences in geography, macroeconomic factors and 
differences in government policy ­ “The ability of Network Rail to 
control for these different factors will vary, as may the timeframe over 
which change can be made.” 
• “[S]ub­national level data from five railway infrastructure managers in 
Europe and North America (including Network Rail) collected directly 
from the infrastructure managers, was used for separate analysis in 
PR08, a previous report]” 
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Regulator (country) New Zealand Commerce Commission (New Zealand) 
Sector (i.e. Water, Gas, 
Electricity) 
Electricity distribution (Price control 2004) 
Element (“axis”) Description of current approach 
Market structure (e.g. 
degree of competition, 
business levels, etc) 
The New Zealand electricity market is split into three vertical segments: 
Generators (or suppliers); distribution; and retail. While, a company is 
allowed to own a generation business and a retail business, is not allowed to 
own distribution operators i.e. distribution need to be separate. 
Distribution operators are made up of private sectors owners and 
municipalities. Companies can own more than one operators, but most 
operators a independent. 
Unit of analysis (e.g. 
group, licence level, sub­
business, activity) 
NZ Commerce Commission engaged Meyrick (an economic consultancy) to 
conduct an assessment of the scope for cost efficiency gains. Meyrick’s 
approach was to decompose the X factor into two components: a ‘B’ factor 
reflecting the overall or average productivity trend for electricity lines 
businesses and two ‘C’ factors reflecting relative productivity and 
profitability of each distribution business. These factors then formed the 
base for calculating an efficiency index. 
Meyrick used data covering 29 distributors over the period of 1996 to 2002. 
These distributors are grouped into two categories: urban and rural. They 
are also grouped into three classes: earning high, average and low rates of 
return and allocated C factors of ­1, 0 and 1 percent respectively. 
Variables used in the analysis: 
• Outputs variables: throughput, system line capacity and connection 
numbers. 
• Inputs are broken into five categories: operating expenses, overhead 
lines, underground cables, transformers and other capital. 
• Variables mentioned in report: energy delivered in kilowatt hours, 
system line capacity in MVA kilometres and connection numbers, 
underground lines capital, transformer capital and other capital items. 
Time frame (e.g. current The data used by Meyrick was historical, covering the period from 1996 to 
year, historic [panel, 2002 
pooled], forward looking 
model) 
Regulatory mechanism 
(e.g. deterministic, 
discretionary) 
Meyrick calculated various comparable multilateral Multilateral Total Factor 
Productivity (MTFP) indices for each of the distributors; distributors are 
also classified into three groups with “C” indexes. 
• “Those distributors performing better than the industry average on 
productivity levels and those earning low rates of return would be 
set less onerous overall X factors compared to those performing 
near the industry average. Those performing worse than the 
industry average on productivity levels and those earning high rates 
of return would be set more onerous overall X factors compared to 
those performing near the industry average. These comparisons 
should ideally take account of differences in distributors’ operating 
environments to the maximum extent possible.” 
A relatively deterministic approach was used with each operators being 
placed in a band (1, 0, ­1) depending on the results of the modelling for each 
C­factor. 
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Analytical technique used 
(e.g. unit cost 
benchmarking, DEA, 
SFA, OLS, COLS, etc) 
The consultants used MTFP and estimated: 
• “B” and “C” comparable indexes are produced for each distributor. 
• MTFP – only using C factor , and both B and C factors are looked 
at in an integrated framework. 
Any other relevant factors Two efficiency targets could potentially be considered by the regulator: (i) 
the absolute level of the distribution operator relative to best practice (i.e. a 
frontier); and (ii) a distribution operator’s growth rate relative to 
competitors. 
125 
 
 
         
                                
                           
                        
                               
                  
                     
                     
          
                   
       
     
                           
                               
                         
                                 
 
                                 
            
                           
                 
   
                       
               
                     
                           
                
                                  
                           
  
                               
                         
                           
                     
                             
                              
                                   
                                   
                       
 
ANNEX D: ACADEMIC CASE STUDIES 
This section provides a few specific academic case studies where panel data has been applied. In 
Table D.1 we provide a summary of the specific applications of frontier efficiency and 
productivity measurement, these include numerous panel data models. The D.1 summary table 
is copied directly from a 2010 discussion paper, A review of frontier approaches to efficiency and 
productivity measurement in urban water utilities, by Andrew Worthing. 
Academic (paper) Determining the contribution of technical change, efficiency change and 
scale change to productivity growth in the privatized English and Welsh 
water and sewerage industry: 1985–2000 
By David S. Saal, David Parker and Tom Weyman­Jones, 2007 
Sector Water and Sewerage 
Description of approach 
The paper estimated a quality­adjusted input distance function with stochastic frontier techniques in order 
to estimated productivity growth rates for the period 1985–2000 – productivity was decomposed so as to 
account for the impact of technical change, efficiency change, and scale change. 
The paper does not provide comparable efficiency levels for each company, but looked at the industry in 
general. 
Both output and input variables were incorporated into a function that enabled the authors to obtain an 
efficiency distance relative to the frontier. 
• Inputs variables used were: full time equivalent employee; operating costs less current cost 
depreciation, infrastructure renewal expenditures and non­capitalized manpower costs; estimated 
capital stock 
• Output variables used were: connections with water customers; connections with sewerage 
customers; physical water supply; physical sewage treatment load. 
• Exogenous operating characteristics variables used were: water abstractions from underground 
sources; the ratio of trade effluent loads to resident population; bathing water intensity; the 
proportion of connected water properties that were metered. 
The paper used data obtained from WaSCs covering the period of 1985 to 2000. The authors estimated 
total factor productivity and decomposed this into efficiency change, technical change return to scale 
effect. 
The model used a translog functional form and a Malmquist productivity index was computed. The error 
term was decomposed into components: one representing randomness (and is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed) and the other measuring inefficiency (and is assumed to be 
drawn from an independent half­normal distribution that is truncated at zero). 
The paper does not compare operators; only changes to the average industry performance are provided 
since this paper attempts to measure the impact of privatisation on the industry in general. 
The paper is an empirical study aiming to evaluate the effects of privatisation and the introduction of a 
new regulatory regime on efficiency in the water and sewerage sector. Although this is the main focus of 
the paper, efficiency scores of different operators were estimated while doing so. 
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Academic (paper) Improving the econometric precision of regulatory models 
By Subal C. Kumbhakar and Alan P. Horncastle, 2010. 
Sector Water 
Description of approach 
21 licenses, one each for the 21 water companies (of which 10 are water and sewerage companies and 11 
are water­only companies) 
The paper examines the impact of the proposed merger of two operators in relation to Ofwat ability to 
produce accurate estimates for the purpose of benchmarking. 
The paper reviewed the then current methodology used by Ofwat (COLS) to determine whether a 
particular merger would impede on its ability to accurately estimates comparable efficiency values and 
therefore its ability to appropriately regulate the water industry. This is then followed with 
recommendations on the appropriateness of econometrics techniques for such tasks. For this particular 
task, panel data models were judged to be the most suitable. 
The paper focuses on Ofwat’s opex efficiency analysis – but the authors noted that this could be applied 
to capex, too. 
The authors used data obtained from Ofwat covering the period from 1997/8 to 2007/8 for their 
analysis. 
The authors argued that joint estimation of all the sub­models using the ‘seemingly unrelated regression’ 
(SUR) procedure in a cross­section and/or panel data framework can dramatically improve the accuracy 
of the modelling. 
The authors presented measurement improvement that can be obtained using panel data analysis on 
resources and treatment, distribution, power and business activities. 
Two methods were presented: the authors use panel data covering multiple years and cross­section only 
covering 2007/8. Data used for the paper is historical as follow: 
• panel data for 1997/8 to 2007/8 and 2000/1 to 2007/8; 
• pooled OLS for 1997/8 to 2007/8 and 2000/1 to 2007/8; and 
• cross­section for 2007/8 
The authors recommended using panel data instead of simple OLS as panel data produces more accurate 
estimates necessary to inform adequate decision making when faced with proposed merger(s). 
Both the panel data model and the cross­section models subjected to the merger and non­merger of two 
of the companies show that panel data produces more accurate estimates. 
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Academic (paper) Improving the econometric precision of regulatory models 
By Subal C. Kumbhakar and Alan P. Horncastle, 2010. 
Sector Water 
Description of approach 
The paper examines efficiency measurements issues, applied to the English and Welsh water and 
sewerage industry. It focuses on separating regulatory and environmental impacts from managerial 
inefficiency. 
The authors plot trends of capex allocated distortion, other expenditure allocative distortion and Labour 
input distortion. 
The dataset used covers the period from 1992/93 to 2004/05 for the ten Water and Sewerage 
Companies: 
• Four outputs variables : the total volume of delivered potable plus non potable water; the total 
number of household and non­household water service­connected properties; the total number 
of household and non­household sewerage service­connected properties; the physical amount of 
waste water. 
• Three inputs variables: labour, other operating expenditures and capital. 
• Other non controllable variables such as environmental variables were also included 
The authors use a two­stage DEA model to obtain measures of managerial inefficiency, separately from 
general noise and environmental impact. 
1. Measures of both technical and allocative efficiencies are calculated. 
2. Comparisons of the various operators not included; only minimum and average levels of 
efficiency are provided. 
128 
 
 
 
                    
               
        
 
     
                     
                                 
                             
                               
                           
                           
                     
                       
                  
                             
           
                             
                              
                             
         
                         
                 
 
Academic (paper) Performance Measurement in the Australian Water Supply Industry 
By T. Coelli and S. Walding, June 2005 
Sector Urban Water Businesses 
Description of approach 
Various government­owned businesses provide water supply services to Australian customers. Water 
pricing regulation is carried out by independent bodies in the each state or territory. A generalised CPI 
– X is represented in the paper as the type the regime adopted by regulators. 
The authors used panel data on the 18 largest Australian water services businesses, observed over an 
eight­year period from 1995/6 to 2002/3, to measure the relative efficiency and productivity growth 
of the Australian water businesses. They modelled this using a top­down approach, incorporating two 
output variables and two input variables – i.e. opex and capital. 
• Output variables: Number of properties connected and Volume of water delivered. 
• Input variables: Operating expenditure (OPEX) and Capital (CAP). 
The authors used historical data points in their modelling and a DEA methodology. The following 
indexes were calculated for each operator: 
• Malmquist TFP (an index that measures the TFP change between two data points by 
calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a common technology). 
• Both technical efficiency and scale efficiency indexes – an additional index was obtained from 
the product of these two. 
The authors also calculated: technical efficiency change (TEC); technical change (TC); TFP change 
(TFPC); and the potential X factors values. 
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Regulator (country)/ 
academic (paper) 
The Impact of Regulation on Cost Efficiency: An Empirical Analysis of 
Wisconsin Water Utilities. 
By C Aubert and A Reynaud, 2005 
Sector (i.e. Water, Gas, 
Electricity) 
Water Utilities in Wisconsin 
Description of approach 
The authors noted that firms were not all regulated in the same way in Wisconsin, stating that during the 
same year, some could be under a regime close to price cap, whereas others could be under another one 
closer to rate­of­return regulation: 
1. The regulated company could ask for a price in any given year. In this case the rate of return 
regime applies when determining whether to approve the request or no. 
2. The regulated company might have decided not to ask for a price increase. In this case the price 
cap in implementation in the previous year applies. 
The authors used a panel of 211 water utilities observed from 1998 to 2000 to show that their efficiency 
scores could be partly explained by the regulatory framework (price cap or rate of return). 
Efficiency levels, although not presented, are obtained by regressing the log of variable cost of each 
company on output produced and all variable input costs, using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). 
• The variable cost of the utility was the sum of expenses for labour, energy, chemicals, operation 
supplies and expenses and maintenance 
• Two outputs variable were used – the volume in thousands of gallons (Mgal) sold by the water 
utility to final customers and the number of customers served by the service 
• Three technical variables were used – dummies for water utilities that purchase water from 
another utility, those that use surface water, and the average depth of pumping wells. 
The mechanism in place could be considered deterministic in the sense that the regulated company was 
aware of the conditions set for each type of regulatory regime as mentioned above. The authors used 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis with a translog function. 
This is an empirical paper aiming to assess the impact of the regulatory environment on cost efficiency. 
However, in to order achieve this, calculating the of level efficiency of each firm are made but not 
presented – only means, medians of groups are included. Comparison between operators is therefore not 
included. 
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Table D.1: Selected applications in urban water utilities  
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     Source: Worthington (2010) 
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